A STUDY OF THE SELF CONCEPT OF
SĀṄKHYA YOGA PHILOSOPHY

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by

DR. FRANCIS V. CATALINA,
San Luis Obispo, California

with an introduction by

DR. FREDERIC SPIEGELBERG
Professor of Indian Thought, Stanford University, California.

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This book is dedicated
to
Marie

INTRODUCTION

by

DR. FREDERIC SPIEGELBERG
*Professor of Indian Thought, Stanford University, California
and of the C.G. Jung Institute, Zurich, Switzerland*

"MAN's prime interest is man." This first sentence of Catalina's book on Sāṅkhya-Philosophy, when viewed without the qualifying statements which follow in later chapters and clearly describe its meaning, presents a mighty challenge and one might be inclined to violently disagree with it. True, it appears today on the surface in materialistic society and in the accompanying philosophy of logical positivism, as if man were man's chief and only concern. Who is interested in nature as such and its beauties ? Who but a few monks today dares to show interest in metaphysics ?

But this all, surely, is only a surface impression. Man at all times and, subconsciously, also today, is primarily interested, even fascinated, by the great riddle of it all, by the mystery of Being, in all its aspects, in himself, and in all things. Since Brahman is a fact—or, rather, a metafact—man is bound to run headlong into it, in all his search and endeavours, whether it be theological, philosophical, scientific or artistic. Man, as any other being, surely does not live for his own sake, but for Brahman's sake. We and all things, after all, are only the shadow of a great light, which has more power and more Being, than anything else.

But since man has been created with the dreadful ability to forget about this truest of all facts, his endeavours appear mostly to be anything but worship. This may not be true sub

specie aeternitatis, but we live often under this impression. So it takes usually a long time, and much effort to discover the underneath-meaning of our doings. Seemingly we run after limited, minor values, when all at the same time these so-called values take their attraction, their worth, and their apparent being only from the Great Source. It is ultimately the Prime Mover who stands behind any of our desires and activities, though invisible to the uninitiate.

But if this state of forgetfulness is made a virtue of, as in much of today's Western Philosophy, one dreads to think what will finally be the result of such deliberate repression. If it is true that history tends to swing like a pendulum from one extreme to the other, we might be heading towards an era of unbridled emotionalism, without the redeeming counterweight of the intellect, since intellectualism in its extreme is about to go mad in its self-restriction and total denial of all that is behind the forbidden window of man's deeper meaning.

In India it has been Lokayata philosophy, which ages ago has presented us with a twisted caricature of man's search for meaning. Similar self-restricting tendencies may, at first glance, also be found in Sāṅkhya-Philosophy. In obvious reaction against Vedāntic exuberance here is the attempt to design a world-picture, not by starting with the light, but with the shadow of appearances. And the emphasis of this search is on psychology or, paraphrasing the first sentence of this book by altering the spelling of "man" the second time it occurs into "Man" with capital letter : "The prime interest of man is Man." in other words : by looking deeply enough at the very core of his Being, the psychologist too discovers necessarily the background of his and of all being.

Thus it comes to be that the search for the true Self, rather than to be an egotistic enterprise, becomes another form of metaphysics. This is what makes the research of this book so fascinating.

PREFACE

The antidote contained in the following quote[1] will serve to demonstrate the fundamental reason for the writer's appreciation of the living Indian cultural tradition.

> My Chinese friends, menaced by Communism, took refuge in Confucius, quoted classic sayings from the Han dynasty, or buried their bothered heads in the Church, which consoled them in a medium that was not quite their own, but was at least alive, real, and belonged to the twentieth century. My Indian friends, after discussing Communism in China and the East in general, moved on to the more congenial subject of the latest developments in European philosophy, literature, and art, and their relation to current Indian thought. My Chinese friends had arrived at a full stop of utter uncertainty, where for my Indian friends there was not even a comma.

There are a few other remarks that must be made that are pertinent to a better understanding of the intent and approach to the study. The basic assumption is that the ultimate goal of each individual man is to "know thy Self", and that the ways of doing this are necessarily as many as there are individuals.

In the course of describing the Sāṅkhya concept of the cosmological ground of the phenomenal universe, a number of comparisons have been made between the trinitary nature of prakṛti and contemporary concepts of the nature of matter. These comparisons gain in validity as one follows the development of nuclear physics. The different guṇa aspects of prakṛti are more specifically comparable to modern concepts as follows: the sattva guṇa is the cohesive organizing force that gives form to the fundamental quanta of matter, rajas guṇa is the dynamic

[1] Austin Coats, *Personal and Oriental* (New York, Harpers, 1957), 259 pp.

and static energy aspect of this primordeal particle, and mass or momentum is designated as the tamas guṇa. The concept of evolution of the phenomenal world of nature that results from the involution of the puruṣa is very similar to current cosmological theories on the development of the universe from an undifferentiated plenum to the present localized negative entropic states. There are other parallels, but these are sufficient, I believe, to demonstrate the pertinence of the Sāṅkhya concept of the matrices of the Self's involvement and evolvement.

The complimentary concepts of the self that are expressed by Sāṅkhya and Yoga philosophies are coming more to the fore in the thinking of more and more contemporary scholars In some cases because of the inevitable force of contemporary scientific evidence and in many others it is due to their exposure to the philosophies of the Orient. There are more who now feel that the study of non-Western traditions and philosophies to learn from them is more acceptible in academic areas. As a result the concept of the self as expressed in contemporary philosophy is becoming more akin to that of the Orient, and in fact many schools of psychology are now openly attempting to utilize the Yoga concept of the mind in the context of modern man's needs. It is hoped that the effort here will be of some help in furthering the process of integration of the best of the insights of the worlds thinkers without the artificial distinctions into Orient and Occident.

In acknowledging the help and encouragement of some specific people I do not wish to appear ungrateful to those I do not mention, because I am grateful and I know that they understand why their names do not appear here, for it require an unreasonably long listing. For the many opportunities of continuing dialogue that was afforded me by the professors and students at the American Academy of Asian Studies, my sincere gratitude. There are some that I must thank by name. They are J R. Mccullough, C.S. Lovedjeiff, M.G. Wilkenson, A.W. Watts, and H.R.H.P.P. Diskul. Not only do I owe my profoundest thanks to Professor Frederic Spiegelberg for the help he gave me as a student and his graciousness in making time in his busy schedule to write an introduction to my book, it is to him I owe my interest in Oriental Philosophy in general and Indian Philosophy in particular. Dr. Haridas Chaudhuri

has given so much of his time in reading and re-reading of the manuscript as it was being written as well as hours of discussion that my most heartfelt thanks cannot convey my deep appreciation of his patience and inspiration. There can be no question that the responsibility of the validity of the presentation and interpretation of the concepts in this study rest solely with the author. There is one person that had so much to do with the going of this study that words fail to indicate the depth of her inspiration and devotion. She displayed more patience than Job, more persuasive power than Demosthenes, and gave more encouragement and help than can ever be acknowledged. It is to my wife that this book is dedicated as a small gesture of my affection.

—*Francis V. Catalina.*

CONTENTS

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

MAN'S prime interest is man. This interest has been and still is the prime mover in all that man does. For no matter what his method, he is ultimately seeking to solve the riddle of himself. It is imperative that he obtains this information so that he may be better able to direct himself in the fulfillment of his being.

Thus, it is the connate objective of all men, in their own diverse ways, to seek the essence, the 'ding an sich,' that which makes man man. In this search many efforts have been and are still being made. Each individual feels that his is the correct method,and so far as he does, he directs his devotion with more or less fervour. So some men can be seen dismembering the bodies of the deceased down to the minutest cell, others testing and compounding chemicals and elements, while others seek the solution of the why and wherefore of the human machine in other actions of nature. These different attempts towards man's understanding of himself are termed objective sciences. Each of these have taken certain basic prosuppositions as valid truths and are endeavouring to extricate the essence of the microcosm by assembling mountains of statistics that are purported to give the macrocosm in outline. Efforts have been made to comprehend these particular studies under one discipline, that discipline being philosophy. It is the task of this highest science of sciences to view all the disparate efforts and strive to understand and coordinate them into a meaningful whole so that man can know his being and thus his value.

Philosophy, too, has taken up the problem of the meaning of man. Unfortunately, this field has succumbed to the same evil

which it was supposed to overcome, that is, it has become dissipated into innumerable squabbles over the dissection of and the proper method of ideation. One of these lines of endeavour has been directed at the problem of individuality; the question of what makes one man different from another man, or are they no more than just so many units of animated protoplasm ? It can be seen that these are merely restatements of the basic problem of man. Many ideas have been expressed as answers and as many different statements of this crucial problem have been propounded. This is to be found in any culture which has developed philosophically, in fact, this is part and parcel of the cultural and philosophical growth of any society.

Man in his effort to find enlightenment has sought 'The Truth.' His search must not turn back because of the unfamiliar terrain encountered. As in the past, men are turned back and frustrated, not by 'The Truth,' but by his conception of what that truth is. He is constantly haunted by the fear that the golden light which he has been pursuing might in reality be a will-o-the-wisp. The comfort of the old philosophy makes it difficult to consider and examine an alien system of thought. Pride is by far the greatest stumbling block to the acceptance of the possibility that the goal of true knowledge and wisdom might be found outside the cultural realm of his own birth and growth.

This exclusive inclusiveness has been and still is in practice throughout the world. Western man has been a victim of this quandary to a greater extent than he is willing to admit. Isolation of the universal is an incongruity, and so long as men insist that they have the patent on the proper approach to infinity, so long will the path lead nowhere but deeper into the infinite maze of the finite. The finitude of the manifested world does not guarantee its comprehension by finite minds. Many efforts in this direction are being made, and so far apparently, succeeding only in building up an infinite mountain of statistical materials. On the other hand, some new insights into the infinite have been made by Western minds due to the influence of Oriental methods of subjective introspection.

With the world situation as it is, the interest in the Orient and its peoples are coming to the fore. The feeling is that the Occident must strive to understand the people on the other

side of the globe for mutual survival. In order to do this one must either visit the area and talk with the people, or read reports of others on the culture and customs that are prevalent in these Asiatic countries.

Basic to an understanding of these cultures is an acquaintance with their philosophy and its manifestations in the religion and customs of these people. Most of the reports of these aspects of the Oriental cultures have been done by people who were trying to study these 'semi-civilized natives' of a subjected country, not so much for the value of understanding the points of view of the people as for finding a method of Christianizing them or better securing their rule over them. The aim here is to try to understand these people and their culture so that a better relationship can be achieved and for the values which these studies can give. This does not mean that the learning process should be a one way matter. Both Occidental and Oriental should make a strenuous effort at understanding each other's ideals and efforts at implementing them. Each must be willing and eager to learn, accepting what is good from others and rejecting what is not good from his own background. No culture has a monopoly on intellectual achievement, some only shine more in one area of human endeavour than in another.

Generally, in Western academic and cultural circles, those who study Oriental cultures and philosophies are considered as either occultist quacks or aspiring Christian missionaries. A more enlightened view is gaining headway, but it is not by any means fully appreciated. One of the basic philosophical concepts of the Orient that has been much maligned is that of the individual and his value.

The majority of Asians are non-Christian and in fact are not in the tradition of Judeo-Hebraic religious philosophy. This puts the Jews, Christians, and Moslems into a group which tends to regard all other groups as pagan. Approximately half the world's population adheres to beliefs which have their roots sunk deep in the philosophical and religious speculation of the wise men of India. Not only does Hinduism, Buddhism, and Sufism owe their teachings in total or in part to the utterances of these sages, but a larger portion of the Western tradition than is admitted has its foundations in these speculations. Thus, in order to have more of an understanding of

these systems and to better know Western thought, it is necessary to strive to understand the principles of these philosophical systems.

I. OBJECTIVE OF STUDY

In order that a fuller understanding of the Hindu, Buddhist, and other associated philosophical-religious groups may be better approached, the fundamental philosophic concepts of these systems must be thoroughly examined and assimilated. This having been accomplished, their influences and ramifications in other areas, and in diverse cultural movements can be more readily traced. The advantages of this will be, among others, the fuller and more integrated view of not only these other systems, but of both cultural heritages and thus an improved chance for international expression of brotherly love for all fellow beings. On a more personal level, this enlargement of our individual perspective will enable us to direct our efforts toward gaining of the ultimately and necessarily more peaceful world if mankind is to survive. Even more subjectively, the possibility of our fully expressing and finding our individual selves will be immensely aided.

Since the prime interest here is with the intrinsic value of man, and in view of the accepted necessity of the enlargement of the individual perspective, this study shall be directed toward a better comprehension of the Indian efforts at elucidating the concept of the essential individual. The hoped-for benefits of this attempt are first, a more thorough understanding of the concept of the true self and of the personal worth of the individual, and secondly, as a possible foundation for the enlargement of the neighbourhood society to the inclusion of all peoples, thus putting into practice the concept of universal love as taught by all enlightened ethical systems of the world. This investigation is primarily concerned with the Sāṅkhya-Yoga concept of the individual as incompassed within the concept puruṣa. It is hoped that this will show that far from having no personal value, the individual has been most consistently the prime concern of the philosophers of India.

It is contended here that the ultimate objective of most systems of philosophy is, in the last analysis, the same. That objective seems to be the leading of the 'Good Life.' All of these studies of the philosophies of this area will be directed to the effort of demonstrating the universals which are to be found in all systems. For it is felt that most disagreements are only in degree and more apparent than real.

Further, this investigator feels that any study or human endeavour must have value to man if it is to be of any consequence. The prime concern in this study is the definition of the self in the Socratic sense of 'know thy self.'

It must be remembered that we are here discussing philosophy and not practices that are in current social usage. Too often in the past the best of the West has been held up to the worst in the East. Comparisons cannot rightfully be made between Plato, Christ, Kant, or Russell and such fanatics of Christian society such as the snake cults, the witch hunters, and the Doukhobors. Yet, this is done in considerations of non-Christian cultures. If comparisons are to be made, they must be made on the same level; the best with the best and not the best with the worst unless the latter comparison is made within the same society.

The area in which the writer plans to make his life work is philosophy, and he feels that philosophy cannot be regarded as a sectional or provincial field of human endeavour. In line with this, thought and effort have been made to understand some of the philosophical systems which are not the direct basis of Western cultural heritage. Some time has been spent in the study of the philosophical systems of India. This is directly due to a basic philosophy of cultural integration and amalgamation, and in an effort to implement this concept the present paper has been undertaken.

II. SCOPE OF THE STUDY

A brief historical review of the place and development of the Sāṅkhya and Yoga systems in the philosophies of India will be dealt with in the first section of the dissertation. Evidences will be cited which will show that the roots of philosophic thought which emerged from the ancient literature of India extend back into time prior to the historic Aryan immigration into the valley of the Indus. Some of the effects of the Aryan invasion and their subsequent amalgamation with the indigenous peoples

and culture will be discussed. The strength and vigour of this marriage is indicated by the tremendous cultural and philosophic growth which followed. Among the intellectual children are the philosophic systems of Nyaya, Vaiśeṣika, Mīmāṁsā, Buddhism, Vedānta, Sāṅkhya, and Yoga. After the historical background of the Sāṅkhya and Yoga schools is presented, there will be a brief survey of their founders and of the main literature of each. The relationship of these two systems and that of the other schools of philosophy will conclude the discussion of the historical background of their position in Indian Philosophy.

Following the historical background will be a chapter dealing with some of the basic concepts of Sāṅkhya-Yoga. First, the name of Sāṅkhya is discussed and some of the general attitudes about this system. The theory of causation, satkārya-vāda, is examined and its logic followed to its conclusions regarding the ultimate source and matrix of all worldly phenomena, prakṛti. The composition of prakṛti is presented and the characteristics of its ultimate constituent units, the guṇas, are studied. Then the theory of pralaya or homostasis is discussed and how the prakṛti with its guṇas evolves the world, both the psychical and the physical. The chapter is concluded with a description of the epistemological theories of the Sāṅkhya.

Chapter four deals with the relationship of the Sāṅkhya and Yoga philosophies. Reasons are cited for regarding the two systems as two complementary but distinctly separate systems despite their extreme similarity. The major factor is the difference in the point of emphasis. Sāṅkhya uses logic and intellectual effort to find the universals, while Yoga approaches the problem of attainment on the personal level of application.

Using the previous chapters as background, the self-concept of the complementary systems of Sāṅkhya and Yoga forms the topic of the next chapter. Here the five arguments for the existence of the non-substantial aspect of man is presented along with the reasoning concerning the multiplicity of puruṣas. There is a slight diversion in the discussion of the Scholastic concept of the soul and the Sāṅkhya concept of the linga-śarīra. This diversion leads into the description, in so far as is possible, of the puruṣa. Since the puruṣa and the prakṛti are defined in terms which make them mutually exclusive, the problem of the

relationship of these two disparate existences is explained. Once the relationship is properly defined, the method of attaining release is given through a discussion of the Sāṅkhya-Yoga psychology.

The next area of discussion is that of the self-concept of several representative Western philosophers. The systems of the particular philosophy is presented in so far as is necessary to make the particular self concept clear. It will be seen that the only Western philosophers which had self concepts which are similar to that of the Sāṅkhya-Yoga are the more ancient ones. The dilemma which was given to the Western world by Descartes is examined and followed to its present development in the two major contemporary Western schools. Essentially the dilemma of Descartes is still a very thorny problem for the West, whereas the dilemma does not exist for the Sāṅkhya-Yoga, and in fact, it is not a problem for any of the other current Indian philosophies.

Lastly, the dissertation is summarized and discussed and the conclusions concerning the Sāṅkhya and Yoga self concept and those of the West are drawn. The fallacy or the illusion of the absolute distinction of mind and matter is pointed out. The evidences of present day efforts in both the physical and psychological sciences are cited to show how accurate the philosophies of the Sāṅkhya-Yoga are today.

CHAPTER II

THE HISTORICAL POSITION OF SĀṄKHYA AND YOGA

As with any philosophic system, one can find rudiments of the ideas expressed in the antecedent philosophic endeavours. This in no way reduces the value or importance of the restatement of these ideas in what the particular philosopher believes is a more universal system leading to the living of the good life. Each new system is the amalgamation of all the diverse ideas and learnings that the author has experienced. Sāṅkhya is also an integration of many concepts, some of which can be found in the Vedas and Upaniṣads, but the Sāṅkhya is the result of more than just the Aryan influence. A changed mode of thought can already be seen in the Upaniṣads, and Kapila's rendering of these thoughts makes this more emphatic.

Many of the ideas correlated and systematized in Saṅkhya can be found distributed throughout the Upaniṣads. These ideas became more prominent in the latter Upaniṣads. It must be remembered that the latter Upaniṣads were composed contemporarily and following the time of Kapila.[1] Further, the Aryan invasion was not into an area devoid of any culture. The findings of archaeologists at Hārāppā and Mohenjodāro as well as other sites indicate the invading nomads found a very high culture, or at least the remnants of it. From the research findings "at Mohenjodāro it seemed clear that the civilization that had survived so long was already effete and on the wane when the raiders came, and at Hārāppā we know from evidence

[1] Paul Masson-Oursel, Helena Willman-Grabowska, Philippe Stern, *Ancient India and Indian Civilization* (London, Routledge and Kegan Paul Ltd., 1951), p. 201.

of the rebuilding of the citadel walls that the inhabitants were on the defensive in the last days of the city."[2] Further indications from the Valley of the Ganges suggest that as the raiders made further intrusions, there was "a spread of techniques and peoples eastward from the old Hārāppā kingdom as danger threatened from the west."[3] From the literature and artifacts that have survived the age, it seems that "all these migrations of peoples came at a time when there is a breaking-up of the ancient Western Asiatic civilizations and the introduction into the old strongholds of civility, of new blood, new ideas, and even perhaps new techniques, such as the use of the horse-drawn chariot in warfare."[4]

Whenever a nation conquers another higher culture, it does so because, among other reasons, it admires and desires the benefits of that culture. Hence, the barbarians physically conquer the peoples and unconsciously begin to absorb the benefits of their artifacts. Without realizing it, they also assimilate the philosophy behind the actuality of the culture. From this assimilation and mixing of the intruders and people of the settled civilizations, there begins to arise in various places an admixture, and stratification begins to produce a co-mingling reducing variance so that "the barbarians imperceptibly assimilated the traditions of the civilization they had despised yet prized; they had conquered only to be themselves conquered at last by its persuasive and subtle power."[5] Today in India, symbols and items of religious art and practices can be seen which are replicas of some of the articles found in the archeological searches of the ancient and pre-aryan cities. Zimmer cites several evidences of continuity, such as the forms of ox carts, of tools, the art of domesticating elephants, and the many bathing places that are comparable to those found in Mohenjodāro. Zimmer further states :

> Conspicuous among the Indus Valley religious symbols is the phallus—to this day the most common object of worship in the sanctuaries of Hinduism, where it

[2] Stuart Piggott, *Prehistoric India* (Middlesex, Penguin Books, 1952), p. 239.

[3] *Loc. cit.*

[4] *Ibid.*, p. 241.

[5] *Loc. cit.*

> represents the generative male energy of the universe, and is symbolic of the great god Shiva. Furthermore, the complement to the male symbol, in Mohenjodāro as well as in Modern India, is our goddess with the lotus in her hair.[6]

He also points out that the Mother goddess of the world is not mentioned in the Aryan literature as such, but is attached to the main body of the Rig Veda as a "late and apocryphal hymn."[7] Zimmer finds that:

> It is extremely interesting to observe that among the few remains surviving to us from the Indus Civilization—coming down through a corridor of some six thousand years as echoes of a religiosity antedating the arrival of the Vedic Aryans, an antique religiosity, old as the pyramids of the Nile—the two aspects of the God are already revealed. Figure 42 shows a little faience plaque from Mohenjo-Dāro, on which is engraved a horned deity, seated like a yogi with his heels pressed close together, naked, having three faces, and with phallus erect. The personage wears many bracelets on his arms and a great fan-shaped headdress—perhaps the latter is the piled up, matted hair. He is seated on a little throne or altar, and is surrounded by two antelopes, an elephant, a tiger, a rhinoceros, and a buffalo. (The glyphs along the upper margin cannot be deciphered). The figure resembles nothing so much as Shiva-Pashupati, "The Lord of Beasts."[8]

Another figure, a torso from Hārāppā, because of the position of the base of the extremities, resembles the "posture of dance. In fact, there is every reason to believe that this archaic torso represents a dancer, not very different in form from those of the much later Natarāja type."[9]

Historically in the literature of India, the efforts of the Aryans to dominate the enslaved peoples can be traced. One of the devices for doing this was the absorption of the gods

[6] Heinrich Zimmer, *Myths and Symbols in Indian Art and Civilization* (New York, Pantheon Books, 1947), p. 95,

[7] *Ibid.*, p. 96.

[8] *Ibid.*, p. 168.

Ibid., p. 169.

of the indigene religion into their own pantheon, but in a subordinate position in relation to the gods they had brought with them through the gap in the Himalayas. But gradually there occurs a "resurgence of the earlier Indian forms, and their definitive reassumption of power with the triumph of Vishnu, Shiva, and the Goddess over Indra, Brahmā, and their entourage."[10] This absorption of the intruding culture by the supposedly destroyed civilization is not new apparently, and is evidently still a present day phenomenon.

Scholars have enough information concerning the life of ancient Greece to recognize strains other than the Indo-European in the structure of Greek life and thought. A more recent example of this amalgamation process is contained in the history of the Roman conquest of the Greeks, who in turn conquered them culturally. Some of it is going on right now. The great influx of Oriental art and commercial goods into our markets, and the stimulation of interest and thought are a few examples of a present day movement in that direction. It is not meant to indicate that the conquering power has nothing to contribute, but rather the amalgamation of the cultures usually produces a new and greater culture. The West can contribute a large amount of technological knowledge while learning what to do with the advantage gained thereby.

Sāṅkhya, as "the first of the six schools of Indian Philosophy"[11] represents, in the opinion of the writer, the beginning of the "golden age" of Indian Philosophy. This does not say that the coalesced civilizations had not produced anything before this. This is the beginning of the sum of the parts of the cultures to exceed the total of these parts. The rudiments of Sāṅkhya and any other philosophy which are found in the Upaniṣads, of course, represent the intellectual field of battle on which the cultural heritage of the invaders and the invaded met. The vanquished and the vanquisher both are different from the original combatants by virtue of having engaged in the conflict, if nothing else. Changes in style as well as content of the literature of India amply show this.

[10] *Loc. cit.*

[11] Ram Chandra Bose, *Hindu Philosophy* (New York, Funk and Wagnalls, 1884), p. 96.

The most outstanding concept introduced to the Aryan mind is that of the unending cycle of rebirth in man, and all that it implied. Immortality became something to be escaped, not something to be sought after. The concept of immortality the Aryan brought with him from his home beyond the Kyber Pass was very nearly the same as that of the Homeric Greeks. "All that the Rigveda wanted was that the pious man should live out his full life without premature death. After life the dead were received into abodes which were too indeterminate to be called either heavens or hells."[12] This attitude of both these Aryan groups was due to the belief that "all that made a man a man and life worth living was bound up with the body."[13] The gods of these people, Greek and Indian Aryan, were, "glorified men : gay, lustful, brawling heroes,"[14] who exemplified the ideal of nomadic warrior tribes. As these people settled and life became more sedate, because of less frequent wars and more abundant food, they began to have time to do more thinking and to produce new hymns for the Rigveda. With the result these new hymns became more concerned with morality and "the belief in the existence of another world, where the highest material joys are attained as a result of the performance of the sacrifices and also in a hell of darkness underneath where the evil-doers are punished."[15] But there was no desire to seek release from the wheel of saṁsāra, in fact they had no concept of Karma and saṁsāra. The ideal desired was the exact opposite of that sought in the effort to escape from the round of saṁsāra. In the oldest Vedas we find prayers seeking immortality in the heavens with the gods. In a Rig-Vedic hymn to Varuṇa the prayer ends with a plea for riches and immortality.

> This gentle lord gives wisdom to the simple :
> the wiser god leads on the wiser to riches.
> O lord, O Varuṇa, may this laudation come close
> to thee and lie within thy spirit.

[12] Paul Masson-Oursel, *op. cit.*, p. 135.

[13] B.A.G. Fuller, *A History of Philosophy* (New York, Henry Holt & Co., 1945), p. 20.

[14] Lewis Browne, *This Believing World*, (New York, The Macmillan Co., 1930), p. 91.

[15] Surendranath Dasgupta, *A History of Indian Philosophy* (Cambridge, at the University Press, 1951), Vol. I, p. 25.

> May it be well with us in rest and labour. Preserve us evermore, ye gods, with blessings.[16]

As the amalgamation proceeds, the desirability of immortality fades. Crass immortality is no longer a prize to be sought, but one to be shunned, for the heavens and hells are also in the wheel of saṁsāra. The immortality they had previously sought became a chain fastening them to the treadmill of saṁsāra.

As the period of the emergence of the philosophic system of Kapila is approached, it is found that certain premises (which are alien to the literature of the original migratory nomads that streamed into India by way of the great northern gateway) have been accepted.

The Aryans came into India and found an advanced civilization. After conquering these peoples, the Aryans adapted their lives to the use of the artifacts of the enslaved peoples. Through contact with the artisans and the use of native household servants, the indigenous philosophy began to be integrated into their own thinking. Thus, the Rig-Vedic religion became Brahmanism by degrees. This merged into the period of the Upaniṣads and gave birth to the philosophies of Sāṅkhya and Yoga as systems. Following these came the development of all philosophies now current in India and throughout most of the Orient. The cultural integration is still going on. The East, unlike the West, is more receptive to the opportunity to incorporate and improve its philosophical understanding. The West is beginning to make use of this opportunity also.

I. SĀṄKHYA AND KAPILA

In the preceding, pages the name of Kapila has been mentioned in connection with Sāṅkhya. Kapila seems to have undisputed claim to the authorship of the Sāṅkhya system. Who he was is a very confused issue, for little if anything is known about him. He probably lived in the century before Buddha's life and teaching. According to tradition, Kapila's father was a Ṛṣi (inspired sage) by the name of Kardama, and his mother was called Devahūti. "Kapila is believed to have learned the rudiments of

[16] Robert O. Ballou, Editor, *The Bible of the World* (New York, The Viking Press, 1939), p. 14.

philosophy and the nature of the soul from his mother."[17] There is a carving in the cave temple of Anuradhapura in Ceylon which is purported to be a likeness of Kapila. He passed the latter part of his life on Sāgara island, located in the mouth of the Ganges River about ninety miles from Calcutta. Every year thousands of devoted people visit this island on the last day of the Indian month of Māgha (January-February). In this pilgrimage and through worship, Kapila's memory has become a tradition. The scholars may be confused and have doubts about the facts of Kapila's life, or even doubt his ever having existed, but to many Indians he is worshipped as a great sage and philosopher.

Kapila is ultimately to be regarded only as a symbol embodying the philosophic principles of the Sāṅkhya system. In this regard, the Indians feel that the teaching is of the utmost importance rather than the individual who propounds these truths. This candour of India is due to the concept of the phenomenal being as a momentary mode of expression of the Truths of Infinity. It can also be pointed out that the concept of time as cyclic rather than linear has a great deal of influence on the historical sensitivity of philosophic thought in India. Western scholars have been baffled and dismayed by this lack of concern for the past in respect to personalities of great men.

Mythical or otherwise, Kapila is accepted as the founder of the Sāṅkhya system. It is not claimed that everything in his philosophic teachings were original with him. "No work of his, if he ever committed his system to writing, has been preserved."[18] "There is no evidence to show that the Sāṁkhyapravacana Sūtra and the Tattvasamāsa generally attributed to Kapila were composed by him."[19] The Sāṅkhya-kārikā of Īśvarakṛṣṇa is "the oldest systematic manual which has been preserved. As it was translated into Chinese between 557 and 583 A.D., it cannot belong to a later century than the fifth, and may be still

[17] Theos Bernard, *Hindu Philosophy* (New York, Philosophical Library, 1947), p. 66.

[18] Arthur A. Macdonell, *A History of Sanskrit Literature* (Delhi, Munshiram Manoharlal, 1960), p. 393.

[19] S. Radhakrishnan, *Indian Philosophy* (London, George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1948), Vol. II, p. 254.

older."[20] The Sāṅkhya-Kārikā is regarded as "the earliest available as well as the most popular textbook of the school. From its name it is clear that it is not the first work of the system."[21] Īśvarakṛṣṇa claims to be in a direct line of succession from Kapila through Āsuri and Pañcaśikha. Āsuri has been placed before 600 B. C. by some scholars, while Pañcaśikha is thought to have lived during the first century A.D.

Thus we have evidence of a continuing tradition extending beyond twenty-five hundred years. During the course of this time some of the followers of Kapila wrote works and commentaries, but most of these were lost to us, and there is but little information about their contents.

Other than Īśvarakṛṣṇa's Sāṅkhya-kārikā, which "claims to be merely a condensation of an earlier text called Ṣaṣṭitantra,"[22] some of the other available works are Gauḍapād's Bhāṣya (8th century A.D.), Vācaspati Miśra's Sāṁkhyatattvakaumudī (9th century A.D.), and based upon this is Nārāyaṇatīrtha's Sāṁkhya-candrikā. In the 15th century, Aniruddha wrote the Sāṁkhyavṛtti and Mahādeva's Sāṁkhyavṛttsāra is placed about 1600 A.D. By far the most important work done by Vijñānabhikṣu is his Sāṁkhya-pravacanabhāṣya. This sixteenth century scholar also produced the Sāṁkhyasāra, Yogavārttika, Yogasarasamgraha, and a commentary on the Brahma Sūtra called Vijñānāmṛta. In modern times, of course, there have been more works produced on the Sāṅkhya philosophy, but all are based upon the above literature.

II. YOGA AND PATAÑJALI

Historically, Yoga as a practice is more ancient than is the literature known by that name. This statement is quite generally accepted by the scholars of Indian philosophy. The physical practice of yoga is evident from the Mohenjodāro plaque described above by Zimmer as resembling "nothing so much as Shiva-Pashupati,"[23] who is still regarded as "the Divine Yogī,

[20] Macdonell, *loc. cit.*

[21] Radhakrishnan, *loc. cit.*

[22] Bernard, *op. cit.*, p. 82.

[23] Zimmer, *loc. cit.*, p. 168.

the model and archascetic of the gods."[24] The historical background of India is very well put by Radhakrishnan:

> The great river of Hindu life, usually serene but not without its rapids, reaches back so far that only a long view can do justice to its nature. From prehistoric times influences have been at work moulding the faith. As a result of the excavations in Harappa and Mohenjodāro we have evidence of the presence in India of a highly developed culture that must have had a long antecedent history on the soil of India, taking us back to an age that can only be dimly surmised. In age and achievement the Indus-valley civilization is comparable to that of Egypt or Sumeria. The noteworthy feature of this civilization is its continuity, not as a political power but as a cultural influence. The religion of the Indus people is hardly distinguishable, according to Sir John Marshall, from that aspect of Hinduism which is bound up with animism and the cults of Siva and the Mother Goddess. These latter do not seem to be indigenous to the Vedic religion.[25]

He further states that "the religion, in the first literary records that have come down to us, is that of the Āryans, though it was much influenced by the Indus people, the Dravidians, and the aborigines".[26] The word Yoga appears in the Rig-Veda primarily in a sense of "achieving the unachieved, a connection and the like,"[27] and less frequently in the sense of yoking or harnessing. As there is a growth in the ideas of aceticism (tapas) and self-control:

> The force of the flying passions was felt to be as uncontrollable as that of a spirited steed, and thus the word yoga which was originally applied to the control of steeds, began to be applied to the control of the senses.[28]

[24] *Ibid.*, p. 115.
[25] G.T. Garratt, *The Legacy of India*, (Oxford, at the Clarendon Press, 1951), p. 257.
[26] *Ibid.*, p. 258.
[27] Dasgupta, *loc. cit.*, p. 226.
[28] *Loc. cit.*

"The science of breath had attracted notice in many of the earlier upanisads, though there had not probably developed any systematic form of prāṇāyāma (a system of breath control) of the Yoga system."[29] It is not until the "Maitrāyaṇī that we find the Yoga method had attained a systematic development."[30] From the above evidence it appears that not only has the Yogic practices been a part of man's culture for thousands of years, but that he has always responded to an inner urge toward communication with the Supreme Being. These Yogic practices have undergone many alterations and adjustments to the new cultures, which, each in their turn, were absorbed unto the present. The point here is that Yoga and its philosophy is not purely of Aryan origin.

> Of the Patañjala school of Sāṁkhya, which forms the subject of the Yoga with which we are now dealing, Patañjali was probably the most notable person for he not only collected the different forms of Yoga practices, and gleaned the diverse ideas which were or could be associated with the Yoga, but grafted them all on the Sāṁkhya metaphysics, and gave them the form in which they have been handed down to us.[31]

Patañjali is regarded and he so indicates that he is the compiler of the Yoga system into the Yoga Sūtra.[32] For he is considered by the two great commentators on the Vyāsabhāsya, Vacāspati and Vijñāna, "not the founder of Yoga but an editor."[33] A critical study of the sūtras will show that they "do not show any original attempt, but a masterly and systematic compilation which was also supplemented by fitting contributions."[34] In the Yoga sūtra, the first three chapters are composed in such a systematic form defining and classifying already existent materials, that it shows Patañjali only systematized them. Another factor is the lack of missionary zeal which is indicative of his recording a pre-existent system.

[29] *Ibid.*, p. 227.
[30] *Loc. cit.*
[31] *Ibid.*, p. 229.
[32] Radhakrishnan, *op. cit.*, p. 341.
[33] Dasgupta, *loc. cit.*
[34] *Loc. cit.*

From the above statements it is readily seen that Patañjali does not display as much originality in his Yoga sūtra as Kapila does in his Sāṅkhya sūtra.

A good deal of disagreement is found in the matter of the identity of Patañjali. There are three Patañjalis in the literature of India. One a medical writer, another a grammarian, and of course Patañjali of the Yoga sūtra. Patañjali is not regarded as being a mythical being. The difficulty arises from the confusion of these authors of the three areas of literature. All three authors are regarded by some as the one and same person, others make the identity of the grammarian the author of the Yoga sūtras, and others regard the medical writer as the author of the Yoga sūtras. In the writings of Dasgupta the evidence is "against the identification of the two Patañjalis by some Yoga and medical commentators of a later age."[35] He concludes in respect to the other two:

> I am disposed to think that the date of the first three chapters of the Yoga sūtras must be placed about the second century B.C. Since there is no evidence which can stand in the way of identifying the grammarian Patañjali with the Yoga writer, I believe we may take them as being identical.[36]

Further argument could be cited both for and against the above conclusions.

Other than the Yoga sūtra of Patañjali which is the oldest text book on the Yoga philosophy there are the Bhāṣya on the Yoga sūtra of Vyāsa (fourth century A.D.); the glossary on Vyāsa's Bhāṣya called tattvavai-śāradī (ninth century); Bhoja's Rājamārtānda, and the Yogasārasaṁgraha of Vijñānabhikṣu. The Maitrāyana, Sāndilya, Yogatattva, Dhyānabindu, Haṁsa, and Nābabindu are some of the later Upaniṣads which assign much importance to the Yoga principles. These are the major sources of our knowledge of the Yoga system. The Yogasūtra is the basis of the system, and the others are elaborations and clarifications.

[35] *Ibid.*, p. 231.
[36] *Ibid.*, p. 238.

III. SĀṄKHYA AND YOGA

Chronologically, the philosophy of Sāṅkhya as a system precedes that of Yoga. In the main, the two systems are very much alike. However, there are some significant differences which warrant our calling Yoga a separate system of philosophy. The metaphysical position of the two is fundamentally the same, but they differ in their views of ethical, practical, and philosophical concepts.

Dasgupta makes the point that the Sāṅkhya and Yoga philosophies have gone through a number of modifications since their compilation. He further indicates that Patañjali used the common source of the ideas found in Sāṅkhya rather than deriving all the common concepts from Sāṅkhya. At any rate, the Yoga system of Patañjali, which calls itself an exposition of Sāṅkhya, is an amalgamation of the common metaphysical concepts of Sāṅkhya with all the different forms of practice and diverse ideas concerning Yoga that he could collect. Dasgupta says that an analytical study of the Yoga sūtras will bring "conviction that they do not show any original attempt but are a masterly and systematic compilation, supplemented with certain original contributions."[37]

Ram Chandra Bose opens his chapter on the Yoga philosophy by saying that it "is the counterpart of the Sāṅkhya system, and begins where the other ends."[38] He further states that the Sāṅkhya gives us the goal but that Yoga shows how we can attain this goal. This investigator finds with Bose that "the Yoga philosophy may properly be represented as the counterpart, not only of the Sāṅkhya system, but of almost every other system of Indian philosophy, theistic, atheistic, and pantheistic,"[39] and to this should be added panentheistic. Yoga philosophy is the practical approach to the goal of almost every system of philosophy in India—with variations to accommodate the particular philosophy with which it is being used.

It can readily be seen from the foregoing that the systems of Sāṅkhya and Yoga are of fundamental importance in the

[37] S.N. Dasgupta, *Yoga Philosophy in Relationship to other Systems of Indian Thought* (Calcutta, University of Calcutta, 1930), p. 51.
[38] Bose, *op. cit.*, p. 157.
[39] *Loc. cit.*

understanding of Indian philosophy in general. This includes all the systems, orthodox or heterodox; that are now in India or have migrated to other lands. Most of the systems now existent in Indian thought developed upon their antecedents, in all probability around the beginning of the Christian era. Since Sāṅkhya and Yoga are the antecedents, it is contingent on the student of Indian philosophy to understand these two systems so that he will be able to follow the reasoning of the latter arguments and expositions. Since the current systems evolved during the present era, they are not only interrelated in time but also in subject matter. The approach exemplified in the Sāṅkhya and Yoga philosophies has served as the model of many subsequent intellectual production. However, since they were expounded by contemporaries, they often enlisted the logic of the arguments of their opponents either to support their contentions or anticipated the possible objections to their own structure and presented evidences to thwart these possible rejoiners. Thus as with the study of present day philosophic development, it is often necessary to undertake the study of more than one system in order to comprehend the one which is of immediate interest. With these thoughts in mind, the Sāṅkhya and Yoga philosophies will be examined in relationship to one another with special reference to their concepts of the self. An understanding of these ancient philosophies would be particularly valuable as a guide to the understanding of the present philosophies of modern India, and can be of assistance in the understanding of contemporary Western philosophies.

Pre-dating Sāṅkhya and Yoga as formal systems are two doctrines which are still functional in the philosophies of present day India. The two are mukti and karma. These two, with their necessary corollary concepts, form a basis for doctrinal continuity among the different systems now current. "These doctrines are regarded so cardinal and inviolable that there was hardly any voice in India that protested against them."[40] Even with this general agreement in regard to these two doctrines, there are a great many divergences in greater or lesser degree which resulted from the natural development of the particular philosophy in line with its own specific premises. The six orthodox systems

[40] Dasgupta, *Yoga Philosophy*, *op. cit.*, p. 10.

all fit into the above description, and also the so-called heterodox schools of thought. The mark of orthodoxy is not the belief in God but the acceptance of the authority of the Vedas. The terms which describe these two concepts have altered their meaning. Originally, the words āstika and nāstika meant a believer and a disbeliever of the Vedas. Today it is taken to mean respectively theistic and atheistic. Another meaning that it formerly had was that of a believer in immortality, and with this interpretation all the Indian schools of philosophy (except that of the Cārvākas, the materialists) would be included. Sāṅkhya and Yoga are āstika in both of the old meanings of the word. In reality, it seems that Kapila remained silent as did the Buddha in respect to the concept of God. He felt that the existence or non-existence of God could not be proved or disproved, and thus beyond his system of philosophy. Patañjali makes only a mild reference to God in four aphorisms of book one. In aphorism twenty three he says "Or by profound devotedness toward the Lord, (the ascetic may attain the state of abstract meditation)."[41] The individual student can choose to concentrate on any single object, and if he so chose, it may be Īśvara who is described in aphorism twenty four as being. "A particular Spirit (Puruṣa) untouched by troubles, works, fruits, or deserts."[42] The object of concentration is not as important as the intensity of effort. The difference between Sāṅkhya and Yoga does not appear to be crucial on this point. It is contended that Sāṅkhya does not deny the existence of God. All that is denied is that "It is not established (that there is an eternal Lord); because there is no evidence of it."[43] The evidence that appears to be denied are the three kinds of proof which Sāṅkhya admits; perception, inference, and testimony. Sāṅkhya denies the existence of evidence of Īṣvara, and is non-committal about Īṣvara's existence or non-existence. It is up to the student of Sāṅkhya or Yoga to decide for himself, and thus in the contemporary meaning, make these systems āstika or nāstika, theistic or atheistic respectively. Atheism does not necessarily

[41] Tookaram Tatya, *The Yoga Philosophy* (Bombay, the Subodha-Prakash Press, 1885), p. 22.

[42] *Loc. cit.*

[43] James R. Ballantyne, *The Sāṅkhya Aphorisms of Kapila* (London, Trübner & Co., 1885), p. 319.

mean a denial of God although it is usually so regarded. It also means the belief in a non-personal God.

Sāṅkhya and Yoga are generally regarded to be alike in their doctrines of cosmology, physiology, psychology, and the emancipation as the goal of life attainable by a clear distinction between matter and spirit. They are usually considered different on the matters of atheism and theism and the approach for attaining knowledge of the distinction between puruṣa and prakṛti. According to Richard Garbe in his article in Hasting Encyclopedia of Religion and Ethics, Yoga has become "more personalistic in more recent literature."[44] An examination of the fundamental doctrines of these systems is essential to an understanding of their Self concept.

[44] R. Garbe, "Yoga" *Hastings Encyclopedia of Religion and Ethics* 1st. edition, XII, p. 831.

CHAPTER III

SOME BASIC CONCEPTS OF SĀṄKHYA-YOGA

A name, as applied to any philosophy, is usually a key word embodying either a prime concept or a distinguishing concept of the philosophy which marks it from other philosophies or from its parent system. In time, the name of a philosophy can become clouded, and its original meaning is no longer clear. The titles of Sāṅkhya and Yoga are not excepted from this confusion.

In the case of Sāṅkhya, a number of interpretations are found as to its origin. The most common takes the name of Sāṅkhya as being derived from the word saṅkhyā, which means number. This interpretation is arrived at because its method of attaining the right knowledge. On the other hand, another derivation is taken from the two words saṁyag jñana. These together mean perfect knowledge. Chatterjee and Datta feel that the latter origin is the more plausible. Possibly both origins have some sort of validity as they both seem to have a place in the description of this philosophical system. It would seem that the choice is of either the means or the ends as the crux of the philosophy. The aim of this philosophy, as with many systems of India, is the ending of all pain and suffering. Its method is the gaining of the perfected knowledge of the ultimate reality by an analysis and enumeration of the fundamental categories of existence. In ultimate analysis Sāṅkhya affirms two basic principles, puruṣa and prakṛti. The other categories of existence are derived from them and their interaction.

The Sāṅkhya system is normally thought of as an atheistic and dualistic system. There seems to be a good bit of evidence to disprove this. For example, in a quote of Burns-Gibson by Dasgupta we find this in part :

> As existents, the many souls and one prakṛti are one co-existence, the unity of Being and Knowing, and as pure beings they are absolutely indistinguishable from one another and from nought. For thought, they collapse into one, and that one sinks into non-being. What then remains is Vyakta, the phenomenal world of subject and object, co-existent, co-essential and inseparable in their utter central-distinction. And this residuum of Kapila exactly corresponds with the residuum of Spinoza, when his infinite attribute of thought of consciousness has absorbed and superseded all other infinite attributes, rendering them inevitable in the dialectic of reflection.[1]

It should be added that the Indian mind does not accept the pantheistic concept that the universe exhausts the ultimate source of all. Rather they feel that the manifested world is only a very small portion of infinity, and thus are more correctly called panentheistic. In the "Bhagavad-Gita" this statement is found in the Eighth Discourse, the twentieth śloka; "Verily there existeth, higher than that unmanifested, another Unmanifested, Eternal, which during the destruction of all beings, is not destroyed."[2]

Sāṅkhya is a dualistic system as it is today, which has been indicated above. However, there is some evidence to support the view that it may not be an absolute dualism.[3] Be that as it may, attention now is turned to the arguments that are used to arrive at an apparent duality of prime principles.

I. THE THEORY OF CAUSATION

Puruṣa and prakṛti are the two ultimate principles as derived by transcendental analysis of the structure of experience. Puruṣa is the pure subject, the ultimate source of all consciousness. Prakṛti is the causal background of the whole objective world and is derived from the Sāṅkhya theory of causation (satkārya-vāda). This theory of causation, satkārya-vāda, is based upon

[1] Dasgupta, *Yoga Philosophy*, *op. cit.*, p. 23.

[2] Annie Besant, Bhagavān Dās, *Bhagavad-gita* (Adyar, Madras, The Theosophical Press, 1950), p. 153.

[3] Dasgupta, pp. 220-221; Majumdar, pp. 31-32, 52ff., 105-106.

the Sāṅkhya understanding of the relationship of an effect to its material cause. The problem as seen by the Sāṅkhya philosophers is this : is the effect originally existent in the material cause prior to its manifestation as an effect ? Their findings are in the affirmative. They "define cause as the entity in which the effect subsists in a latent form."[4] The basis of their conclusions rest upon these grounds : (1) No activity can be directed-toward a non-existent object. (2) An effect can only be produced by a material cause which is causally related to it. (3) Particular effects can only be the result of certain particular causes. (4) The effect must exist in an unmanifested form as a potential of the efficient cause. (5) It is denied that something can come from nothing. (6) That cause and effect are not different, fundamentally they are identical with each other in the material cause.

The first statement that a non-existent cannot be made the object of an activity is demonstrated by the example of the impossibility of changing the colour blue into red, or salt into sugar. Hence, any effect that is produced from some material cause must have pre-existed in that cause, and can only be manifested by particular conditions which are favourable to its manifestation. The activity of the efficient cause, like the potter and his tools, is necessary to manifest the effect, pot, which exists implicitly in the clay.

The second ground that is given follows from the first. It is stated that the relationship between material and its effect is invariable. This can be seen in relation to the above statement, which says that the pre-existent effect can only be manifested by certain conditions. The material cause cannot produce an effect which is not in any way related to it causally, nor can it be related to that which does not exist. Hence, the effect must have existed in the material cause prior to its manifestation.

Number three is a reiteration of the above statement. Only certain effects can possibly come from certain causes. The examples cited are those of curds coming from milk, and that cloth can only be made out of thread, no matter the material of the thread. This verifies the existence of the effect in the material cause, otherwise any effect could be produced from any cause. This

[4] Radhakrishnan, *op. cit.*, p. 256.

does not deny the possibility of man discovering the necessary conditions which he must bring about to produce an effect which is inherent in a material cause which does not readily manifest itself from this particular cause under normal conditions. Thus they allow for discovery of natural laws which allow men to produce such materials as plastics.

A potential effect is an existent effect according to the fourth assertion. That is, the effect exists prior to its manifestation in a potent cause and only needs the presence of the proper conditions to bring about the actualization of the effect of this particular cause which holds the potentiality of this effect, and probably many other effects which will become phenomenal under the proper conditions. This potentiality of a cause to produce an effect is considered to be a power that is definitely related to that effect. In conjunction with this, the assertion is that the power cannot be related to an effect if there is no existence of the effect in some form before the effect is changed from its state in the unmanifested to the actualized state in the manifested world.

The next argument presented states that if the effect is really non-existent before its production by the cause, then this must mean that the non-existent has come into existence. That is to say, the material cause has produced something from nothing, and this is considered to be absurd by the Sāṅkhya philosophers.

Sāṅkhya's last theory on causation is that, ultimately, cause and effect are not in reality different. This identity is used to affirm the existence of the effect in the cause. Since the material cause is accepted as existing, and the effect is not really different from the cause, then the effect must also exist, whether it is manifested or not. "In fact, the effect and the cause are the explicit and implicit states of the same substance."[5] A piece of cloth is not actually different from the threads from which it is composed, nor is a statue really different from the stone which it has been carved. These statements convinced the Sāṅkhyans that the effect exists in the material cause prior to its appearance or production in the phenomenal world.

[5] Satischandra Chatterjee, Dhirendromohan Datta, *An Introduction to Indian Philosophy*, (Calcutta, University of Calcutta, 1950), p. 260.

Following the Sāṅkhya theory of causation to its logical conclusion, and since their theory "means a real transformation of the material cause into the effect, it logically leads to the concept of prakṛti as the ultimate cause of the world of objects."[6] They do not exclude any object of the world. Not only do they include the part of the world which is normally thought of as the physical world, but they also include men's bodies and minds, the senses, and the intellect, which are regarded as limited and dependent things resulting from various combinations of certain elements. Sāṅkhya is a pluralistic system of philosophy which "attempts an explanation of nature as an immense complexity of elements which is ever changing."[7] This ever-changing "hierarchy of forms from physical matter, which is itself a product of submaterial elements, is represented as an unfolding of the resources of nature."[8] This brings the discussion to the point where it must be said "If all effects are latent in their causes, and if infinite regress is to be avoided, there must be an uncaused cause."[9] Thus, the Sāṅkhya theory of causation leads naturally to an ultimate basis of the empirical world that is the unmanifested prakṛti.

The line of argument for the existence of prakṛti runs as follows: (1) All individual things are limited and dependent on something which is more comprehensive. So these particulars must be dependent upon something which is not limited, something which is more universal and lasting than the particulars. Thus "The finite as the finite cannot be the source of the universe."[10] (2) All the things of the world possess certain pervasive characteristics which are common to all. These are the ability to produce pain, pleasure, and indifference. This then implies that all individual things have as their source a common cause. Here is a primitive statement of the current nuclear theory, for the Sāṅkhya feels that the elements are not completely distinct from one another. (3) "All effects proceed from the activity of some cause which contains their potentiality

[6] *Ibid.*, p. 261.
[7] Radhakrishnan, *op. cit.*, p. 259.
[8] *Loc. cit.*
[9] *Loc. cit.*
[10] *Loc. cit.*

within it."[11] "Evolution implies a principle which cannot be equated with any one of its stages. It is something larger than its products, though immanent in them."[12] "The world of objects which are effects must, therefore, be implicitly contained in some world-cause."[13] (4) All effects are eventually re-dissolved into their cause. Each particular effect is produced by its particular cause, and this cause which is the effect of a prior cause is finally resolved into its cause, and finally we come to the cause which is the cause of all subsequent causes and is itself its own cause. The process must stop somewhere otherwise it falls into the fallacy of an infinite regress, ad infinitum. Further, anywhere it should stop and say here is the original cause; it will be prakṛti. For this is what prakṛti is, "the root cause of the world."[14] There are other arguments which are put forward to substantiate the concept of prakṛti. Two more grounds upon which they base their case are given by Radhakrishnan, "The effect differs from the cause, and we cannot therefore, say that the finite and conditioned world is its own cause. . . . There is an obvious unity of the universe, suggesting a single cause."[15] According to the Sāṅkhya, there is a continuity between all levels in the world, and the evolvement and devolvement of the products proceeds with a definite order.

The world is the pariṇāma or transformation of prakṛti. All things are the effects of an active cause, because nothing cannot produce something. Hence, "the cause must contain more reality than, or at least as much reality as, the effect."[16] This last statement seems to say that the avyaktam, unmanifested prakṛti is more than that which is manifested in it, and at the very least it is equal to all of its effects. But the description of prakṛti as unmanifested precludes the possibility of its infinity being used up in the finitude of the manifested universe.

Radhakrishnan[17] sums up the reasoning for the existence of prakṛti saying that nothing which is not originally involved can

[11] Chatterjee & Datta, *op. cit.*, p. 263.
[12] Radhakrishnan, *loc. cit.*
[13] Chatterjee & Datta, *loc. cit.*
[14] *Ibid.*, p. 264.
[15] Radhakrishnan, *loc. cit.*
[16] *Loc. cit.*
[17] *Ibid.*, p. 260.

be evolved, and that although every effect has a cause, prakṛti is without cause and is the cause of all effects. Prakṛti is called pradhāna as it is the mainspring of all effects. Further, it is the primary form of being from which the various orders of existence evolve. Sāṅkhya recognized that it is impossible to deduce puruṣa from prakṛti, that is self cannot be deduced from the non-self. Radhakrishnan then distinguishes between the prakṛti and its products. The products are caused, dependent, many, and limited in time and space. Conversely, prakṛti is uncaused, independent, one, and all-pervading and eternal. The products are the evidences of prakṛti. Since prakṛti cannot perish, it could not have been created. An intelligent principle cannot be the material from which the inanimate world is produced, since spirit cannot be transformed into matter. Finally, agency does not belong to the puruṣa or self but to the ahaṁkara or self sense, which is itself nothing other than a product of prakṛti.

The above is a summary of the grounds for the existence of the prime principle of prakṛti. Some of the arguments are also presented for the dichotomy of spirit and matter. This problem shall be examined later. An understanding of prakṛti is essential to the full understanding of the self concept as expressed by the Sāṅkhya and Yoga philosophies. It is also necessary to understand the concept of prakṛti if the method for reaching the self is to be grasped. Another point in the understanding of the self concept of these two philosophies is the learning of what matter is and what is not spirit or self.

As men have accepted the modern atomic theories without physically perceiving the atoms or their sub-atomic particles; so the Sāṅkhya feels that the concept of prakṛti should be accepted on inferential grounds as science has done with the atom. It is of little importance that prakṛti cannot be seen. For there are many things which are readily accepted even though they are beyond the range of human perception. Things of this category can be either too large to encompass or too fine to be perceptible to the senses without the aid of instruments. Even instruments fail, for the most powerful microscope cannot show an atom, nor can the most powerful telescope show the whole of the vast universe, which is only a speck in infinity.

The Western theory of the conservation of matter and energy is stated by the Sāṅkhya philosophers in the following terms. "Nothing that exists can be destroyed, and the products exist in prakṛti, though in an unmanifested state."[18]

What is this material cause of the world? Prakṛti is the first cause, and in potential holds all effects which are manifested in the world as well as those which are not so manifested. The manifested world includes not only all of the objective sphere of experience, but also the realm of the subjective and psychological experience as well. From this it is seen that the concept of what constitutes the non-self, anatman, will delineate what constitutes the self, or puruṣa. The reasoning by which the existence of prakṛti is deduced has been shown. Now the doctrine of evolution, tattvāntarapariṇāma, will be examined, and the basis of this evolution and conversely the involution of the world of things.

"Sāṅkhya believes that before this world came into being there was such a state of dissolution—a state of disunion and had by their mutual opposition produced an equilibrium the prakṛti."[19] This state can be compared to the concept of physics that the universe shall cease to be functional when a perfect equilibrium is attained. That is, with no differences in potential there can be no change. If there can be no change, there can be no movement; no movement means there can be no time, or succession of causes and their effects. With no effects the world of production cannot be said to exist. In order for the world to be evolved, the state of pralaya must be disturbed. There appears to be no satisfactory explanation of the cause of the disturbance. Apparently, along with the other inbuilt laws of function of prakṛti, there is a cyclic evolving and dissolving that is eternally operating. Sāṅkhya is no different from any other system which attempts to describe the world of nature. They all have this difficulty of establishing the creative cause of disturbance of the state of pralaya which is a perfect balance of heterogeneous parts constituting a placid, characterless homogeneity. Of course, the equilibrium is similar to that of a chemical equilibrium. Even though there is no apparent

[18] *Ibid.*, p. 261.

[19] Dasgupta *op. cit.*, p. 245.

change going on, the constitution of the atoms demands that they remain in constant motion. Consequently, every move must be compensated for by another move which negates the prior movement. So it can be seen that the state of pralaya is a state of quiescence and equilibrium, but it is a dynamic state of infinite potentiality.

The ultimate constituent factors which are comparable to the Greek conception of the atoms as irreducible and ultimate reals are called guṇas in the Sāṅkhya philosophy. The guṇas can be compared with the actual meaning of the word atom, viz. indivisible, for the guṇas cannot be reduced further and still have existence, in the usual sense of the word. Prakṛti is the pre-existent or unmanifest substrate which is the first cause. In the state of pralaya, prakṛti, though unmanifest and as the undifferentiated cause of the guṇas, holds all effects in a state of potentiality. Only three effects actually materialize directly from prakṛti, and this trinity is the material cause of all other effects. Thus, prakṛti is the root producer of these ultimate constituents which by their premutation and combination constitute the manifest universe. The concept of these primal constituent units of prakṛti will be examined.

II. THE COMPOSITION OF PRAKṚTI

First, the word guṇa has three meanings which somewhat describe the first production of prakṛti. In Sanskrit guṇa has three meanings, quality, rope, and not-primary. It must be remembered that these ultimate and subtle entities are not qualities but are constituent factors. Sāṅkhya does not allow for the separate existence of qualities. All qualities are the results of the various combinations of the ultimate units of substance. The so-called qualities are nothing more or less than the "particular manifestation or appearance of a subtle entity."[20] Quality is not possessed. It only indicates a substance's manner of reacting. No matter how many qualities one seems to find, Sāṅkhya says that it is only our interpretation of the reactions of these subtle entities. This is true also for all qualities, whether attributed to the physical or mental world. This conception of the guṇas does not leave very much that is

[20] *Ibid.*, p. 243.

not considered to be subtle substance, and thus belonging to the material world. The Sāṅkhya by including the realm of the mind eliminates the dichotomy of mind and matter. The functioning of the mind is to be understood in a physical sense. The development of the science of cybernetics[21] in the West is based upon this conception of the mind. This similarity will be examined further in the section on psychology.

Why were these three ultimate subtle entities called guṇas, and how do the ideas of qualities, rope and not-primary actually apply to these substances? The guṇas signify factors or constituents of prakṛti. "They are called guṇas (or qualities), since prakṛti alone is substantive, and these are merely elements of it."[22] Beyond this the idea of quality does not apply in Sāṅkhya. It is suggested that since the guṇas are the cause of the puruṣa's being bound to this phenomenal world, the idea of rope with its strands is appropriate. Since the guṇas are not the prime cause, but are the effects of prakṛti, they are rightly referred to as not-primary. "But in whatever sense we may be inclined to justify the name guṇa as applied to these subtle entities, it should be borne in mind that they are substantive entities or subtle substances and not abstract qualities."[23] The guṇas are infinite in number[24] and in accordance with the above named characteristics have been classified into the three types mentioned earlier. Their names are sattva (intelligence-stuff or potential consciousness), rajas (energy-stuff), and tamas (mass-stuff). These guṇas "which agree in certain characteristics of self-shining or plasticity are called the sattva-guṇas, and those which behave as units of activity are called the rajo-guṇas and those which behave as factors of obstruction, mass or materiality are called tamo-guṇas."[25] Due to different combinations or ratios of grouping of these three entities the multitude of qualities come into being. This concept is embodied in the modern scientific conception of the construction of the atom. In this scientific conception the atom has the proton, the

[21] James T. Culbertson, *Consciousness & Behaviour* (Dubuque, Iowa, Wm. C. Brown Co., 1950), p. viii.
[22] Radhakrishnan, *op. cit.*, p. 263.
[23] Dasgupta. *op. cit.*, p. 244.
[24] Radhakrishnan, *op. cit.*, p. 265.
[25] Dasgupta, *loc. cit.*

electron, and the neutron. These three are, in a sense, comparable to the concept of the Sāṅkhya of the sattva, rajas, and tamas respectively. The proton provides the coalescence or form of the atom, the electron gives us energy, and the neutron provides the mass. The Sāṅkhya felt that the atom would exhibit the characteristics of the guṇa which was predominate in it. Of course, the Sāṅkhya would indicate that the atom is a compound of the panchīkarana, even here the characteristics of the different atoms would be dependent upon the varying modes of combination of the guṇas in them. For instance, if the sattvas were predominate the atom would be very light and subtle. In other words, the ratio of sattvas, rajas, and tamas present in any one atom is the essential determining factor for the manifestation of any particular quality. For example, drawing from some elementary chemistry, the composition of water is known to every school child in the junior high school of today. It is composed of the atoms of hydrogen and oxygen in the ratio of two to one, and is generally written with the symbols of H_2O=water. The two different atoms act quite differently when independent of each other. Also if the ratio of these atoms is changed we find that we have a new product such as hydrogen peroxide (H_2O_2) etc. This rather common material, usually found on the drug store shelf in the form of a solution, exhibits properties which are quite different from those of water. As can be expected, a compound consisting of the atoms enacts its own individual characteristics when it is free of other atoms. Is it not probable that the elementals of the atom would also display their own characteristics in a state of freedom?

The guṇas are ever active, forming and reforming new compounds, producing novel qualities and congregating into new substances, except when in the state of pralaya or state of equilibrium. In this state the guṇas are so arranged as to be prevented from being re-distributed. Dasgupta[26] describes the state of pralaya as the one and only stage in which the guṇas are not compounded in varying proportions. Each of the guṇa substances are so opposed by each of the other guṇa substances that their equal and mutual opposition creates an equilibrium

[26] *Loc. cit.*

in which the characteristics of none of the guṇas manifests itself. This state of pralaya is absolutely void of all characteristics, and thus, is absolutely incoherent, indeterminate, and indefinite. It is without quality, a simple homogeneity. This state of pralaya is a state of being, which is, as it were, non-being, and this state in which the guṇas are in mutual equilibrium is called prakṛti. Pralaya is a state which cannot properly be said to be existent nor non-existent as it fulfils no purpose, yet it is the hypothetical mother of all things. Out of the state of pralaya come all modifications once and the equilibrium is disrupted.

The guṇas have as one of their essential characteristics that of change. They are in a constant state of flux, forever changing and the transformations are of two kinds. One is the transmutation of one guṇa into another state of intensity within itself. This is a never-ending process. The triune 'atoms' which constitutes prakṛti are thus in constant process of pulsation. In this state of equilibrium there can be found no motion, nor sound, nor taste, touch, colour, nor smell, none of the qualities. In this state of equilibrium which is motionless, the transformation or change that occurs is the one that makes one of the guṇas predominate over the others. When this happens, the condition which allows the reproduction of the world has occurred once again. "A thing is always produced, never created, according to the Sāṅkhya theory of satkāryavāda. Production is manifestation and destruction is non-manifestation."[27] This transformation is "called virūpapariṇāma, or change into the heterogeneous, and is the starting point of the world's evolution."[28] Some of the attributes of the three guṇas will be discussed in order that the Sāṅkhya theory of evolution of the material world, mind, and matter, can be understood. For both thought and gross matter are composed of sattva, rajas, and tamas. Sattva and rajas predominate in thought, and tamas and rajas do so in gross matter. First, some of the proofs and arguments for the existence of the guṇas will be explored, then the attributes of these three ultimate entities shall be better understood. The guṇas cannot be seen by us, and therefore are

[27] Radhakrishnan, *op. cit.*, p. 263.
[28] Chatterjee and Datta, *op. cit.*, p. 267.

inferred from the objects in the world which are the effects of the inter-action and intra-action of the guṇas. In the Sāṅkhya analysis of thought and matter, feeling is the basic ingredient of the guṇas, that is they are feeling substances. They believe that "feeling is the most interesting side of our consciousness. It is in our feelings that we think of our thoughts as being parts of ourselves."[29] Upon analyzing any percept into its raw datum, it is found to be composed of a group of crude and undeveloped sensations at the instant of its appearance. It is received as more of a shock than as an image, and according to Dasgupta[30] it is received more as a feeling mass than as an image. He believes that even in ordinary life the elements which precede an act of knowledge are probably mere feelings. Dasgupta seems to mean by feeling, not the sense reaction to external stimuli, but the feeling in the aesthetic sense. Evolution in the Sāṅkhyan sense proceeds from the highest to the lowest. This is so for most of the other philosophies of India. Proceeding down through the evolutionary scale, the automatic actions and relations of matter are concomitant with crude manifestations of feeling which do not arise to the level of knowledge At the lowest level the distinctive feeling no longer exists, and the matter-complexes only give rise to physical reactions. The earliest track of consciousness is feeling, according to Dasgupta. At these lower levels it would probably be more accurate to say that instinct is the earliest mark of consciousness. Matter-complexes at a certain stage become feeling-complexes and vice versa. He concludes that the feelings are therefore the things-in-themselves which constitute the ultimate substance of both consciousness and gross matter. Feeling is the ultimate substrata of all that is gross or mental matter.

The West is accustomed to consider feeling as subjective, and hence not valid as a true expression of the world as it is in itself. Not so with Sāṅkhya, for they "hold that thought and matter are but two different modifications of certain subtle substances which are in essence but three types of feeling entities."[31] The theory of satkārya-vāda or causation is the basis of the deduction of the existence of the guṇas. The reason is as follows :

[29] Dasgupta, *op. cit.*, p. 242.
[30] *Loc. cit.*
[31] *Ibid.*, p. 243.

All objects of the world, from the intellect down to the ordinary objects of perception (e.g. tables, pots, etc.), are found to possess three characters capable of producing pleasure, pain and indifference, respectively. The same things are pleasurable to some person, painful to another, and neutral to a third. . . . Now, as the cause must contain what is in the effect, we can infer that the ultimate cause of things must have been constituted also by the three elements of pleasure, pain, and indifference.[32]

These three subtle entities are called respectively sattva, rajas, and tamas, and they are "constitutive of both prakṛti, the ultimate substance, and the ordinary objects of the world."[33]

III. THE GUṆAS

The three guṇas sattva, rajas, and tamas in that order will be described. The order of these three is from the most desirable to the least desirable. That is sattva which is the nature of pleasure, light and illumination, is more desirable than rajas, which is of the nature of pain, mobility, and stimulation. Rajas is in turn more desirable than tamas, the element with a nature of indifference, mass, and envelopment. All of these feelings are descriptive of very worldly reactions to the experiences of life. But further examination reveals the ideals of the Sāṅkhya and Yoga philosophies, and many of the current philosophies of India, are far from being of a worldly nature.

"An infinite number of subtle substances which agree in certain characteristics of self-shining or plasticity are called the sattva-guṇas,"[34] or intelligence-stuff, says Dasgupta. Radhakrishnan[35] describes this guṇa as potential consciousness, and that it tends toward conscious manifestation causing pleasure to the individual. He says that etymologically, the word sattva has been derived from the root 'sat' which means that which is real or existent. Since consciousness, caitanya, is generally attributed to this type of existence, sattva is said to be potential consciousness. A secondary sense of 'sat means perfection, thus sattva produces

[32] Chatterjee and Datta, *op. cit.*, p. 264.
[33] *Ibid.*, p. 265.
[34] Dasgupta, *op. cit.*, p. 264.
[35] Radhakrishnan, *op. cit.*, p. 262.

goodness and happiness. This element is thought to be buoyant or light. Further explanation of the sattva element by Chatterjee and Datta tells us that :

> Sattva is that element of Prakṛti which is of the nature of pleasure, and is buoyant or light (laghu), and bright or illuminating (prakāśaka). The manifestation of objects in consciousness (jñāna), the tendency towards conscious manifestation in the senses, the mind and the intellect, luminosity of light, and the power of reflection in a mirror or the crystal are all due to the operation of the element of sattva in the constitution of things.[36]

Heinrich Zimmer's view of this concept is a bit different. His examination is from a somewhat philosophical philological perspective. He analyses sattva as a noun which was built on the participle 'sat' or 'sant' which is derived from 'as' the verb 'to be.' 'Sat' to Zimmer, means being as it should be, i.e., good, well, perfect. Accordingly, 'sattva' is the ideal state of being, and is exemplified by goodness, perfection, crystal purity, immaculate clarity, and utter quiet. "The quality of sattva predominates in gods, and heavenly beings, unselfish people, and men bent on purely spiritual pursuits. This is the guṇa that facilitates enlightenment."[37] The sattvas appear to represent the substantial basis of all of our ideals. The purer the sattvic content of anything, the higher the thing is in the hierarchy of the prakṛtic good.

"The second guṇa, rajas, is the source of all activity and produces pain. Rajas leads to a life of feverish enjoyment and restless effort."[38] Rajas is interpreted by Dasgupta as energy-stuff. The description given by Chatterjee and Datta state that, "Rajas is the principle of activity in things. It always moves and makes other things move. That is, it is both mobile (cala) and stimulating (upaṣṭambhaka),"[39] and further, "On the affective side of our life, rajas is the cause of all painful experiences and is itself of the nature of pain (duḥkha)."[40] Zimmer's des-

[36] Chatterjee and Datta, *op. cit.*, p. 265.
[37] Heinrich Zimmer, *Philosophies of India* (New York, Pantheon Books Inc., 1951), p. 295.
[38] Radhakrishnan, *loc. cit.*
[39] Chatterjee and Datta, *loc. cit.*
[40] *Ibid.*, p. 266.

cription of rajas shows how undesirable the guṇa rajas is within the ideal goal of the Indian philosophies :

> The noun rajas means, literally, "impurity"; in reference to the physiology of the female body, "menstruation", and more generally, "dust." The word is related to rañji, rakat, "redness, colour," as well as to raga, "passion." The dust referred to is that continually stirred up by wind in a land where no rain falls for at least ten months a year.[41]

He continues, saying that the rajas obscures the view of not only the universe but also of oneself. It is the product of both intellectual and moral darkness. The mythological being in which rajas guṇa predominates are the titans. They are the anti-gods or demons who exhibit the will for power in its full force and are reckless in the pursuit of supremacy and splendour. They are bloated with ambition, vanity and boastful egotism. The rajas guṇa is evidenced everywhere among men. This guṇa inspires desires, likes, and dislikes, competition, and the urge for the enjoyments of the world. It is the inner compulsion of man and beast which drives them toward the good of life regardless of the suffering or the expense to the needs of others.

As has been mentioned previously, the effort toward the achievement of the goal of liberation necessitates the concentration of sattva and rajas guṇas in one's being. The guṇa rajas is the creator of chaos if undirected or not held in check by either of the other two guṇas. Sattva tends to give the rajas guṇas direction, recognizing thatdirection is also a manner of checking its wild and irresponsible activity, while tamas tends to hold it in check by sheer force of inertia. This will be clarified after the properties of this last, and spiritually, most undesirable of all the guṇas are enumerated.

From Dasgupta's simpletran slation of mass-stuff through Radhakrishnan's statement explaining tamas as, "that which resists activity and produces the state of apathy or indifference, It leads to ignorance and sloth."[42] A more detailed description is given by Chatterjee and Datta:

[41] Zimmer, *Philosophies, op. cit.*, p. 296.
[42] Radhakrishnan, *op. cit.*, p. 263.

> Tamas is the principle of passivity and negativity in things. It is opposed to sattva in being heavy (guru) and in obstructing the manifestation of objects (varanaka). It also resists the principle of rajas or activity in so far as it restrains (niyam) the motion of things. It counteracts the power of manifestation in the mind, the intellect and other things, and therebyproduces ignoranceand darkness, and leads to confusionand bewilderment (moha).[43]

By its negativity and passivity it acts obstructing the principle of activity and produces a dull and lazy individual. It is the source of the state of apathy or indifference, visāda. The three guṇas, sattva, rajas, and tamas have been compared to the whiteness, redness, and darkness, respectively.

A fairly well diversified conception of the last of the guṇas should be had with Zimmer's interesting philologicala nd naturalistic comments concerning tamas. He says, "Tamas (cf. Latin tene-brae, French téné-bres)–literally darkness, black, dark-blue; spiritually, "blind-ness"—connotes the unconsciousness that predominates in the animal, vegetable, and mineral kingdoms." Continuing, he points out that, "Tamas is the basis of all lack of feeling, dullness, ruthlessness, insensibility, and inertia. It causes mental gloom, ignorance, error, and illusion."[44] His presentation then shows that the stolidity of apparently lifeless matter, the mute and merciless strife among the plants for soil, moisture,and air; and the insensible, ruthless search and devouring prey of animals ; are some of the primary manifestations of this universal principle. Its manifestation on the human level is in the slothful stupidity of the egotistic and self-satisfied individuals who acquiesce to anything so long as they feel that their personal slumber, safety, or interests are secure. On the positive side this guṇa represents the power or force giving stability to the universe, to every society, and to the individual. This is the natural result of tamas, counterbalancing the ever present possibility of the self-explosion which perpetually attends the motile dynamism of the rajas guṇa.

After having reviewed some statements on what the three guṇas are and what they exhibit in the material world, an

[43] Chatterjee and Datta, *loc. cit.*
[44] Zimmer, *Philosophies op. cit.*, p. 297.

attempt will be made to synthesize a conception of each of these subtle entities. The guṇas are eternally in a process of transmutation, that is they continually change the intensity of their characteristics, which delineates them one from another so that they are at any one moment more or less distinguishable from each other. There has been no evidence as yet to indicate whether or not there is an order of progression in these transmutations or whether they are of a chaotic nature. The properties of the guṇas, sattva, tamas, and rajas appear to be a corollary of the conception in the popular aspect of the religious mythology of India in the ideas expressed by creation, maintenance, and dissolution. These conceptions are embodied in the Gods of Brahmā, Vishnu, and Śiva. It should be noted that each of these Gods is worshipped primarily for their being Evolver, Maintainer, and Desolver of the universe, respectively. Yet they are a Trinity in the full meaning of thew ord. For each is regarded as only a particular aspect of the Unity that is One. This does not deny the existence or need of the other aspect, for it is assumed that the guṇas need the opposition, or rather the substance of the other guṇas, to enable it to function according to its nature. From this basic configuration of the atoms of the Sāṅkhya evolves the entire universe.

IV. THE STATE OF PRALAYA

The primordial state of prakṛti is that of pralaya and sāmyāvastha. This is called a state of dissolution or a state of equilibrium. The former refers to the fact that prakṛti is at rest and the latter to the dynamic aspect of this in-action. This is the present day theory of science centered around the conception of homeostasis, or the laws of thermodynamics. Simply, this theory means that for every action there is a reaction. Because of the tendency toward a state of equilibrium, every force which tends to disrupt the movement towards the equilibrium brings other forces into play which work to re-establish the process toward the state of equilibrium.

A chemical equilibrium that is arrived at in any particular reaction is an excellent example of this law of nature. Of course there are more complicated ramifications of the above example, but the main point here is that any one change brings on a

compensating change. The saying that nature abhors a vacuum could very well be said that nature (prakṛti) abhors imbalance. In fact, Sāṅkhya insists that there is a constant effort on the part of the guṇas to re-establish the state of pralaya or sāmyāvastha, the state of quiet or equilibrium. Thus, it appears that not only does prakṛti cooperate in the production of the universe, but she strives to dissolve it back into the primeval homeostatic homogeneous state beyond existence and nonexistence. It would seem that this is the identical state sought by the individual in his effort to free himself from the rope (guṇa) which binds him to the round of existence. If this is so, then all one must do is to cooperate with nature and the desired state of samadhi will be achieved.

Before there is any existent thing, prakṛti is in the state of equilibrium. The guṇas are perfectly balanced in a dynamic way. Each of the guṇas is constantly in the process of transmutation within itself, i.e. similar to uranium 235 and uranium 238. The balance is maintained so long as the guṇas remain in the proper ratio in any one area of the prakṛti. In some way this equilibrium is broken; possibly by the concentration of one guṇa's intensity over that of the other two, either by internal transmutation or by accumulation. When this occurs, it is the beginning of the "change into the heterogeneous, and it is the starting point of the world's evolution."[45] What causes this change from the state of equilibrium? If the prakṛti is the first cause, then it must be the cause of its attaining the quiescent state as well as being the cause of its return to the active heterogeneous state in which the world evolves.

> It is postulated that the prakṛti or the sum-total of the guṇas is so connected with the puruṣas, and there is such an inherent teleology of blind purpose in the lifeless prakṛti, that all its evolution and transformations take place for the sake of the diverse puruṣas, to serve the enjoyment of pleasures and sufferance of pain through experiences, and finally leading them to absolute freedom or mukti.[46]

[45] Chatterjee & Datta, *op. cit.*, p. 267.
[46] Dasgupta, *op. cit.*, p. 247.

Essentially, the same points are made by Chatterjee and Datta. They write, "The evolution of the world has its starting-point in the contact (samyoga) between puruṣa or the self and prakṛti or primal matter."[47] Attention is drawn to the fact that the contact between the prakṛti and puruṣa does not imply any real conjunction such as is found in finite material substances. Rather, "It is a sort of effective relation through which prakṛti is influenced by the presence of puruṣa in the same way in which our body is sometimes moved by the presence of a thought."[48] Since there can be no evolution unless these two become related to each other in some manner, the world's evolution cannot be due solely to the non-intelligent prakṛti. The evolutionary process must be guided by the intelligence of the puruṣa.

Radhakrishnan appears to completely concur with the preceding discussion. He asserts that prakṛti is not naturally unstable and does not differentiate because of necessity. A disturbance in the guṇa equilibrium brings about the destruction of prakṛti by the overcoming of the dynamic tension, overweighting one side and thus once again initiating the process of becoming. Without the transcendental influence of puruṣa, prakṛti cannot evolve. Radhakrishnan says, "The fulfilment of the ends of the puruṣa is the cause of the manifestation of prakṛti in the three specialized states," and "since prakṛti is one and ubiquitous, all things have prakṛti for their basis, and, in a sense, everything shares the characters of everything else."[49]

It is evident from the above that even though the prakṛti is the one ground of all, that is, in the realm of existence, there is no purpose for her existence except to fulfil the round of saṁsāra. In moving through the cycle prakṛti is actualizing and manifesting her own nature. The prakṛtic nature is not unstable, as was pointed out above.

When all the karmas of all the puruṣas wear out, the multiplicity of this world dissolves into the quiescent state. In this state nothing remains except the guṇas in their primal homogeneous and indistinguishable state. Equilibrium has once again been achieved. It must be noted that:

> In the unmanifested condition, prakṛti is but the union of opposites. When they are all held together in a state of equilibrium (samyavāsthā), there is no action. The state of rest is said to be the natural condition of prakṛti. Yet the absence of outer activity does not mean the absence of any tendency to act. The tendencies to manifestation (sattva) and activity (rajas) are held in check by the tendency to non-manifestation and non-activity (tamas).[50]

The supreme principle of the universe is conceived by Sāṅkhya, and Yoga, as a unity of elements exhibiting real opposition toward each other; "an abstract unit can be either perpetually active or perpetually inactive."[51]

Prakṛti, when in the state of pralaya, is not a mere passive equilibrium, but a state of dynamic tension, according to Dasgupta. Further, this intense activity of the dynamic tension does not lead to the generation of new things and qualities. The course of new productions is suspended in pralaya for the activity of the equilibrium is repetitious, and serves only to maintain prakṛti in the quiescent state.

> The state of pralaya thus is not a suspension of the teleology or purpose of the guṇas, or an absolute break of the course of guṇa evolution; for the state of pralaya, since it has been generated to fulfil the demands of the accumulated karmas of puruṣas, and since there is still activity of the guṇas in keeping themselves in a state of suspended production, is also a stage of the saṁsāra cycle.[52]

Before going on, it should be pointed out that the state of mukti or liberation is a state which is very different from the state of pralaya. In this stage the guṇa movement ceases forever with reference to the liberated puruṣa.

V. EVOLUTION

Prakṛti, the root-evolvent, is at rest in its natural state. The factor which disturbs the equilibrium and begins the whole

[47] Chatterjee & Datta, *op. cit.*, p. 271.
[48] *Loc. cit.*
[49] Radhakrishnan, *op. cit.*, p. 266.

[50] *Loc. cit.*
[51] *Loc. cit.*
[52] Dasgupta, *loc. cit.*

evolutional process anew is "the transcendental (non-mechanical) influence of the puruṣa."[53] This effect is explained by the analogy to the manner in which a piece of iron is affected by a magnet, without the magnet itself being affected by the iron. This transcendental influence of the puruṣa means that there is an inherent teleology in the constitutive elements of prakṛti which assures that all the guṇa movements and modifications are in such a manner that the purpose of the puruṣa is served. There are two views concerning the teleology of prakṛti. One says that by its own nature prakṛti establishes the state of pralaya, and then disturbed it again starts her creative work anew. On the other hand, it is asserted that the activation of prakṛti is dependent upon the transcendental influence of the puruṣa. Prakṛti "is called the root-evolvent, as being both root and evolvent; it is the root of all effects."[54]

Īśvarakṛṣṇa's Kārikā states in the third sūtra :

> Nature (Prakṛti) the root (of material forms), is not produced. The great One (Mahat-Buddhi or Intellect) and the rest (which spring from it) are seven (substances), producing and produced. Sixteen are productions (only). Soul is neither producing or produced.[55]

Sūtra twenty two of the Kārikā states :

> From Nature (Prakṛti) issues the great principle (mahat, intellect), and from this the Ego or Consciousness; from this (consciousness) the whole assemblage of the sixteen (principles or entities), and from five of the sixteen the five gross elements.[56]

These two statements cover all the productions which constitute the manifested world. This process is accomplished in two steps. They are "the psychical (pratyayasarga or buddhisarga) and the physical (tanmātrasarga or bhautikasarga)."[57] The evolution of the buddhi, the Ahaṅkāra, and the eleven

[53] *Loc. cit.*

[54] E.B. Cowell, and A.E. Gough (Translators), *The Sarva-Darśana-Samgraha* by Madhava Acharya (London, Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co., Ltd., 1914), p. 221.

[55] John Davies (Translator), *The Sāṅkhya Kārikā* of *Iśwara Krishna*, (London, Trubner & Co., 1981) p. 17.

[56] *Ibid.*, p. 54.

[57] Chatterjee and Datta, *op. cit.*, p. 277.

sense-motor organs is the first step. In the last step the five subtle physical elements (tanmātra) and the gross elements with their products are completed.

The first product to emerge in the evolutionary process is mahat or buddhi. The mahat is primarily composed of sattva guṇas. It "is indeed the earliest state from which all the rest of the world has sprung forth; and it . . . holds within it the minds (buddhi) of all puruṣas which were lost in the prakṛti during the pralaya."[58] These buddhis, containing all the old ignorance (avidyā), re-establish the old relationship with the specific puruṣa with which it has always been associated. Once some of the buddhis begin to evolve, all the other buddhis separate out from prakṛti. The buddhis are almost pure sattva guṇa. This process, once it begins, proceeds much as a chain reaction. A concentration of the sattva guṇa causes the other transformations of prakṛti to have a preponderance of this guṇa exactly as the original buddhis. This stage which consists of all the buddhis is called buddhitattva. The buddhi-transformation is the primary modification of prakṛti. It is the most universal stage, for it encompasses all the individual buddhis as well as the potential of all matter from which the gross world is evolved. The buddhitattva viewed as the broadest and wholly unqualified state consisting of the entirety of the universe, is named mahat (the great one). Mahat is distinguishable from prakṛti, and thus is called liṅga (sign). Prakṛti, because of its characterlessness, is called aliṅga.

As the direct functionary of the puruṣa, the buddhi "is that which discriminates the subtle difference between the chief principle (Pradhāna=Prakṛti) and the soul."[59] It must be emphasized that what has usually been translated as soul in the literature of India would, in reality, be better translated as spirit or self.

When buddhi, as mind, has defined itself in appropriate ways, it developes (with the aid of rajas) the sāttvika or vaikārika ahaṅkāra. The ego-sense or ahṅkāra is distinguished from the buddhi as it "is a specific expression of the general conscious-

[58] Dasgupta, *loc. cit.*

[59] Davies, *op. cit.*, p. 72.

ness (buddhi)."[60] The function of the buddhi "is a mere understanding and general datum as thisness,"[61] while the ahaṅkāra's function is abhimāna or self-assertion. Both of these words, ahaṅkāra and abhimāna, mean more than self consciousness. They add "to the simple conception of individuality the notion of self-property, the concentration of all objects and interests and feelings in the individual."[62] When these words are used in an ordinary sense, they mean pride. This meaning is only secondary. Philosophically they are used only to express "the perception, not the exaltation, of the self; though very naturally this perception led to a sense of superiority over outward things."[63] Further modifications follow the state of mahat-tattva, developing in a three-fold manner, due to the three different guṇas. This disturbance of the mahat by the three parallel surgence of the guṇas results in the stage called ahaṅkāra. Depending upon which guṇa (sattva, rajas, or tamas) is predominant in each of these aspects of development, the tendency is called in the order listed; vaikārika ahaṅkāra, rājasika or taijasa ahaṅkāra, and tamasika ahaṅkāra or bhūtādi. Rājasika ahaṅkāra is not able to denote a new preponderance alone. It only enables the transformations of the other two guṇas. In the case of the sattva preponderance, the buddhi only becomes more definite in character.

The ahaṅkāra is three-fold according to which guṇa is predominate. When the sattva guṇa predominates, the vaikārika ahaṅkāra gives rise to "the eleven organs, namely the five organs of perception (jñanendriya), the five organs of action (karmendriya), and the mind (manas).[64] The derivatives of the tamas mode of ahaṅkāra are the five subtle elements (tanmātras). The rājasika ahaṅkāra functions in both the other modes of the ahaṅkāra, "and supplies the energy needed for the change of sattva and tamas into their products."[65]

> The three modes therefore act upon, or rather within, egoism or consciousness (for this, as a part of Prakṛti, or an emanation of it, is itself formed for the modes), and their various action has the effect of producing different results ; the first and second modes in union causing the first issue, and the second and third in their joint action the inferior class of existences.[66]

[60] Dasgupta, *op. cit.*, p. 250.
[61] *Loc. cit.*
[62] Davies, *op. cit.*, p. 59, n4.
[63] *Loc. cit.*
[64] Chatterjee and Datta, *op. cit.*, p. 274.
[65] *Loc. cit.*

The individual buddhi and their particular sattva evolutes of ahaṅkāra and the eleven derivatives are so related that though they are different from buddhi in their functions, they are all comprehended in the buddhi, and marks only its gradual differentiations and modes. As the ahaṅkāra partially depletes itself generating the lower evolutes, it draws upon the buddhi for replenishment, and the buddhi, in turn, is refilled from prakṛti. Prakṛti is the infinite reserve of the constituent factors for the evolution of the universe.

The ahaṅkāra is regarded as the principle of individuality and the ego-function. The cause of the self, believing that it is involved in all the responses to the phenomenal world, is the ahaṅkāra. It is also "the center and prime motivating force of 'delusion' (abhimāna)."[67] Zimmer further describes the ahaṅkāra as :

> The misconception, conceit, supposition, or belief that refers all objects and acts of consciousness to an "I" (aham). Ahaṅkāra—"the making (kāra) of the utterance 'I' (aham)"—accompanies all psychic processes, producing the misleading notion "I am hearing ; I am seeing . . ." etc. It is thus the prime cause of the critical "wrong conception" that dogs all phenomenal experience ; the idea, namely, that the life-monad (puruṣa) is implicated in, nay is identical with, the processes of living matter (prakṛti).[68]

Ahaṅkāra is the agent, not the puruṣa. "Mahat stands to ahaṅkāra as consciousness to self-consciousness. The former is the logical presupposition of the latter."[69] From the ahaṅkāra evolves "the eleven principles" which are the organs or faculties of sense and action, together with the 'manas'."[70] The faculties

[66] Davies, *op. cit.*, p. 61.
[67] Zimmer, *op. cit.*, p. 319.
[68] *Loc. cit.*
[69] Radhakrishnan, *op. cit.*, p. 268.
[70] Davies, *op. cit.*, p. 60.

of sense are those of seeing, hearing, touch, taste, and smell. The five subtle organs of action are those of speech, grasping, walking, digestion and reproduction.

> The real organs are not the perceptible external organs, like the eye-balls . . . etc. There are certain imperceptible powers (śakti) in these perceptible end organs which apprehend physical objects and act on them, and are therefore, to be regarded as the organs (indriyas) proper.[71]

Sāṅkhya calls the organs of perception or cognition budhīndriya; and those of action are termed karmendriya. As indicated above, the organs of cognition and action are not thought of as the physical organs. They are regarded as the "determinate modifications of the indeterminate modifications of the indeterminate mind-stuff (ahaṁkara or egoism)."[72] The material organs of the gross body are considered to be "the seats of those determinate sensory and motor psychophysical impulses. The buddhīndriya are the receptive psychophysical senses, while the karmendriya are the reactive psychophysical senses. The sense organs are subtle matter since they are derived from the ahaṅkāra ;

> . . . which, though not spiritual, may be called mental or psychophysical. Hence, the distinction between the organs of knowledge and the organs of action is ultimately based upon, the primary distinction between the sensory and motor mechanisms of the psychophysical organism, by which it knows the external world and reacts to it.[73]

The reception and reaction to the physical world proceeds from the raw experience of the external senses to the mind, manas, where these impressions are assimilated, classified and synthesized before being transmitted to the unifying apperception of the ahaṅkāra. Then they are determined by the buddhi and finally presented to the self. The buddhi then reacts to these impressions, reversing the procedure.

[71] Chatterjee and Datta, *op. cit.*, p. 275.
[72] Jadunath Sinha, *Indian Psychology Perception*, (London, Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co., Ltd., 1934), p. 4.
[73] *Loc. cit.*

Sāṅkhya insists that "the sense is something super-sensuous ; to confound it with the site is a mistake."[74] It is further contended that the sense organs are non-material since they are derived from ahaṅkāra. Both the sensory and motor organs are presided over by the mind, manas. In the hierarchy of the three internal organs, manas is the lower, next is the ahaṅkāra, and then the buddhi. These three are "the principal sense-organs, since they apprehend all objects : past, present, and future. The external senses are the subordinate organs, since they apprehend only present objects."[75] The concept of the internal organs as higher or lower is relative, depending upon the function of the particular organ. In ascending order, the "Manas is the chief organ in relation to the function of the external senses ; ahaṅkāra is the chief organ in relation to the function of manas ; and buddhi is the chief organ in relation to the function of ahaṅkāra."[76] Buddhi is considered the prime organ because of its more direct relationship with the puruṣa or self, its pervasion of all the sense organs, the retention of all subconscious impressions, saṁskāra, and the faculty of memory and meditation.

> The buddhi and its sattva evolutes of ahaṁkāra and the senses are so related that though they are different from buddhi in their function, they are all comprehended in the buddhi, and mark only its gradual differentiations and modes."[77]

Thus, every buddhi and its included ahaṅkāra and senses constitutes a separate microcosmos distinct from all other buddhi groups. They, the buddhis, are similar to each other, but due to their own particular avidyā, ignorance, this similarity does not become identity to the extent that perception is dependent upon the senses, the manas, and the ahaṅkāra, it is particularized for the individual buddhi. On the other hand, the portion of perception which is not part of the sense experience is regarded as belonging to the "community of all buddhi in the buddhi-tattva."[78] The buddhitattva is a community of individual

[74] Ballantyne, *op. cit.*, p. 204.
[75] Sinha, *op. cit.*, p. 6.
[76] *Ibid.*, p. 7.
[77] Dasgupta, *loc. cit.*
[78] *Loc. cit.*

buddhis which are made distinct by their own particular avidyā, ignorance.

VI. THE TANMĀTRAS

The discussion above has been concerned with the sattva evolutes of the ahaṅkāra. It will be remembered that the ahaṅkāra has a threefold development. The first is the sattvic tendency, the second is the rajasic, and the third the tamasic. These three modes of development are not independent of each other. They are to be regarded only as three aspects of a unity. The gross elements from which the world of objects is evolved are the tanmātras. The tanmātras evolve from the aspect of the ahaṅkāra, which has a preponderance of tamas. This state is called bhūtādi. The bhūtādi is an intermediate state. With the help of the rajas, the tanmātras are generated from the bhūtādi state. "The bhūtādi thus represents only the intermediate stage through which the differentiations and regroupings of tamas reals in the mahat proceed for the generation of the tanmātras."[79] The Sāṅkhya concept of evolution must not be thought of as meaning "coming out or emanation, but increasing differentiation in integration within the evolving whole."[80] In the stage of bhūtādi the regrouped tamas reals constitute the differentiation which has taken place within the mahat. This state of bhūtādi is completely homogeneous and inert. It has only the characteristic of quantum or mass.

Following the bhūtādi stage of differentiation is that of the tanmātras. Tanmātra designates subtle matter, which is "vibratory, impingent, radiant, instinct with potential energy."[81] They result from the disproportionate collocation of the primal tamas units with the primal rajas units. The various tanmātras "possess physical characters, some of them penetrability, others again capability of viscous and cohesive attraction."[82] They also possess the potentials of the energies of the "inner, subtle counterparts of the five sense experiences, viz., sound, touch colour-shape, flavour, smell,"[83] but since they are subtle matter,

[79] *Ibid.*, p. 251.
[80] *Loc. cit.*
[81] *Loc. cit.*
[82] *Loc. cit.*
[83] Zimmer, *op. cit.*, p. 327.

the tanmātras are without the form which is actualized in particles of gross matter. These potentials must undergo further transformations, aggregating into new configurations before they develop to the point at which they can act as a stimulus to the senses. The particles of gross matter go through a state in which they are too minute to act as sensory stimuli and are infrasensible.

The five tanmātras are the generic essences of the five gross physical elements. The tanmātras evolve progressively and simultaneously in this order; śabda, sparśa, rūpa, rasa, gandha, that is sound, touch, colour-shape, flavour, and smell. The first tanmātra to be generated directly from the bhūtādi is the śabda. The rūpa tanmātra follows the same pattern, that is a unit of sparśa plus a tamas unit from bhūtādi combined to form the rūpa tanmātra ; this occurs for the next two also. Schematically this process can be represented as follows :

Śabad . . . . śabad tanmātra
Śabda and a tamas unit . . sparśa ,,
Sparśa ,, ,, ,, . . rūpa ,,
Rūpa ,, ,, ,, . . rasa ,,
Rasa ,, ,, ,, . . gandha ,,

These constitute the intra-atomic units "which must be grouped and regrouped in a particular form to constitute a new existence as atoms before they can have the power of affecting our senses."[81] The basic difference between the tanmātras and the paramāṇu or atoms, is that the tanmātra are only potentially capable of affecting the senses ; whereas the paramāṇu are the actual gross material of the world.

Before going on, it must be pointed out that the description of gross matter as ether, air, fire, water, and earth is not to be thought of as a tabulation of the constituent elements as based upon a chemical analysis. They are to be regarded from the effect upon the five senses by which the objects of the world are known.

Each of our senses can only apprehend a particular quality and thus five different ultimate substances are said to exist corresponding to the five qualities which may be grasped by the five senses. In accordance with the

[81] Dasgupta, *op. cit.*, p. 252.

existence of these five elements, the existence of the five potential states or tanmātras was also conceived to exist as the ground of the five gross forms.[85]

Observation of the external world, whether by scientific instruments or not, is ultimately the response of the senses. The instrument gathers data which can have meaning to men only after it has been presented to the mind by way of the senses.

The physical atoms are generated from the tanmātras. First, the śabda tanmātra augmented with tamas from bhūtādi, generates the ākāśa, or ether. Following this, the touch potential or sparśa tanmātra combine with the śabda tanmātra to produce the gross atom of air or vāyu. The process is repeated to form the other gross atoms, that is the tanmātras of sparśa and rūpa combine to generate the fire or tejas atom, and the series continue for the formation of the water or ap-atom and the earth or kṣiti atom. After the generation of the ākāśa, the production of the gross atoms progresses to produce all the different atoms and simultaneously all the atoms increase in quantity. Some of the ākāśa atoms remain as ākāśa atoms and some of the vāyu atoms remain as vāyu atoms and so on for the others. The phenomenal world is thus made up of all the five gross atoms in varying combinations. Some of the properties of the mahabhutas are as follows : "The ākāśa-atom possesses penetrability, the vāyu-atom impact or mechanical pressure, the tejas-atom radiant heat and light, the ap-atom cohesive attraction."[86]

The ākāśa is a transitive form linking the bhūtādi to the tanmātras and these in turn to the production of the gross atoms. The Sāṅkhya designates two types of ākāśa. Kāraṇa-ākāśa which is non-atomic and all-pervasive is the formless mass in bhūtādi. The "ākāśa corresponds in some respects to the ether of the physicists and in others to what may be called proto-atom (protyle),"[87] and cannot be regarded as mere negation or unoccupiedness, āvaraṇābhāva. When the rajas and tamas factors associate, the tanmātra of sound is formed. The

[85] *Loc. cit.*
[86] *Ibid.*, p. 253.
[87] *Loc. cit.*, n.

tanmātra further integrates mass units from the bhūtādi and ākāśa atoms result. This latter is referred to as kārayākāśa. It is generated throughout the matrix of the kāraṇa-ākāśa and serves as the basis for the production of the vāyu atom. The kārayākāśa, since it is atomic, occupies limited space. The ahaṅkāra and the five tanmātras are referred to as aviśeṣa or indeterminate since they are capable of further determination and differentiation. The viśeṣa or determinate elements are the eleven senses and five mahābhūtas. There is a distinction made between the configurational change and that resulting from the evolvement of prakṛti. The viśeṣa represent the final products of prakṛti's course of evolution. All the rest of the phenomena of the world is nothing more than the rearrangement of these factors into new configurations and collocations.

The five mahābhūtas are referred to as atoms by Dasgupta, but it would be better to consider them as sub-atomic particles. These five factors are the basic constituents from which the "atoms" of the elements are produced. Thus, a certain aggregation of the mahābhūtas will result in the configuration which is called hydrogen and by further modifications of this collocation, all ninety two of the natural atoms of modern physics are evolved. The modern scientific concept of the atom acknowledges that they are all ultimately compounded of the same factors, only varying in the quantities of the basic materials. The Sāṅkhya philosophy has a cosmology which is very ancient, yet it appears to be very applicable in today's world.

VII. SĀṄKHYA EPISTEMOLOGY

The Sāṅkhya theory of knowledge is based upon the assumption that there are three discernable aspects of knowledge. They are the knower, the known, and the matrix of knowledge. The subject or knower is a conscious being and in reality the self. The object or known is that which is presented to the self by way of the mediating intellect. The matrix of knowledge is the transcendental relationship of the puruṣa and the buddhi with its component parts.

Pramā or valid knowledge has only three sources. "Perception, inference, and fit testimony are the three-fold (kinds of) accepted proof, because in them every mode of proof is fully

contained."[88] What cannot be demonstrated by the three methods named cannot be counted as valid knowledge. True knowledge must be definite and unerring.

Perception, which is of two kinds, is "definite cognition of particular objects through the contact of the senses."[89] Perception precedes the other two modes and is regarded as their superior because of this priority. The definition is only of the sense perception and does not apply to perception as experienced by one who has achieved mukti. The two kinds of perception are indeterminate and determinate. Indeterminate or nirvikalpaka perception is constituted of the raw sense data of the physical senses, and is called ālocana which denotes only the bare act of sensing an object. The other, savikalpaka or determinate perception, is the result of the raw sensum being analyzed, synthesized, and interpreted by manas. This is called judgement or vivecana.

The second source of valid knowledge is that of inference. This is also divided into two types of inference. They are vīta and avīta. These two terms mean affirmative and negative respectively. An inference is vīta if it is based on a universal positive proposition, and avīta if based on a universal negative. Inference of the sāṅkhya is the same as that of our modern logicians and can be either of a deductive or inductive nature. Vīta is of two kinds, roughly, corresponding to deduction and induction. The first is pūrvant inference and is based upon particular observations; and the other is sāmānyatodrṣṭa which is based upon logical relationships.

The last of the three sources of valid knowledge is that of testimony. It is not just any testimony, but is "testimony (such as is entitled to the name of evidence) is a declaration by one worthy (to be believed)."[90] This category of knowledge is also divided into two subdivisions, and these are known as laukika and vaidika. The first refers to valid assertions of ordinary trustworthy persons. The latter is the testimony of the scriptures. This last category is not to be accepted blindly, but must withstand logical analysis.

[88] Davies, *op. cit.*, p. 22.

[89] Ganganatha Jha, (Translator), *The Tattva-Kaumudī* (Poona, The Oriental Book Agency, 1934), p. 14.

[90] Ballantyne, *op. cit.*, p. 123.

In Sāṅkhya, as in all the philosophies of India, the basis of release from all the pain and suffering of life is vidyā. The path to mukti of liberation is by overcoming the avidyā or ignorance and attaining right knowledge. The valid sources of knowledge are the keys to mukti, if properly utilized. The application of these modes of knowledge will be more fully dealt with in the discussion of the self.

CHAPTER IV

YOGA AS A SEPARATE SYSTEM

YOGA is almost invariably linked with the Sāṅkhya philosophy. Yet it is regarded as one of the six darśanas. Yoga has been referred to as the Theistic Sāṅkhya because of the similarity of the two systems. This reference stems from the inclusion of Īśvara in the Yoga Sūtra. Sāṅkhya only denies the possibility of a logical concept of God, and hence does not refer to God in its system of logic.

Yoga teaches a system of discipline which is designed to give the practitioner perfect physical and psychological control of himself. This control enables him to attain Mukti or liberation.

It seems that the addition of the God concept and a series of practices to the Sāṅkhya system would hardly justify counting Yoga as one of the six orthodox systems of philosophy. The importance of Yoga is seen in its inclusion in the six systems as well as the fact of its being accepted as the counterpart of almost every other system of philosophy of India. Further confusion is added by "both the Kapila Sāṅkhyasūtra and the Patañjali Yoga-sūtra being referred to as 'Sāṅkhya-pravacana', (an exposition of Sāṅkhya)."[1] Dasgupta does not feel that the Yoga system is simply a modification of that of the Sāṅkhya. He believes that both the systems of Kapila and of Patañjali are derived from the same original school of Sāṅkhya, which preceded Kapila as well as Patañjali. Metaphysically, these two schools are fundamentally the same, but there are many philosophical, ethical, and practical points upon which they differ sharply.

[1] Dasgupta· *Yoga Philosophy, op. cit.*, p. 2.

The two most widely recognized differences are those dealing with the idea of "God" and the emphasis on the practical aspect of Yoga, it is widely recognized that Yoga practices are considered "the counterpart, not only of the Sāṅkhya system, but of almost every other system of Indian philosophy."[2] The relationship of Yoga to the Sāṅkhya system, and most of the other systems, is described by Bose as follows :

> The Yoga Philosophy is the counterpart of the Sāṅkhya system, and it begins where the other ends. The conclusion to which the Sāṅkhya system brings us is that the emancipation of the soul is effected by right knowledge, . . . The Sāṅkhya Philosophy raises the question, but refers to the Yoga Philosophy for its solution; and therefore the first form is incomplete without the second.[3]

It is evident from this and many other statements that the close doctrinal affinity of Sāṅkhya and Yoga is quite generally accepted. Dasgupta acknowledges the two systems are similar, but he feels that they are similar because of a common origin ; a source which gave rise to the development of two systems along almost parallel lines. Some claim that "the only difference between the two is that the Saṁkhya pertains to the universal condition of nature, and the Yoga system pertains to the individual condition of nature."[4]

In the practical system laid down for the introverted concentration, one of the steps urged to aid one in developing singleness of mind is the directive to concentrate upon one object. Among these objects is listed "God". In book one, aphorism twenty three, Patañjali says "Illumination is also attained by devotion to God."[5] A later aphorism states, "Or (the steadying of the mind may be effected) by pondering anything that one approves."[6]

The above aphorisms indicate that Garbe's assertions that God is interjected as a sop to the theists seems to have some foundation. It is more probable though that Patañjali was, as

[2] Bose, *op. cit.*, p. 157.
[3] *Loc. cit.*, vide p. 31.
[4] Bernard, *op. cit.*, p. 89.
[5] S.P. Swāmi, *Aphorisms of Yoga* (London, Faber & Faber, Ltd., 1938), p. 37.
[6] Tatya, *op. cit.*, p. 35.

most Indian writers, concentrating upon the process of developing the thesis of his method of gaining control of the mind. Anything which was not directly concerned in this process is alloted only incidental mention. It seems to be normal practice for most writers to mention things only in a cursory manner or ignore them completely if it is felt that the discussion of the subject would only be redundant for his readers. Another factor which holds a high place in the intellectual climate of India is that of individualism. Contrary to the view of many Western writers, most of the philosophies originating in India hold that the individual freely determines his own path to liberation. There is almost unanimous acceptance of this goal. The statement that there is but one goal and the paths to it many, is almost universally accepted in Indian thought of today.

Even though Yoga allows for the existence of Iśvara, the description given is that of one of the multitude of puruṣas. "The Lord is a particular Spirit (Purusha) untouched by troubles, works, fruits, or deserts. In Him does the germ of the omniscient become infinite. He is the preceptor even of the first, for he is not limited by time."[7] Sāṅkhya does not allow for the superiority of any of the puruṣas over any of the others. Īśvara, by his omniscient influence, "facilitates the attainment of liberation, but does not grant it."[8] Liberation is not union with "God," but it is the discrimination between prakṛti and puruṣa as in the Sāṅkhya. The position of Sāṅkhya on the concept of God is that of agnosticism. God is outside the realm of the knowable, hence is not a proper subject of epistemology. It would appear from these two positions that the two systems are not as antithetical as the titles of atheism and theism would indicate. This difference seems to be more apparent than real.

In the area of cosmology and psychology there are a few differences which do not appear to be much more than one of the points emphasized. While Sāṅkhya insists upon discriminative knowledge derived by logical analysis, Yoga lays emphasis upon psychological discipline. Manas, ahaṅkāra, and buddhi are regarded as distinct principles by Sāṅkhya. Yoga groups

[7] *Ibid.*, p. 22.

[8] Radhakrishnan, *op. cit.*, p. 371 ; Dasgupta, *op. cit.*, p. 258; Dvivedi *op. cit.*, p. 21.

them all under the concept of citta. They are thus regarded only as aspects of the citta. Yoga regards citta as all pervading in the human form; Sāṅkhya does not. The Yoga accepts the same sources of valid knowledge as the Sāṅkhya; perception; inference, and authoritive testimony. Citta has five states or vṛttis. They are the vṛttis of right cognition, illusory knowledge, imagination, sleep and memory. The aim of Yoga is the complete control of these states so that the reflection of the puruṣa will be more perfect and thus bring about liberation.

One point of difference in the cosmologies of these two philosophies is that of the source of the tanmātras. This difference appears to be due to the emphasis of the universal by Sāṅkhya, and conversely the emphasis of the individual by Yoga. In the Sāṅkhya the tanmātras evolve out of the ahaṅkāra while the Yoga feels that the source is the mahat. This separation allows for the attainment of mukti while still of this world. If the tanmātras are a part of the ahaṅkāra, the discrimination which dissolves the ego sense would also dissolve all that is based upon it. Thus, the Yoga gives the objective world more validity. This does not imply that the tanmātras, which constitute the individual, are independent of the ahaṅkāra. The evolutionary process for both philosophies ultimately are not very different in their final products. Another cosmological difference revolves around the disruption of the prakṛtic pralaya. In the case of Sāṅkhya, the equilibrium is broken by innate teleology of the guṇa attributes of prakṛti activated by the transcendental influence of the puruṣas. The cycle is never ending, and is the basis of cycles of creation and destruction of the universe. Yoga attributes the disturbance of the pralaya to the transcendental influence of Īśvara. In either instance the impetus is of a nature similar to that of the sun on the earth. Prakṛti reacts to the effulgence of the puruṣas or Īśvara. All the puruṣas and Īśvara are uneffected by prakṛti at any point of the cycle of production and reduction. The apparent effect is due to a lack of discrimination between the observer and the observed. Mukti or liberation results from viveka or discriminative knowledge. Puruṣa has achieved the state of kaivalya or isolation-integration, which is the ultimate goal of all beings when this discrimination is attained.

A point of agreement between Yoga and Sāṅkhya is that of

regarding time and space as construction of the mind.[9] "As a matter of fact, there is no real aggregation between the moments and their succession; hence all such Divisions of time . . . are purely subjective."[10] Since time is regarded as subjective, it cannot have any real objective existence. "The knowledge born of discrimination is liberative, omni-objective, comprehending things in all conditions, and simultaneous."[11] When true knowledge is achieved, the categories of the mind which are born of avidyā are superseded and the puruṣa recognizes itself as beyond all the wiles of prakṛti. The puruṣa which is in reality beyond any mutation, is not bound by space and time or any other category of mind.

Sāṅkhya and Yoga are very much alike in their basic philosophy. The great difference is in the area emphasis. Sāṅkhya concentrates on the logical structure of the world and its availability to understanding, while Yoga directs its major effort toward the embodiment of this knowledge in the life of the individual. Sāṅkhya gives the preference to the theoretical, and Yoga devotes its major effort to the application of the theory to practical life.

[9] Dasgupta, *op. cit.*, p. 256, n.
[10] Jha, *op. cit.*, p. 215.
[11] *Ibid.*, p. 219.

CHAPTER V

THE SĀṄKHYA-YOGA CONCEPT OF THE SELF

Up to this point, the paper has dealt primarily with what constitutes the non-self. It has been indicated that everything which is a part of the world is not of the self. Human understanding is dependent upon the mind which is not a part of the self. From the time that man first attempted to express or convey an idea to another man, the problem of communication has been with us. How does one know that his idea has been correctly grasped ? In the everyday world this problem of communication causes difficulty, and much more so in the discussion of abstractions. The concept of the self as wholly other than the rationally conceivable is very difficult to grasp and even more difficult to convey. A more accurate explanation of the self might be made by designating the things which it is not. In fact, this is the basis of the incorrect interpretation of the philosophies of the Orient as being negative in their outlook. This is erroneous, of course, and due to a faulty understanding of the teachings of these peoples.

Since Sāṅkhya and Yoga are so similar they have many terms in common. Most of the terms are also used in the same way. They do differ in respect to the universal and the individual. This difference is due to the contrariety of the base of their systems. The former deals primarily with the universal aspects of the world, while the other deals with the universal categories as they are related to the all-important individual.

The terms puruṣa and jīva are used to indicate the self in Sāṅkhya-Yoga. The usual interpretation of these terms by many modern scholars, both Western and Eastern, is that of soul. Since this latter term has had so many different associations

connected with it, it would be better to use the terms self or spirit. Better still, the terms should be adopted as they are. Puruṣa and jīva can be made clear just as easily as the terms soul, self, and spirit. It might even be easier to convey the concept represented by these two symbols, as they will not have as many disadvantages as the more familiar but overworked terms of self, soul, and spirit.

Sāṅkhya feels that the existence of the puruṣa is not a matter of dispute, although it is conceded that there is disagreement among philosophies about the nature of puruṣa. In fact, the acceptance of the puruṣa is regarded as axiomatic.

> (The relation of cause and effect is) not (alleged as) the means of establishing (the existence of Soul); because, as is the case with (the disputed term) 'merit', there is no dispute about there being such a kind of thing; (though what kind of thing is matter of dispute).[1]

This aphorism is further enlarged upon in the commentary which accompanies it :

> There is no dispute about 'there being such a kind of thing', i. e., as to there being Soul . . . for the dispute is (not as to its being, but) as to its peculiarity (of being), as (whether it be) multitudinous, or sole, all-pervading, (philosophical system, or theory), there is no dispute as to (there being something to which may be applied to the term) 'merit' (dharma)—for the difference of opinion has regard to the particular kind of (thing, . . . which shall be held to involve) 'merit'.[2]

This argument apparently included even the materialist. In the following aphorism, the materialists are refuted. Kapila then gives the reasons for the acceptance of a particular kind of puruṣa.

The self-intelligent principle, puruṣa, is distinguished from the prakṛti and its qualities. The puruṣas are isolated, neutral, intelligent and inactive. They are many, without parts, without qualities, and do not contract or expand. When occupying a body, it is allpervasive and is not contained in the body in which it is manifested.

[1] Ballantyne, *op. cit.*, p. 158.
[2] *Loc. cit.*

"The exact nature of soul is however very difficult of comprehension, and yet it is exactly this which one must thoroughly grasp in order to understand the Sāṁkhya philosophy."[3] Of course this also applies to its theistic twin, Yoga. The puruṣa of the Yoga as well as Sāṅkhya philosophy is described as entirely devoid of characteristics of any kind. Its nature is that of pure consciousness (cit). Vedānta and the Sāṅkhya-Yoga views differ in their consideration of the puruṣa. Vedānta considers the puruṣa's nature to be pure intelligence and bliss (ananda). Not so with Sāṅkhya-Yoga, for bliss is considered but another name for pleasure, which as such is a part of the prakṛti and not of the puruṣa.

Another area of dispute with the Vedānta is the consideration of the individual selves (jīva). In Vedānta the jīvas are considered to be but manifestations of primal ignorance (maya), and as such are illusory from the ultimate standpoint. Sāṅkhya-Yoga asserts that there are many puruṣas and that they are real and not illusory. Sāṅkhya-Yoga is definitely dualistic in the insistence on the absolute dichotomy between puruṣa and prakṛti, spirit and matter. With respect to the distinction between individual puruṣas, they are just as resolved that the puruṣas are infinite in number, hence they are pluralists. Kapila says that :

> Because there is definite adjustment of birth, death, and the organs, because there is non-simultaneity of activity and because there is diversity due to the three Attributes—the plurality of Spirits is established.[4]

Vācaspati Miśra comments that the conjunction of puruṣa with a new body, physical and psychological, "does not mean modification; since the Spirit is essentially unmodifiable."[5] He further states that one puruṣa for all would result in all humans being born, dying, and doing various things at the same time. This absurdity of universal uniformity of human action is avoided by the hypothesis of multiplicity of puruṣas. Another argument in favour of plurality is based upon the natural

[3] Dasgupta, *op. cit.*, p. 238.
[4] Jha, *op. cit.*, p. 64.
[5] *Ibid.*, p. 65.

diversity inherent in the three Attributes. Miśra's concluding comment on this aphorism states :

> This 'diversity' or 'differentiation' due to the distribution of the Attributes in the various entities, could not be explained if the Spirit were one and the same in all. On the hypothesis of plurality, however, there is no difficulty.[6]

Davies, in his commentary on Kārikā eighteen, points out that Kapila is represented as having written in book one, aphorism one hundred fifty four to the effect that there is no conflict between his teachings and those of the Vedas. The aphorism is as follows: "There is no opposition to the Scriptures (declaratory) of the non-duality (of Soul); because the reference (in such texts), is to the genus, (or to Soul in general)."[7] According to Davies, "The sūtra is probably a late interpolation, due to someone who wished to reconcile the system of Kapila with that of the Vedāntist school."[8] He further states, "Kapila himself seems to have been too honest and too bold a thinker to make such an attempt."[9] The concept of the genus of puruṣa is not only contrary to Kapila's teachings but is also counter to the teachings of the Vedānta system. Each jīva is accepted as an ens by Kapila. "If an absolute Supreme Spirit exists," Kapila appears to have felt, "such a nature lies outside the domain of philosophy; Humanity being with him . . . the highest point of philosophic research."[10]

Five primary arguments are put forward by this philosophic system in support of the existence of the puruṣas. In the Sāṅkhya aphorisms the first argument is as follows :

> (The existence) of Soul (is inferred) from the fact that the combinations (of the principles of Nature into their various effects) is for the sake of another (than unintelligent Nature, or any of its similarly unintelligent products).[11]

[6] *Ibid.*, p. 66.
[7] Ballantyne, *op. cit.*, p. 171.
[8] Davies, *op. cit.*, p. 50.
[9] *Loc. cit.*
[10] *Loc. cit.*
[11] Ballantyne, *op. cit.*, p. 81.

In a later aphorism this statement is found : "Because that which is combined (and is, therefore, discerptible), is for the sake of some other, (not discerptible)."[12] The Yoga Aphorisms also indicate that "For the sake of it alone is the entity of the visible."[13] 'It' refers to the puruṣa, and the 'entity of the visible' is prakṛti. The point that is being made here is that there is a teleology for the actions and productions of prakṛti, and that reason is the self or puruṣa.

The second basis for postulating the puruṣa is given in this aphorism : "(and Soul is something else than the body, &c.); because there is (in Soul), the reverse of the three Qualities, &c."[14] Puruṣa is the viewer of all the productions of prakṛti's three guṇas. This argument is inferred from the previous statement. For, if a thing is for the sake of another, and to avoid the 'regressus ad infinitum', the non-composite nature of puruṣa must be accepted. Thus the properties of the puruṣa are as follows : "Without the three attributes, distinguishable, non-objective, (subjective), uncommon (specific), sentient, and not productive."[15]

"Because there must be control,"[16] is the third premise. "There must be a presiding power, a pure consciousness which co-ordinates all experiences."[17]

> The objects constituted by the 'three Attributes' are such as 'are always controlled' . . . therefore, they must have a 'controller', and this controller must be beyond the three Attributes and independent ; . . . and this is the spirit.[18]

The fourth argument is that "there must be someone to experience."[19] Since "It is Nature that is experienced; the experiencer is Soul."[20] Prakṛti is regarded as non-intelligent and her products can only be experienced by an intelligent agent, puruṣa.

[12] *Ibid.*, p. 159.
[13] Tatya, *op. cit.*, p. 67 ; Jha, *Yoga-Darshana*, p. 122.
[14] Ballantyne, *op. cit.*, p. 160.
[15] Jha, *Tattva-Kaumudi*, p. 61.
[16] *Ibid.*, p. 62.
[17] Radhakrishnan, *op. cit.*, p. 280.
[18] Jha, *op. cit.*, p. 62.
[19] *Loc. cit.*
[20] Ballantyne, *op. cit.*, p. 161.

The last argument is the basis of the Yoga Sūtras of Patañjali. Sāṅkhya says, "(It is for Soul, and not for Nature;) because the exertions are with a view to isolation, (from all qualities; a condition to which Soul is competent, but Nature is not)."[21] In the commentary the reasoning by which this conclusion is derived is as follows:

> The very essence of Nature cannot depart from it (so as to leave it in the state of absolute, solitary isolation contemplated)—because the three Qualities are its very essence, (the departure of which from it would leave nothing behind), and because it would thus prove to be not eternal, (whereas, in reality, it is eternal). The isolation (kaivalya) of that alone is possible of which the qualities are reflexional, (and not constitutive); and that is Soul.[22]

It would be better to use spirit or self rather than the term soul. What is called soul in the West is more properly compared with the linga-śarīra in Sāṅkhya-Yoga. Linga-śarīra is capable of enjoying the glories of a heaven, whereas the puruṣa is beyond any involement of any kind. Self is different than soul because puruṣa is not a mental substratum, but is of the nature of pure consciousness (suddha cit). The comparison here is best made by showing two statements which describe the soul and one which describes the linga-śarīra. The first statement is as follows:

> . . . in the case of man, the substantial form is a spiritual soul, a form which can exist by itself apart from matter. . . . It must be remembered that the soul is not a pure spirit, as thought has not what is spiritual but what is abstract as its direct object; hence it has need of the senses of the body, to bring it in contact with the world of knowable reality.[23]

The second statement also indicates that:

> . . . the normal exercise of the soul's activity requires the co-operation of the organism and that the soul when separated from the body is in a state of relative inferiority

[21] *Ibid.*, p. 162.
[22] *Loc. cit.*
[23] Mercier, Cardinal, et. al., A *Manual of Modern Scholastic Philosophy* (London, Kegān Pawl, Trench, Trübner & Co. Ltd., 1926), p. 308, Vol 1.

> that is incompatible with the requirements of its perfect happiness . . . the spirit-world, the world of the pure-intelligible is beyond the natural faculties of the human soul, and consequently, . . . the soul cannot rise to an apprehension of such objects.[24]

Davies' commentary on the Sāṅkhya Kārikā says in part that the linga-śarīra is a kind of spiritual body formed of the intellect (buddhi), egoism, manas, and the subtle elements. He further indicates that the linga-śarīra has an existence which is separate from that of the gross body. It does not die with the body, but has a subtle kind of vitality formed of prakṛtic material, thus it is capable of ascending to the heavens of the gods.[25] "It forms the personality of each individual."[26] The self concepts of some representative Western thinkers will be taken up in more detail in the next chapter.

Īśvarakṛṣṇa describes the witnessing puruṣa as, "isolated, neutral, perceptive, and inactive by nature."[27] Puruṣa is described by Kapila in the Sāṅkhya Aphorisms as "without qualities," "intelligent," "witness," "constantly and altogether free," and "indifferent."[28] "Within each individual, the self-luminous puruṣa, ātman or pums illuminates all the processes of gross and subtle matter . . . of both life and consciousness."[29] The description of the puruṣa must take a negative approach for it is within the capabilities of the rational mind to designate what it is not, not what it is. The puruṣa is "without form or content . . . devoid of qualities and peculiarities, . . . without beginning, without parts and divisions."[30] It appears that the puruṣa represents that which is permanent, immutable, and intransient in each individual. That which reaffirms constantly that the individual of today is the same individual it was yesterday plus all the new and continuous experiences that have and are proceeding eternally. Puruṣa, then, is the life-monad, that

[24] *Ibid.*, p. 326.
[25] Davies, *op. cit.*, pp. 76-77.
[26] *Ibid.*, p. 80.
[27] *Ibid.*, p. 50.
[28] Ballantyne, *op. cit.*, pp. 56-165-179-181.
[29] Zimmer, *op. cit.*, p. 285.
[30] *Loc. cit.*

"living entity concealed behind and within all the metamorphoses of life in bondage."[31] It is spiritual and of the nature of sheer, self-effulgent light, (prabhasa). If the puruṣa is of the nature of an inactive, neutral, formless, and qualityless entity, the natural question is how does it become involved in the mesh of prakṛti with its guṇas ? How does it control the physical embodiment with all of its more subtle attachments (buddhi, ahaṅkāra, etc.), if it does control the human manifestation ? These two questions seem to be the eternal thorns in the side of all dualistic systems. In Sāṅkhya-Yoga these questions have been anticipated. The answer to both questions seems to be self-illusion. Patañjali says in book two, aphorisms six and seventeen, that the "sense of being is the identification of the seer with the instruments of knowledge,"[32] and "the basic cause of all karma is the identification of the self with the experience and environment."[33] The pure intelligence, puruṣa, and the non-intelligent, buddhi, resemble each other in such a way that buddhi, though in itself is "insentient, appears as if sentient by virtue of being reflected in the sentience,"[34] of puruṣa. It must be remembered that the buddhi is composed of guṇas, the subtle elements of prakṛti, and that the guṇa in extreme preponderance is the sattva of intelligence stuff. The resemblance, in fact, is of the caliber of the image reflected from a mirror.[35] Thus it is the buddhi which reflects the purity and intelligence of the puruṣa to such a degree as to appear to the viewing puruṣa as its own intelligence. Bhoja Raja comments, in part, to aphorism eight of book one of the Yoga Aphorisms, that misconception is a notion which arises in respect of something that is not so and which does not abide in the form of the thing. That is, the notion does not reveal the true form or real nature of the thing.[36] Dasgupta elaborates

[31] *Ibid.*, p. 284.

[32] Coster, Geraldine, *Yoga and Western Psychology*, (London, Oxford University Press, 1935), p. 111.

[33] *Ibid.*, p. 114.

[34] Jha, *op. cit.*, p. 15.

[35] A clear pool is a better analogy, for the disturbance of the waters causes the puruṣa to lose sight of his pure reflection. Tatya, *op. cit.*, p. 4.

[36] *Ibid.*, p. 6.

this idea; all of our thought and other emotions or volitional operations are in reality the non-intelligent transformations of the buddhi or citta. It is by virtue of the buddhi's preponderance of sattva that the puruṣa's reflection causes the buddhi to appear as though the intelligence were its own. He further indicates that according to Sāṅkhya-Yoga the puruṣa cannot be directly demonstrated by self-consciousness. The puruṣa's existence is to be inferred on teleological grounds and on grounds of moral responsibility. "Ordinarily he is identified with or lost in his own confused picture of life."[37] He, the puruṣa, cannot be directly recognized as being separate from the buddhi modifications unless discriminative knowledge has been attained. Without discriminative knowledge, because of the eternal avidyā, the changing states of buddhi are regarded as conscious. These changes are so associated with the reflection of the puruṣa in the buddhi that they are interpreted as the experiences of the purusa.[38] The reflection of the puruṣa and the buddhi are so associated that the discriminative knowledge can come after complete quiescence of the buddhi has been achieved. An excellent analogy is given in Bhoja Raja's commentary to the fourth aphorism in book one, where he compares the mind to a pool and the puruṣa to the moon, "the moon (reflected) in the moving ripples of the water, looks as if that orb itself were moving."[39]

Vijñāna Bhikṣu objects to this view of Vācaspati. For Vijñāna Bhikṣu felt that this type of an association of the buddhi with the puruṣa's image did not support a valid conception of a real person who is the experiencer. He considered the buddhi to be intellectualized by the reflection of the image of the puruṣa which is then super-imposed upon the puruṣa. This then, results in an abiding and experiencing person. Dasgupta says of these two ideas, "What-ever may be the explanation, it seems that the union of the buddhi with the puruṣa is somewhat mystical."[40] Earlier, Dasgupta stated that according to the Sāṅkhya view the relationship of the puruṣa and prakṛti is a transcendental one. In a footnote to this he points out that the Yoga

[37] Coster, *op. cit.*, p. 100 ; Patañjali, Book I, Aphorism 4.

[38] Dasgupta, *op. cit.*, p. 260.

[39] Tatya, *op. cit.*, p. 4.

[40] Dasgupta, *loc. cit.*

has a different view on this.[41] It holds that it is the creative will of Īśvara which allows the evolvement of prakṛti which in turn produces the situation whereby the puruṣa finally is able to realize the freedom which it has always possessed.

The relationship of buddhi (prakṛti) and puruṣa is described by Radhakrishnan thus :

> The first cause, as well as the final cause, of all the cosmic process is puruṣa. But the causation of puruṣa is purely mechanical, being not to its volition but to its mere proximity. Puruṣa moves the world by a kind of action which is not movement. It is compared to the attraction of a magnet for iron.[42]

It is interesting to note that there is an apparent disagreement between Dasgupta and Radhakrishnan on this point of the relationship of the puruṣa and prakṛti. What Dasgupta regards as "the transcendental (non-mechanical) influence of the puruṣa[43] is considered "purely mechanical"[44] by Radhakrishnan. It seems as though Radhakrishnan has taken the analogy of the magnet and iron as a reality rather than merely a mental construct to be used as a tool to make the incomprehensible just a bit more understandable.

Radhakrishnan compares the puruṣa concept of Sāṅkhya with the God concept of Aristotle. For Aristotle affirms a transcendent God as the prime origin of the world and its motions. This God is "a purely contemplative being shut up within himself, so that he can neither act upon the universe nor take cognisance of it."[45] The movement of the world is not determined by God, it is rather created by the striving after God by the world. God, Pure Intelligence, unmoved, moves the universe by His mere being. Is this a mechanical influence upon the world of things ? Does this differ substantially from the transcendental relationship of puruṣa and prakṛti ? Both questions appear to require a negative answer. The relationship

[41] *Ibid.*, p. 248.
[42] Radhakrishnan, *op. cit.*, p. 289.
[43] Dasgupta, *loc. cit.*
[44] Radhakrishnan, *loc. cit.*
[45] *Loc. cit.*

of puruṣa and prakṛti is thought of as mystical[46] by Dasgupta, while Radhakrishnan responds, "Puruṣa is said to be outside prakṛti, and its influence on prakṛti, though real, is unintelligible."[47]

Referring to the puruṣa as the life-monad, Zimmer says in connection with this double problem of the relationship of prakṛti and puruṣa that by its mere inactive and luminous presence, the puruṣa seems to be the activator, and in this hallucinatory role is known as the Lord or Supervisor (svāmin, adhiṣṭhātar) even though it does not actually command or control. Automatically and blindly the conditioning attributes (upādhis) work of themselves. The real center and governor of their life process being the antaḥkaraṇa or inner organ. The puruṣa, by virtue of its effulgence, illuminates and is reflected in the process. This association of the puruṣa and prakṛti never had a beginning and has existed from all eternity. He compares the relationship to that of the sun upon the earth and its vegetation. There is no effect upon the sun by the pervasion of the earth by its life giving rays. What appears to be the sun's activity is in reality nothing more than the activity of matter due to the incidental bathing of the earth by the sun's rays. "The self-effulgence of the uninvolved life-monad (puruṣa), by suffusing the unconscious material of the realm and processes of lifeless matter (prakṛti), creates, as it were, both the life and consciousness of the individual.[48] Zimmer cites the example of an unmoving person reflected in a moving mirror giving the illusion of the person moving.

This is similar to the situation of two railroad trains standing in the station. An individual in one of the cars, looking at the other train, sees movement and for a moment he is unaware as to which is moving, he in his railroad car or the other train.

As a final demonstration of this relationship of the dualism of prakṛti and puruṣa, Max Müller cites a simile :

> . . . the purusha, when he seems to see, to combine, to rejoice, to suffer, and to will, does so by misapprehension

[46] This relationship cannot be defined in terms of logical categories.
[47] *Ibid.*, p. 290.
[48] Zimmer, *op. cit.*, p. 287.

only, like a spectator who is carried away by his sympathies for Hecuba, but who in the end dries his tears and stops his sighs, leaves the theatre of the world and breathes the fresh air of a bright night.[49]

Müller points out the great similarity between this simile and the one Sāṅkhya uses in describing prakṛti as a dancer which is given in Kārikā fifty nine, "As a dancing girl, having exhibited herself to the spectators of the stage, ceases to dance, so does Nature cease to operate when she has made herself manifest to the Spirit."[50]

Fundamental to a thorough understanding of the Sāṅkhya and Yoga philosophies is the concept of prakṛti, the concept of puruṣa, and the concept of the relationship of the two. Prakṛti, composed of the three subtle ultimates called guṇas, becomes manifest only after the dynamic equilibrium of the three gūṇas (sattva, rajas, and tamas) is disturbed by the transcendental influence of the puruṣa. The manifestations which prakṛti assumes, once the state of pralaya is disrupted, are the guṇa aggregates which form the basis of the various phenomena of the physical and mental worlds. As for puruṣa, it is of the nature of pure intelligence, effulgent, inactive, neutral, and devoid of any comprehensible characteristics. The prakṛti is of the opposite nature, non-intelligent, dark, active, and without purpose other than the service rendered to the puruṣa. Prakṛti is like a puppet on strings, so long as the puruṣa's light of consciousness shines upon her she performs, as soon as the light of consciousness leaves her she can no longer perform rationally and disappears back into the unmanifested state of pralaya. The multitude of puruṣas are absorbed into the prakṛtic entanglement in much the same manner in which an audience becomes absorbed in a good drama production.

True insight awakens the puruṣa to the real nature of the situation. This can be achieved only by bringing the buddhi to perfect rest so that the puruṣa can behold its true reflection and thus know itself in all its purity. Mukti is achieved when the puruṣa discriminates between itself and the reflection.

[49] Max Müller, *Indian Philosophy* (Calcutta, Susil Gupta (India) Ltd., 1952), p. 80, Vol. III.

[50] Jha, *op. cit.*, p. 121; Davies, *op. cit.*, p. 94.

To the question, what becomes of puruṣa once it has attained freedom or release, Müller says :

> But this is a question which no philosophy can be expected to answer. All that can be said is that Purusha, freed from all Prakritic bonds, whether ignorance or knowledge, joy or sorrow, would remain himself, would be what he alone can be, unrestricted, not interfered with, free and independent, and hence in the highest sense of the word perfect and happy in himself.[51]

It is to be noted that Müller's answer is very similar to the answer that Buddha gives in relation to this question.[52]

The state of ineffable tranquillity which seems to be identical with the state or condition in which the puruṣa exists eternally, both prior to and after its release from the entanglements of the alluring prakṛti, has been misinterpreted innumerable times. The misinterpretation has occurred both in the cultures of the Orient as well as in the Occident. The uninformed seek a heavenly place where all the things and pleasures which they have denied themselves here on earth will be gratified. As the people become more informed, they seek a more and more spiritual reward for the good life they lead here. The saints, both of the East and West, are the very personification of tranquillity. It appears that the people who have really had the beatific vision agree to a very large extent as to what they have experienced.

I. SĀṄKHYA-YOGA PSYCHOLOGY

It should be remembered that in these systems of thought, although the world of the three subtle guṇas is as real as that of the puruṣa, the apparent participation of the puruṣa in the phenomenal world, physical and mental, is nothing more than self-illusionment of the puruṣa by its own unawareness of the distinction between itself and the prakṛti and its products. The association and participation of the puruṣa in the prakṛtic drama, "is a kind of optical effect—a psychological illusion—

[51] Müller, *op. cit.*, Vol. III, p. 81.

[52] Conze, E., Ed., *Buddhist Texts Through The Ages* (Oxford, Bruno Cassirer, 1953), p. 170.

which makes it appear as if the life-monad were in bondage, trapped in karmic meshes, caught in the unceasing activities"[53] of the eternal dance of the guṇa substances. Bondage, the condition which the limited and limiting mind, buddhi or citta, entertains towards the ever changeless, transcendent, and untainted self, is mere illusion. Salvation then is nought but the release of the illusion by the puruṣa, for this is the only hold that prakṛti has upon it. There is, according to Sāṅkhya-Yoga, between these two eternal reals, a gulf of unspanable heterogeneity, unspanable apparently except via the illusion.

Yoga, as a discipline, may be considered to be designed to "yield an experience of the sovereign aloofness and isolation of the suprapersonal nucleus of our being."[54] by way of the intentional suppression of the spontaneous activities of the matter with which it is involved. This matter is the bodily form and psychic shells which have been superimposed by self-deception on the puruṣa.

The Yoga philosophy is a realistic, mystical and scientific school of thought. It is realistic because it insists upon the real existence of the phenomenal world and a normal evaluation of the perceptions of the senses; it is mystical in its aim for a truth beyond mental comprehension, it is scientific in method and training of the total individual, employing the best psychological principles.[55]

Yoga is founded upon a doctrine of psychological functionalism. This system constructs and then transcends the various planes or worlds of experience. The relativity of all states of reality are thus demonstrated and made known. The inner world becomes known as a function of the inner psychic organs and the outer organs. Control of these energies by extension or retention enables the practiser of Yoga to contract or expand the world of his experience at will, and thus he is freed of all bondage. Success is dependent upon the directing of the sense faculties toward or withdrawing from the usual planes of projection ayatana.[56]

[53] Zimmer, *op. cit.*, p. 315.
[54] *Ibid.*, p. 316.
[55] Earnest E. Wood, *Practical Yoga Ancient & Modern* (New York, E. P. Dutton & Co., Inc., 1948), p. 28.
[56] Zimmer, *loc. cit.*

Complete independence of all the pairs of opposites, dvandva, that assail and seduce man is the unconditional prerequisite by which control and experience of this functionalism is brought about. The entities belonging to the macrocosmic realm of name-form can be dissolved and summoned back at will, only by a yogi who has accomplished perfect and unconditioned control of himself. With all of its contents and wisdom, the human mind is conditioned in every specific case by the peculiar balance of the subtle guṇas that go to make up its character, disposition and all else that makes it a corporeal being. "His ideas, beliefs, and insights, and even the things that he sees around him, are, finally, but the functions or reflexes of his particular manner of not-knowing-better."[57] Avidyā, the lack of discriminative knowledge, is the bird-net which at once catches and supports him as a personality. This intangible and binding limitation of his being will determine the experiences of this and following states of existence.

Zimmer feels that according to the analysis of the psyche presented by the Sāṅkhya, and assumed by the Yoga philosophers, man is active (kartā) through his five organs of action, and receptive through the five organs of perception. These two sets are the vehicles of spontaneity and receptivity, and he further describes them as the faculties working outward, bāhyendriya, and function as gates or doors, while the manus, ahaṅkāra, and buddhi, which constitutes the inner organ or antaḥkaraṇa act as the gatekeepers, inspecting, registering and controlling the flow of traffic.[58] That is to say, the sensual experiences of the external world are collected and registered through manas, appropriated by the ahaṅkāra and then presented to the buddhi which is the equivalent of the chancellor of the king and in its turn delivers them to the puruṣa. In the Tattva-Kaumudī, Vācaspati Miśra gives an analogy of a king who though inactive in the direct administration of his kingdom, effects the active function of government. Outwardly, his control is relayed by way of the chancellor, the king's chief representative of state, down through the hierarchy of government to the extreme echelons of authority. Conversely, the

[57] *Ibid.*, p. 317.
[58] *Loc. cit.*

reports from provinces progressively pass through larger and more centralized regional offices until the digested reports are presented to the king by the chancellor.[59]

The misconception of the self is in the reflected prakṛtic self and not in the self as such. This reflection of the puruṣa is what gives the prakṛti the appearance of consciousness.[60] Ahaṅkāra is the binding which seems to unite the prakṛti and puruṣa. The relationship of the puruṣa and prakṛtic buddhi which is associated with it is of such a nature as to cause whatever mental phenomena that occur in the mind to be interpreted by the puruṣa as being its own experiences.[61] "Even non-discrimination belongs to buddhi, and in bondage it is reflected in puruṣa."[62] In connection with this, Dasgupta indicates in his book 'Yoga As Philosophy and Religion', how complete this reflection of the puruṣa by prakṛti is, even in the last stage before final release. Writing of the purity of the preponderance of the sattva or mind stuff at this stage, he indicates that just prior to the state of kaivalya it is almost identical to kaivalya, the state of perfect isolation-integration. In this state the mind is so perfect that it reflects the puruṣa without distortion of any kind. The difference at this point is not really different from the state of kaivalya except in that the puruṣa must make the final step and recognize itself as distinct from the reflection, no matter how perfectly it reproduces an image of itself. When this occurs, prakṛti can serve no longer to bind the puruṣa.[63] In the Sāṅkhya Kārikā's sixty-five and sixty-six and in the Yoga sūtras, the last half of Book IV, describes this state and its outcome for the puruṣa. "Independence is the counter-product when the Qualities of Nature are devoid of purpose for the real man, or, the power of consciousness stands firm in its own nature".[64]

It seems from this that there is a mutual release for both the puruṣa and its prakṛtic elements. The puruṣa, once it has made

[59] Jha, *op. cit.*, p. 89.
[60] Ballantyne, *op. cit.*, p. 163.
[61] *Ibid.*, p. 65; Tatya, *op. cit.*, p. 3 and p. 69.
[62] Radhakrishnan, *op. cit.*, p. 292; Ballantyne, *op. cit.*, p. 65.
[63] Dasgupta, *Yoga as Philosophy and Religion*, (London, Kegān Pawl, Trench, Trübner & Co., Ltd., 1924), p. 22.
[64] Wood, *op. cit.*, p. 245.

the round trip from freedom to freedom is presumed to remain free for the rest of eternity.[65] In the case of the released prakṛtic elements which compose the citta, it is not clear whether it too is forever reduced to the state of pralaya or if it returns to the prakṛtic reserve which is ever in flux, performing for the remaining puruṣas. It is doubtful whether this was given any consideration, since the presumption has been cited where the prakṛtic guṇas are for one purpose, and that is to serve the puruṣas, leading them back home to their natural state of kaivalya. The puruṣa, at least in respect to the prakṛti, appears without the sense of appreciation for the services rendered.

There is an immediate conjunction between the puruṣa and the citta pertaining to it, and indirectly with the rest.[66] "While puruṣa is the saksin of buddhi, i.e. the witness of the states of buddhi without any intermediary, it is the beholder, draṣṭā, of others through the aid of buddhi."[67] The free and indifferent puruṣa is the saksin when reflected in the perfectly controlled prakṛtic buddhi.

The terms buddhi and citta are used interchangeably. The Yoga word, citta, is regarded as the repository of all subconscious states. Generally, Sāṅkhya uses buddhi in this way. The meaning of both words is the same in substance, that is the mind, but the emphasis is on two different functions. The term buddhi emphasizes the idea of intellection.[68]

When the buddhi is ruled by sattva, true knowledge is possible, when by rajas, desire results, and when by tamas, false knowledge arises. Three factors are involved in all knowledge; the object, the subject knowing, and the process of knowledge. "Citta exists for the sake of the puruṣa, who is deeper than thought, feeling, and will."[69] "Since they are other than both (Soul and Nature, the only two uncaused entities) Mind and the

[65] The freedom of discrimination between seen and seer does not restrict puruṣa from being a spectator of the prakṛtic dance.
[66] Davies, *op. cit.*, pp. 17, 54, 92.
[67] Radhakrishnan, *loc. cit.*
[68] Dasgupta, *History of Indian Philosophy*, p. 265n; Radhakrishnan, *op. cit.*, p. 345ff.
[69] Radhakrishnan, *op. cit.*, p. 346.

rest are products."[70] Although the puruṣa is considered the seat of knowledge, its nature is not altered by conjunction with the prakṛtic being.[71] "Knowledge results when the intelligence, caitanya, is reflected in the mirror of the thinking substance, citta, and assumes its form in so far as the latter has the form of the object."[72] Coster renders sūtra seventeen of book four of the Yoga Sūtra to read, "In order to know an object it is necessary for the mind to be able to reproduce that object in mental matter."[73] The same sūtra is number sixteen in Tatya's edition of the Yoga sūtra with Bhoja Raja's commentary, and he translates it as follows, "An object is known or unknown to the mind inasmuch as the tint of the object is required (to it)."[74] The Sāṅkhya Aphorisms discuss this topic in book one aphorisms eighty-seven and eighty-nine. The commentary says in part that, "knowledge and its sources are due only to the conjunction of the proper sense organ and results in sense perception."[75] The citta undergoes modification assuming the form of the objects presented to it, but being of an unconscious nature it has no perception of what it sees. It can only perceive by way of the reflection of the self acting on it. "The thinking principle (i.e. intellect) tinged by the knower and the knowable is the totality of objects."[76] That is the citta or buddhi is affected by both the objects of knowledge and the puruṣa. It is by the conjunction of the puruṣa that the buddhi is produced and is able to function, and since the buddhi is the internal organ which gathers and assesses the sense data, it is affected by the objective world. Despite the fact that the citta is in constant flux, "The functions of the mind are always known, on account of the constant nature of its lord, the puruṣa."[77] Citta is not self perceiving and is capable of only one modification at any one time. Cognition of more than one object cannot occur

[70] Ballantyne, *op. cit.*, p. 150.
[71] Ballantyne, *op. cit.*, p. 117.
[72] Radhakrishnan, *op. cit.*, p. 346.
[73] Coster, *op. cit.*, p. 129.
[74] Tatya, *op. cit.*, p. 155; Wood, *op. cit.* p. 198;
[75] Ballantyne, *op. cit.*, p. 104.
[76] Tatya, *op. cit.*, p. 160.
[77] M.N. Dvivedī, *The Yoga Sutras of Patañjali* (Madras, The Theosophical Publishing House, 1947), p. 124.

simultaneously.[78] Thus, it is only possible to be aware of the objective world, or of the buddhi or of the puruṣa. They cannot be cognised all at once. Consciousness can only be directed toward one idea at a time.

"Memory is not-allowing a thing cognized to escape."[79] Radhakrishnan says that memories are impressions left in the citta, and that these impressions leave residua which cause interests, desires, new births and further experiences. He further states that the citta's functioning produces potencies which in turn cause other potencies; supplying the driving force to spin the wheel of samsāra perpetually. The chain reaction of potencies resulting from passions and desires produce the sense of personality and life in saṁsāra.[80]

Puruṣa is distinguished from the ahaṅkāra since the ego-sense is dependent upon the experiential world. Ahaṅkara leads a restless and dissatisfied life, for it is subject to the five afflictions of avidyā. Avidyā "is regarding the non-eternal, impure, painful and not-self as the eternal, pure, pleasant, and self."[81] Further, "Egoism (asmitā) is the identifying of the power that sees with the power of seeing,"[82] as well as with the other instruments of the body and mind. This mis-identification leads to further attachments such as the desire for pleasurable experiences, the dread of the unpleasant and "The strong desire for life, seen even in the learned, and ever sustained by its own force."[83] Mukti is achieved only upon the complete suppression of all of these attachments. Once this is done the self-citta relationship is rendered null and void.

> When the self is freed from citta, it withdraws itself into its ground, becomes passionless, purposeless and depersonalised. The puruṣa in its true nature is merely the spectator of the mind's activity. When the mind (citta) is active, the self appears to experience various conditions,

[78] *Ibid.*, p. 126; *Tatya op. cit.*, p. 158.
[79] *Ibid.*, p. 8.
[80] Radhakrishnan, *op. cit.*, p. 346.
[81] Wood, *op. cit.*, pp. 63-235; Jha, *op. cit.*, p. 82; Dvivedī, *op. cit.*, p. 41; Tatya, *op. cit.*, p. 54.
[82] Tatya, *loc. cit.*
[83] Dvivedī, *op. cit.*, p. 42.

and when the mind becomes calm in meditation, the self abides in its own true form.[84]

There is a difference between the understanding of avidyā by the Sāṅkhya and the Yoga philosophies. In the Sāṇkhya avidyā is regarded as the failure of the puruṣa to perceive the distinction between the buddhi and itself, and thus is bound to the buddhi and its transformations. "This non-distinction of puruṣa from buddhi which is itself a mode of buddhi is what is meant by avidyā (non-knowledge) in Sāṅkhya, and is the root of all experience and all misery."[85] In the Yoga, avidyā is due not to non-distinction but to positive mis-conception of itself as the citta. This anyathākhyāti is the cause of the puruṣa accepting "the non-eternal, impure, evil, and non-ātman, to be eternal, pure, good, and ātman, respectively."[86] Avidyā is the very substance of the unbroken series, santāna, of the hindrances, kleśa, and of latent impressions due to karma, karmāśaya, and its fruition.[87]

Yoga and Sāṅkhya both maintain that liberation can come only through the true discrimination between puruṣa and the buddhi. The main emphasis of the Yoga system is on the method of attaining the state of freedom and the suppression of all the activities of the mind in both the buddhi and citta aspects. It is emphasized that the state of dreamless sleep is not to be confused with the final stilling of the mind. "Sleep is the idea based upon the conception of absence."[88] The objective of Yoga or concentration is the exclusion of the superficial layers of mental activity until the puruṣa is laid bare. Citta has the quality of concentration in all the five stages.

The five stages are kṣipta, mūdha, vikśipta, ekāgra, and nirodha. The first and most common to men is the stage of kṣipta, which means wild or restless. Concentration on any one area or object of experience is of very short duration, flitting about as a humming bird seeking the nectar from the many flowers in the garden of life. The next term, mūdha, is taken to

[84] Radhakrishnan, *op. cit.*, p. 347.
[85] Dasgupta, *History of Indian Philosophy*, Vol. I, p. 260.
[86] Dvivedī, *op. cit.*, p. 41.
[87] Radhakrishnan, *loc. cit.*, n.
[88] Wood, *op. cit*, p. 34; Jha, *op. cit.*, p. 22.

mean blinded or ignorant. In this type of concentration the mind instinctively attaches itself to the things of the world. The last stage, which is associated with the three guṇas is that of vikṣipta. This is the ordinary state of the mind in which it avoids the distasteful and seeks the pleasant. Vikṣipta means unsteady or distracted.

When citta is entirely filled by the sattva guṇa, it is in the state of ekāgra or one-pointedness. Here the mind is directed steadily toward only one object for an extended period of time. This is the final stage preparatory to the complete and absolute stabilizing of the mind. Nirodha or the state of cessation is the condition of the mind which allows the achievement of mukti. The entire system of Yoga is aimed at the achievement of the last two stages of ekāgra and nirodha, for they are preliminary to the attainment of samādhi.

Concentration is acknowledged to be present in all the states of mind. The difference is in the degree of intensity. The more intense the concentration, the more nearly is samādhi approached. The vṛtti or mental modifications have been stopped in nirodha, but then the latent residue of saṁsāra must be removed, otherwise it may serve as the root of a new growth of vṛtti and all the involvements of life. If these saṁsāras are not disposed of they may subsequently manifest themselves in a conscious state when a proper occasion arises. Similarly, vṛttis encourage similar depositions, much after the idea that once an act is performed the first time all subsequent performances of it are enacted with that much more ease. Habits, good and bad, are thus formed. Thus, not only are new modifications to be prevented by the Yogi, but all the previous deposits of saṁśaras are to be exhumed and eliminated so that they may not again bear fruit. The mind, once rid of all the vṛttis, is considered to be in "a balanced state (samāpatti), and to assume the form of whatever object is presented to it, the knower, the known or act of knowledge."[89] That is "to the Person, the Sense-organs and the things of the world,—it assumes the form of these; and this is what is called the state of coalescence (Samāpatti)."[90] The nature of the object as it is

[89] Radhakrishnan, *op. cit.*, p. 348.
[90] Jha, *op. cit.*, p. 62.

within itself is assumed by the mind in this stage. They are several states of concentration of lower quality than that of samādhi. All of these lower stages do not have as their object of concentration the puruṣa itself. "These constitute seeded-meditation."[91] Vyāsa explains this aphorism with this bhāṣya :

> The aforesaid four 'coalescences' have the external object for their 'seed'; hence the communion also (that is based upon them) is 'seeded'; and (as in the case of coalescence), that (communion) which appertains to the gross object is 'vacillating' and 'non-vacillating',—'deliberate' and 'non-deliberate'.[92]

These four; savitarka, savichara, sañanda, and sāsmitā; are translated by Tatya as; argumentation, deliberation, beatitude and egoism.[93] The last term is differently translated by others. Some of the other translations are sense of power, self-consciousness, and sense of being.[94] The other terms are also differently translated, but the same meaning is carried by most of them.

The mind is similar to a battleground. Many forces are in conflict driving the person first one way then another. The battle between the inner drives of man bring dissatisfaction and pain much as a battle between armies. Contentment and peace are the result of harmony of the opposing parties or drives. These drives which interfere with the effort at concentration are "Ignorance, Egoism, Desire, Aversion, and Tenacity (of mundane existence)."[95] These five basic impediments are very difficult to control. Other obstacles or distractions to concentration are disease, languor, doubt, carelessness, sloth, worldliness or addiction to objects, erroneous perception, failure, to attain the stages of concentration, and instability in the state of abstraction. These obstacles and impediments are further elaborated in other sūtras in both systems.

The three means of knowledge which are accepted as valid by Sāṅkhya and Yoga are perception, inference, and authority.

[91] Dvivedī, *op. cit.*, p. 34.
[92] Jha, *op. cit.*, p. 70.
[93] Tatya, *op. cit.*, p. 13.
[94] Wood, *op. cit.*, p. 212; Jha, *op. cit.*, p. 30; Dvivedī, *op. cit.*, p. 12.
[95] Tatya, *op. cit.*, p. 51.

Perception by citta occurs when some external object affects it through the sense-organs, and is accompanied by mental modifications directly related to the object. Though the object has both specific and generic features, only the former is primarily concerned in perception. External objects are accepted as real by Sāṅkhya-Yoga. "Like the universe, all sensible objects have their eternal archetypes or noumena, which undergo phenomenal changes, but are never absolutely destroyed."[96] For when one object becomes another, the form is only modified. Objects ultimately revert to their primary or noumenal state. They are to be considered phantasmal in this state. Sensations result when sensible objects excite the senses, and though the object may be the same it may produce a different sensation. The impressions of the presented objects are received by the citta through the medium of one or another of the subtle substances, the guṇas.

The cittic alteration by which cognizance of an object's generic nature is gained is called inference. "The cognition of invariable concomitance is the basis of inference."[97] Perception of one or two things which are invariably connected serves to establish the other's existence.

The third means of knowledge, the appeal to authority or scriptures, is that knowledge which is given by a trustworthy source of things seen or inferred. This knowledge may be communicated to others through the use of words or language. None of these means of knowledge are to be taken as mutually exclusive, for they are in actuality complimentary. It is insisted, in fact, that all three be used in proper balance if there is to be progress toward the goal of perfect isolation-integration.

Cognition, in order that it may be valid, must be distinguished from the other four kinds of mental modifications. The invalid cognitive modifications or vṛttis are misconception or viparyaya, which is an erroneous idea of the true nature of an object. Fancy or vikalpa is a verbal construct, which in fact, does not represent any thing in reality, sleep or nidrā, a vṛtti supported by the negation of the waking and dream modifications, and memory or smṛti the recollection of objects by saṁskāras or

[96] Radhakrishnan, *op. cit.*, p. 350.
[97] *Loc. cit.*

deposits left from previous experience of the thing. In connection with the concept of sleep indicated above, it should be noted that a vṛtti of sleep is evidenced by the individual being able to state whether he has had a good, bad, or indifferent sleep. "Sleep-cognition has been regarded as a particular kind of (positive) cognition (and not mere absence of cognition, unconsciousness), because it is actually recalled on waking."[98] "So sleep is a particular kind of presented idea (pratyaya), and in samādhi even this modification has to be restrained."[99]

Since Yoga assumes, as does Sāṅkhya, that empirical knowledge, which is the product of the erroneous confusion of buddhi and puruṣa, is the knowledge which is contained in and gained through perception, inference and authority; it cannot be counted as being absolutely valid. "Vyāsa quotes a verse to the effect : 'By the scriptures, by inference and by the eager desire for practice in contemplation, in three ways he furthers his insight and gains the highest yoga."[100] That is, in order to become totally integrated, isolated, realized, and fully matured (kevala), the seeker after the true wisdom must break the spell of absolutely everything which his mind and feeling have ever imagined to be his own.

II. THE METHOD OF ATTAINING RELEASE

An indicated above, Yoga advances the proposition that salvation, by way of release, can be obtained by way of the discipline expounded in its teachings. The other systems appear to agree to a large extent, for they all have incorporated most of the basic premises of Yoga and Sāṅkhya into their own philosophies. The basic concept in this method is to move from one stage to another progressively upward toward the final stage of samādhi. In order to do this, one must first learn to concentrate and to meditate. That is, the subtle guṇa substances of the prakṛti must be caused to come to a standstill in relation to the puruṣa with which it has been associated. The knowledge of reality will not be found in the use of the mind in an objective manner, rather it shall be through the suppression

[98] Jha, *op. cit.*, p. 22.
[99] Radhakrishnan, *loc. cit.*
[100] *Ibid.*, p. 351.

of the illusory activities and penetrating beyond the mental strata, which comprises mundane life to the concealed and diviner nature deep within each individual. For ultimately, the real and final purpose of philosophy is to transcend the power and task of reason. This is not only according to the Indian philosophers, but also to such classical Occidental philosophers as Plato and Kant.

Zimmer writes that the access to truth is attainable only by passage beyond the confines of ordered thought. Further, that the teaching of transcendent truths cannot be by the very logic it transcends. It is taught by the pregnant paradox, symbol, and image. The process of careful step by step progressive reasoning is forced to halt eventually, but the mind can still go on to the truths beyond the basic principle of earth-bound human logic; that is, the pedestrian principle of the incompatibility of opposites. A transcendent principle is one which encompasses apparent incompatibles in a unity which is excluded on the logical level of comprehension. "Transcendent truths comprehend an ever recurrent coincidence of opposites and are characterized by an eternal dialectical process."[101]

The first step toward understanding the paradox of phenomenality is the purging of all the more ordinary impurities. In order to do this, the practitioner of Yoga must practise the following preliminary exercises : yama, niyama, āsana, prāṇāyāma, pratyāhāra, dhyāna, dhāraṇā, and samādhi. These mean respectively forbearance, observance, posture, breath regulation, abstraction, contemplation, meditation or deliberation, and concentration. These are divided further. Yama consists in practising the moral law in relation to killing, lying, stealing, continence, and covetousness. Niyama consists of the exercises of purification, contentment, discipline, study, and in the case of Yoga, resignation to Īśvara. The āsanas are comparable to the physical education programmes which accompany the course of studies in the school of today, and is based upon the premise that a sound and healthy body is necessary to more efficient study. Prāṇāyāma and pratyāhāra are a further refinement of the control over the physical aspect of the student of Yoga. These first five are called the bahiraṅga or external aids, and

[101] Zimmer, *op. cit.*, p. 312.

the next three are the antaraṅga or internal aids to release. The antaraṅga are intellectual exercises. None of the eight are mutually exclusive for they are in fact all utilized in all the stages of progress toward final liberation. The importance of any one is dependent upon the stage of development. Contemplation is the fixing of one's mind (attention) upon one object. Prolonged contemplation leads to the unity of the mind with the object contemplated. This unity is meditation. When the consciousness contains only the object, concentration has been achieved. Samādhi when sustained and entered at will leads to mukti.

Further moral disciplines are to be added to the above mentioned, such as mental hygiene, universal brotherhood, kindness, sympathy, cheerfulness, and equanimity. The Yoga discipline urges that the proper inhibitions are brought about by practice and thus the roots of desire are destroyed as a result of living a life of virtue, and the practices are the efforts needed to sustain progress toward steadiness of thought. This latter end is gained by purificatory action, continence; knowledge, and faith. Through strict adherence to this regime, one acquires a detached tranquillity which leads to the final release from the bounds and entangling meshes of the prakṛtic guṇa substance.

In the Bhagavaḍ-Gītā, Krishna tells Arjuna that, "the evil doing, the deluded, the vile men, they come not to Me."[102] After indicating the fact of necessary moral integrity, the primary approaches to mukti are enumerated and described in the following verse :

> Among the virtuous ones who turn towards Me (the Divine) with devotion, O Arjuna, there are four kinds of Bhaktas; the suffering, the seeker for good in the world, the seeker for knowledge, and those who adore Me with knowledge.[103]

All of the present systems of philosophy in India recognize the four basic approaches to the ultimate goal. These four are called Bhakti-Yoga, Karma-Yoga, Jñāna-Yoga, and Rāja-Yoga. These

[102] Besant and Das, *op. cit.*, p. 136.

[103] Anilbaran Roy (Ed.), *The Message of the Gita* (London, George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1946), p. 119.

four are not to be thought of as being mutually exclusive. It is a matter of individual temperament as to which is the more emphasized. The anner mof listing is also a matter of preference. Patañjali would have listed the margas or paths in the above ascending order. His preference was that of Rāja-Yoga. Kapila, of course, held Jñāna-Yoga in the highest esteem. Akhilānanda does not list the margas as above. He describes Bhakti-Yoga as the realization through unselfish work and duty. Jñāna-Marga is the way of discriminative knowledge. Rāja-Yoga is the discipline which aims at complete control of the mind."[104] There are other Yogas which have many followers. The one which has the most notoriety in the West is that of Haṭha-Yoga. In this Yoga "the methods of bodily control, breath regulation and mantras"[105] are discussed. This discipline is the physical education part of Yoga. There are extremist in any culture, for the West also has its muscle bound athletes. The more bizarre extremist make the greatest impression, and unfortunately, too often the comparison is made of "one's own good theory with the other's bad practice."[106] The exercises of the Haṭha-Yoga are quite different from those to which the West has become accustomed, but they have been derived over the centuries to accomplish a particular end. The primary purpose for the physical exercises for Patañjali was the acquiring of a healthful body which would not interfere with his mental discipline; the same basis for the physical education department of present day schools.

The basic concept of the Sāṅkhya and Yoga concerning the ultimate reality of man has been discussed. It has been shown that the Self concept of these two systems are identical for all practical purposes. They do differ in some areas of their psychology, cosmology and methodology. Sāṅkhya teaches that discriminative knowledge will result in liberation. Yoga acknowledges this, but insists that the achievement of this knowledge can only result from the complete stilling of all the mental faculties. Thus Sāṅkhya is of the Jñāna-marga and Yoga is the

[104] Swani Akhilananda, *Hindu Psychology* (London, George Routledge & Sons Ltd., 1948), p. 179.

[105] Radhakrishnan, *op. cit.*, p. 358 n.

[106] Rudolf Otto, *India's Religion of Grace and Christianity Compared & Contrasted* (New York, Macmillan Co., 1930), p. 59.

Rāja-marga. They are not mutually exclusive, for concentration is necessary to study the Sāṅkhya writings, and intellectual effort is essential to an understanding of the texts of the Yoga school. In the cosmology, Yoga introduces the personalistic God, Īśvara, while the Sāṅkhya insists that there is no evidence which can logically prove the existence of a divinity of the nature of Īśvara. Psychologically, the difference between the two systems is one of emphasis. Sāṅkhya directing its effort toward the gaining of the universals in a logical structure of knowledge while Yoga concentrates its effort upon the universals which have meaning to the individual in his striving toward final liberation. In a sense, Sāṅkhya is a negative approach to the knowledge of the self, for the logical structure, while positive, is designed to distinguish what is not the self. It is the enumeration of the things referred to in the Upaniṣadic statement of "neti, neti,"[107] thus indicating the indefinibility of the puruṣa. This is primarily an intellectual regime. In Yoga the discipline is designed to enable the practitioner to "Know thyself" in the Socratic sense. It is thus a positive approach through a method of negating the effects of the prakṛtic world. This positive action is directed so as to still gyrations of the prakṛtic dancer in order that the spectator will realize the distinction between the seen, the seeing, and the seer. Both systems insist upon the follower being of sound body and mind, and that he be a virtuous and moral person. If he is not, the desired results cannot be achieved. The good life is the fundamental requirement in all the philosophical systems of India. It is recognized that there is room for disagreement concerning what constitutes the good life and the method of achieving it. However, the disagreement is more of degree than of kind.

In the next chapter several representative Western philosophic writings will be examined in relation to the self concept. The purpose being to compare and attempt to evaluate the various conceptions of the self in relationship to the various concepts and some of the more recent scientific discoveries.

[107] Robert Ernest Hume, *The Thirteen Principal Upanishads* (London, Oxford University Press, 1951), p. 97.

CHAPTER VI

THE SELF CONCEPT : EAST AND WEST

THE self concept of several representative Western philosophies will be discussed and compared with that of Sāṅkhya-Yoga. Starting with Plato and Aristotle, the study will proceed to the consideration of some of the contemporary philosophers.

The concepts of immortality, soul, personality, and the duration of existence are contained in and related to the self concept. Plato's writings discuss all of these related concepts, but due to his style, they are not treated in a systematic manner, "Plato himself hated nothing more than system-making."[1] This is emphasized by the fact that "if he had a system, he refused to tell us what it was,"[2] and any forcing into a system will serve only to distort and misrepresent his teachings. This lack of systematization is of itself not conducive to a full understanding of Plato's writings. That Plato believed in immortality of the soul, cannot be doubted. There does remain some doubt about the type of immortality and as to the character of the immortal being. In the *Republic* Plato says that Socrates concludes "since the soul is not destroye dby any evil, either its own or another's, clearly it must be a thing that exists forever, and is consequently immortal."[3]

In the *Phaedo* Socrates replies to Crito's enquiry about his burial wishes, that it is of little interest to him, but Crito must first catch and hold him. He then discourses to the group about

[1] A. B. Taylor, *Plato The Man and His Work* (New York, Meridian Books, 1956), p. VII.

[2] *Loc. cit.*

[3] Francis M. Cornford, *The Republic of Plato* (New York, Oxford University Press, 1945), p. 345.

the distinction between the body and that which constitutes the real Socrates.[4] Another argument in favour of the soul is given in the *Phaedrus*. Socrates is again speaking, "The Soul is immortal, for that is immortal which is ever in motion; but that which moves and is moved by another, in ceasing to move ceases also to live."[5] He concludes that, "Therefore, only that which is self-moving, never failing of self, never ceases to move, and is the fountain and beginning of motion to all that moves besides."[6] The statement goes on to discuss the beginninglessness of the soul, and reasons that, "therefore the self-moving is the beginning of motion; and this can neither be destroyed nor begotten."[7] If the self-moving were destroyed, Socrates says, then the whole universe would cease to function. But since the self-moving is immortal, he continues, it "is the very idea and essence of the soul."[8]

Still referring to the soul, he indicates that its form is of a divine nature and that man can only speak of it in a figurative manner. The divine is described as "beauty, wisdom, goodness, and the like."[9] The myth of the ascent to the highest heaven is continued, and Socrates says that the immortal souls, when they are at the end of their course, go out and stand upon the back of heaven, and as the revolutions of the sphere carry them around, they behold the world beyond. Of this heaven above all the heavens, there is no poet which has sung or shall ever be capable of singing in a manner worthy of this vision. What does Socrates say of this vision ? "The colourless, formless and intangible truly existing essence, with which all true knowledge is concerned, holds this region and is visible only to the mind, the pilot of the soul."[10] The description given by Socrates seems to be quite similar to that given in the Sāṅkhya Aphorism of the puruṣa. For the puruṣa is described as "without

[4] B. Jowett, trans., *The Dialogues of Plato* (New York, Scribner, Armstrong & Co., 1874), p. 444, Vol. I.

[5] *Ibid.*, p. 550.

[6] *Ibid.*, p. 551.

[7] *Loc. cit.*

[8] *Loc. cit.*

[9] *Ibid.*, p. 552.

[10] H. N. Fowler, Trans., *Plato* (London, Wm. Heinemann, 1915), Vol. I, p. 475.

form or content . . . devoid of qualities and peculiarities, . . . without beginning, without parts and divisions."[11] For Socrates, the heaven beyond the heavens is the source of the divine element in man. That this divine element is different from the tripartite soul is indicated in the myth of the soul looking beyond itself into the essence which is void of characteristics. It is to be noted also that the description of the three parts of the soul is very similar to the three aspects of the linga-śarīra. Buddhi is comparable to the charioteer, while manas would be related to the good steed, and the ahaṅkāra is similar to the dark and unruly horse. The three divisions of the psyche are noūs, thumos, and epithumia. These are taken to designate the intelligence, the spirited or emotional, and the appetitive or desiring aspect. These correspond quite closely with the Sāṅkhya concepts of buddhi, manas, and ahaṅkāra.[12] It appears that Plato's concept of the immutable essence is very similar to that of the Sāṅkhya-Yoga. However, it must be remembered that Plato, recognizing the shortcomings of communication, often resorted to the use of myths. These myths were not meant to be taken literally, but rather the total effect of the story is to be considered with regard to the concept that he wanted to put across. For "the Platonic myths almost always point to a gap in scientific knowledge."[13] The concept of the self is very nebulous in the writings of Plato. The dialogues, it should be recalled, were written for general circulation and represent an attempt to popularize philosophy. What his lectures at the academy contained, can only be gleaned from the remarks of other writers and only in part from his own writings. If anyone should have learned directly from Plato, it should have been his former student, Aristotle.

There is ample evidence that Aristotle did not always agree with the teachings of Plato. He advanced some new conceptions of his own, as well as altering the older conceptions to be better suited to his philosophy. His work is the first systematic treatment of philosophy in Greek culture. This systematization aids

[11] Ballantyne, *op. cit.*, pp. 56, 165, 179, 181.

[12] Edward J. Urwick, *The Message of Plato* (London, Methuen & Co., Ltd., 1920), p. 18ff. gives an interesting comparison of these concepts.

[13] E. Zeller, *Plato & The Older Academy* (London, Longmans, Green & Co., 1876), p. 161.

a great deal in knowing more precisely what he has to say on any given subject. He has, in fact, written a treatise specifically on the soul, *De Anima.* His approach is to state the problem, discuss what has been said on the subject by others, and then to give his own thoughts on the problem and propose solutions.

Aristotle devotes the entire first book to a very critical review of the ideas of the soul as expressed by his predecessors. After this rather cursory presentation, he dismisses them and makes a fresh start. The problem is again posed, i.e. what is soul ? The basic assumptions upon which he builds his definition of the soul are three, and are predicated upon the concept of substance. His assumptions are that substance has a sense in which it is recognized as matter, another sense in which it is regarded as form or essence, and lastly the other two in combination. He then states that matter is potentiality, and form is actuality, and the latter has two related grades. Further, he reasons, since natural bodies are thought of as the substance of all other bodies, thus those which have life are composites. It, the composite, is also a body, and the body cannot be the soul because it has life attributed to it. "Hence the soul must be a substance in the sense of the form of a natural body having life potentially within it."[14] It is then posited that since substance is actuality, the soul must be the actuality of the body. As pointed out above, actuality has two senses. These two senses correspond to the possession of knowledge and the use of that knowledge. Soul is actuality in the first sense, thus soul is a form, because form and actuality are synonymous for Aristotle. Soul is now the first grade of actuality of a natural and potentially living body. In order "to give a general formula applicable to all kinds of soul, we must describe it as the first grade of actuality of a natural organized body"[15]

From the generalized statement the question of the identity of the soul and body can be dismissed as meaningless and unnecessary. This is because "Unity has many senses (as many as 'is' has), but the most proper and fundamental sense of both is the relation of an actuality to that of which it is the actuality."[16]

[14] Richard McKeon, (ed.) *The Basic Work of Aristotle* (New York, Random House, 1941), p. 555.

[15] *Loc. cit.*

[16] *Loc. cit.*

This disposes of the problems of what soul is and how it is subjoined to the body. Aristotle summarizes his answer :

> . . . which applies to it in its full extent. It is substance in the sense which corresponds to the definitive formula of a thing's essence. That means that it is 'the essential whatness' of a body of the character just assigned.[17]

But at the end of the chapter, Aristotle raises a question as to the relationship of the soul and the body. He says that the soul plus the body constitutes the animal. From this it indubitably follows, according to the above reasoning, that body and soul are inseparable, or at least certain parts are not separable. The possibility of separation is due to the fact of the actuality of some parts of the soul, being nothing more than the actuality or potential of that part. Again, some can be separated because they are not the actuality of any body whatsoever. He concludes the outline determination of the soul by saying, "Further, we have no light on the problem whether the soul may not be the actuality of its body in the sense which the sailor is the actuality of the ship."[18] This discussion of Aristotle seems to indicate that he suspected that his definition was not as efficient as he had at first thought.

In another chapter Aristotle describes the mind and its functions. The soul is equated with the mental life of an individual. The discussion above seems to equate soul and form. In his discussion of the mind, Aristotle says, "mind must be related to what is thinkable, as sense is to what is sensible."[19] This conclusion is drawn from the following reasoning. Thinking is a process in which the soul is acted upon by the thinkable, directly or indirectly. Thus, the intellectual part of the soul, which is impassible, is regarded as capable of receiving the form of an object, or at any rate it must be potentially identical with the character of the object but not with the object. This description of the process of knowing seems to be quite similar to the Yoga concept about this process. For Yoga says, "An object is known or unknown to the mind in as much as the tint of the object is required to it."[20] This Aphorism is elaborated

[17] *Loc. cit.*

[18] *Ibid.*, p. 556.

[19] *Ibid.*, p. 589.

[20] Tatya, *op. cit.*, p. 155.

by Bhoja Raja's commentary. He explains the Aphorism thus, "An external object is known and unknown from the tint of the object— i. e. from bestowing its shape upon the mind."[21]

The whole of chapter four of book three is very similar to the description of the mind as given in book four of the Yoga Aphorisms of Patañjali. For, Aristotle indicates that the mind is itself thinkable.[22] The structure of the mind is such that it potentially has the cause of all subsequent thinkable objects. There are many other similarities which are areas for further study.

Aristotle says that the soul is the cause or the source of the living body. He explains this to mean that the soul is the cause and source of the body in the three recognized senses. "It is (a) the source or origin of movement, it is (b) the end, it is (c) the essence of the whole living body."[23] This has the ring of the concept of puruṣa, for the puruṣa is the origin of the movements culminating in the empirical being. It is the end in the sense that the dance of prakṛti is for the everwitnessing puruṣa, and the puruṣa is the very life of the body by its transcendental influence. Even Aristotle recognized that his concept of soul is used to cover a great many ideas or forms which do not properly belong to soul in the highest sense. For he points out that movement is not in the soul, and that "mind itself is impassible. Thinking, loving, and hating are affections not of mind, but of that which has mind, so far as it has it."[24] So it is when the body declines all the activities such as the above decline also for "they were activities not of mind, but of the composite which has perished: mind is, no doubt, something more divine and impassible."[25] Near the end of the work, *De Anima*, Aristotle wrote a short chapter which has been an area of great discussion among his commentators from the beginning.

In the previous chapter he has discussed the mode of knowledge and thinking in relation to the mind. Here he concluded

[21] *Loc. cit.*
[22] McKeon, *op. cit.*, p. 590.
[23] McKeon, *op. cit.*, p. 561.
[24] *Ibid.*, p. 548.
[25] *Loc. cit.*

that mind can think of itself and that matterless objects are identical with what thinks. A question is raised and is the topic for the next short but very much discussed chapter. It is asked why the mind does not always think. There are two factors in all the things in nature, Aristotle reasons,[26] and they are matter. which is potentially all the particular things, and a cause which is productive in the sense that it makes all the things of nature. Soul likewise has the two distinctive factors described above. Thus the intellectual part of the soul is what it is because it becomes all things, and there is another part which is what it is because it makes all things. That is, it is a cause or agent only in the manner in which light produces colours by falling upon objects—i.e. as the sun is the cause of life on earth without it in reality acting with purpose in respect to the earth. "This intellect is separable and impassive and unmixed, being in its essential nature an activity. For that which acts is always superior to that which is acted upon, and constitutes the cause of matter."[27] Continuing, he says that actual knowledge is identical with things which are known and potential knowledge is prior in time to actual knowledge for the individual, but not in the universe at large. The active intellect, he states, does not at one time know and at another not know. Aristotle then concludes the chapter with these two statements, which appear to be speaking of the distinction between two concepts which are very similar to the Sāṅkhya-Yoga concepts of puruṣa and prakṛti. His statements are as follows :

> Only in separation from matter is it what it really is, and this (its essential nature) is alone immortal and eternal. But we do not remember, because the reason of which we are speaking is impassive, while the intellect which can be affected is perishable, and without the former does not think at all.[28]

Thus, when the psyche is freed from the conditions of the world, it is itself in its purity and this alone is immortal and

[26] *Ibid.*, p. 591; A. Seth Pringle-Pattison, *The Idea of Immortality* (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1922), p. 66n.
[27] *Loc. cit.*
[28] *Loc. cit.*

eternal. Without this factor the soul is lifeless and unthinking matter.

There are several kārikās which could be quoted in comparison with these statements of Aristotle, but two will suffice for now. The first, number twenty, says in part, "It is thus, from this union, that the unintelligent body (the linga) appears to be intelligent."[29] The second is number forty-one, and says, "As a painting does not stand without a support or receptacle, . . . so the linga does not exist unsupported, without specific elements."[30] In fact, the material discussed and the mode of handling it, and the conclusions reached in Aristotle's *De Anima* and the Sāṅkhya-Yoga writings are almost too similar for one not to notice and wonder about the similarity of origin. It is recognized that it is possible to read too much into a writing, and also that there is a different cultural basis in which these ideas are expressed. It is also noted that the concept of the soul changed greatly and rather suddenly after contact with what are referred to as the Oriental mystery religions. Since Aristotle was so systematic, it seems that there exists a fertile field of research in the analysis and comparative study of the psychology of the Sāṅkhya and Yoga systems with those of the Aristotelian writings.

The next Western philosopher is Rene Descartes. He is regarded by many as the father of modern European philosophy. His writings are of importance in relation to the present paper because of his basic premise. For his entire philosophy is built upon one thing which cannot be doubted by Descartes, and that is the existence of the self as the thinking agent. Whether full implications of his thoughts on this subject were realized by Descartes cannot be determined from his writings. He approached the problem of knowledge in a negative manner. The basic question which he asked himself was "What can I not doubt ?" His answer was his famous, "cogit ergo sum." This Latin phrase has been variously interpreted. The translation is usually given as, "I think, therefore I exist." The disagreement is not in the translation but in the understanding of what is meant by the visual and verbal symbols, "cogito ergo sum."

[29] Davies, *op. cit.*, p. 51.

[30] *Ibid.*, p. 78.

There are at least four basic ways in which this statement may be interpreted. First it can be taken to mean that being or existence is the effect or product of being conscious. That is not the meaning of the formula for Descartes. The argument against this interpretation is that "implication is not production or creation."[31] Vietch further argues that this does not properly interpret "sum" consistently with the "cogito." For, he further reasons, "if I am first of all supposed to be conscious, I am supposed to be and to exercise a function or to be modified in a particular form."[32] Hence, he continues, "It could hardly, consistently with this, be said that 'I conscious' produce or create myself, seeing that I am already in being and doing."[33] The second interpretation which is possible, according to Vietch is that "my being conscious implies that I am and was, before and in order to be conscious."[34] He feels that Descartes would be the last to maintain that ego pre-existed before consciousness. A third interpretation is that being conscious is the means of knowledge of existence. Consciousness and existence are identical and are convertible phrases. Vietch says that this statement is inadequate for the thinking of Descartes. The inadequateness lies in the fact of using two terms to be identical. This does not effect an assertion of existence. Lastly, the statement which Vietch feels is the nearest approach to the true meaning of Descartes. His interpretation of the "cogito ergo sum" is stated thus, "My being conscious informs me that I exist, or through my being conscious I know for the first time that I exist. Here my being conscious is first in order of knowledge."[35] This is elaborated; being conscious is the means of showing existence. One's being conscious is first in the order of knowledge, that is it is the beginning of knowledge, both temporally and logically. This is to be regarded as a two-fold fact. For the act of realization of consciousness and existence is almost simultaneous. This is not to be taken to mean an absolute identity of existence and momentary consciousness,

[31] John Vietch, trans., *The Method, Meditations and Philosophy of Descartes* (London, M. Walter Dunne, 1901), p. 18.

[32] *Loc. cit.*

[33] *Loc. cit.*

[34] *Ibid.*, p. 17.

[35] *Loc. cit.*

nor does it indicate convertibility of consciousness and existence. If these were regarded as identical, this would mean that "cogito ergo sum" is only a statement of a momentary fact. "All, therefore, that can be said, or need be inferred, is that my existence, or the me I know myself to be, is revealed in the consciousness of a definite moment."[36] Vietch continues, "But I am not entitled to say from that alone that the being of me is restricted to that moment."[37] He concludes that it might be found "that the identity and continuity of the momentary ego are actually implied in the fact that this experience of its existence is not possible except as part of a series of moments of successive states."[38] In this manner he establishes that the ego is not mere existence but duration through time is to be an added feature.

In the *Meditation II*, Descartes, after saying "Cogito ergo sum," asks himself a question. His question seeks to learn whether there is a single existence or a series. He answers the question about the frequency of his existence thus, "As often as I think; for perhaps it would even happen, if I should wholly cause to think, that I should at the same time altogether cease to be."[39] He further reasons that he is nothing more than a thinking thing, and that this thinking thing is real and existent. Now a new question arises. Is mind the extent of his being? Responding to this query concerning what a thinking thing is, he says, "It is a thing that doubts, understands, (conceives), affirms, denies, wills, refuses; that imagines also, and perceives."[40] These are all taken as properties of his nature and this nature is the ego which does each of the acts listed above. The ego is the same being who perceives all the external phenomena and even if it is objected that these are in reality false perceptions, it cannot be denied that, "I seem to see light, hear a noise, and feel heat; this cannot be false, and this what in me is properly called perceiving, which is nothing else than thinking."[41]

[36] *Ibid.*, p. 20.
[37] *Loc. cit.*
[38] *Loc. cit.*
[39] *Ibid.*, p. 227.
[40] *Ibid.*, p. 228.
[41] *Ibid.*, p. 229.

In *Meditation III*, Descartes begins by summarizing his conclusions up to this point. He asserts that he is a thinking (conscious) thing or being who doubts, affirms, denies, knows some objects, wills, refuses, and also imagines and perceives. Continuing, he says, that even though the things of imagination and perception might be nothing apart from his own existence, he is "assured that those modes of consciousness which I call perceptions and imaginations, is as far only as they are modes of consciousness, exist in me."[42] Early in the sixth meditation, he asserts the existence of the material world. Later he affirms the dichotomy of mind and body. This distinction is made on the grounds of the divisibility of the body and the unity of the mind.

In considering a particular philosophical system, it must be borne in mind that things may be read into the system which the author did not intend or at least did not fully realize. Descartes, as with most Western philosophers, has equated what are called ahaṅkāra and antaḥkaraṇa in Indian philosophy. These two are then equated with the eternal principle within man. That is, the ego and the total mind of man are thought of as one, this is then equated with soul, which Descartes takes as the abiding principle in man. He came near the Sāṅkhya-Yoga concept when he recognized that consciousness and ego were not necessarily an identity. But he took the ego to be the durable thing rather than the consciousness as the essential being.[43] Thus he failed to discover, for the West, the fundamental fallacy of regarding the personality of the ego as an eternal reality. His failure was, in large part, due to the religious environment of his time.

Descartes recognized that an eternal thing must not be subject to the changes of matter, so he created a dichotomy and a dilemma. Mind and matter are absolutely different to him, and this raised the problem of interaction between the two. This problem is still with us in the West.

Descartes is of importance not so much for his actual work in philosophy as for the stimulation and direction he gave to philosophy. The basic problem he posed stirred men and gave

[42] *Ibid.*, p. 234.
[43] *Ibid.*, p. 229.

impetus to the thought systems generally referred to as Rationalism. This system, broadly, is one which takes the criterion of truth as being intellectual and deductive rather than strictly sensory. Descartes, Spinoza, and Leibniz are usually thought of in connection with this school of thought. All three attempted a mathematical formulation which was designed to systematize eternal truths for mankind. But in the relationship of mind and matter, they only succeeded in compounding the problem. Descartes attempted to explain the apparent interaction of these two absolutely different things by funneling the sense data through the pineal gland to the mind or soul, and the mind's reaction back through this tiny gland to the body. Spinoza completed the divorce and developed a system whereby the Universal One would create a parallel action for every response of the mind and vice versa. Thus, the last vestige of a casual relationship between mind and its body was destroyed. For Spinoza, man is a psycho-physical entity who is, "so far as God exhibits himself in us in terms of Extension and Thought, a correlation of a physical and a mental event."[44] Mind and body being completely different, there can be no interaction between them. All there can be is a parallelism between bodily changes and mental registrations. It appears that Spinoza equated God with the phenomenal universe and this would be equating God with prakṛti in the thought of the Sāṅkhya-Yoga. That is, the mahat, since it is the first manifestation of prakṛti and all the phenomenal world proceeds from it, is the source and origin of the parallel physical and mental changes.

Leibnitz accepted the idea that there could be no intra-action between the two modes of the one God's being. He postulated a monad which is unextended, indivisible, simple, fundamental and eternal. Each monad differs in degree from all others and its level of consciousness is its uniqueness. Except for the allowances that Leibnitz made for the Christian teachings concerning the human soul-monad, his system is strikingly similar to the concept of the Jaina philosophy. His monad is in reality beyond description as is the puruṣa. The many monads make up the world and function at the level of their enlightenment, or

[44] B.A.G. Fuller, *A History of Philosophy* (New York, Henry Holt & Co., 1947), Vol. II, p. 80.

scope of their consciousness. They are built up in degrees as a hierarchy is developed, until the divine monad is reached at the pinnacle. This description has certain affinities to the concept of the cosmic man of the Jaina. Leibnitz in his philosophic works has approached the advaita theory in that all consciousness is of the divine and is unique only to the extent that it does not recognize its source and origin.

Since there can be no interaction between monads, nor between the monads and the world, Leibnitz developed the theory of pre-established harmony. In this theory, God creates the world very much as a clock is manufactured. All the various parts of this gigantic mechanism is so synchronized that the experience of the phenomenal world appear to be happening to the particular monad and at its direction. Not only has the mental world been severed from the physical world, but the eternal being of each individual has been isolated from all other spiritual beings, including God. The extremity to which Rationalism had gone in the denial of validity for the external world and the assertion of the utter insulation of the individual monads from all others, fostered a reaction of skepticism.

Depending upon the solution to the problem of the dichotomy of mind and matter, two schools of thought exist in the West. One is called the idealist and the other the realist. These two schools, in their extreme sense, represent the opposite horns of the dilemma resulting from this dichotomy. In the idealist system, the only reality is that of the mind or spirit, while on the other hand, the realist asserts that the external world has an existence entirely independent of the mind, and in fact, some go so far as to indicate that the material world accounts for the entirety of human experience. Between these extremes there are many variations shading into one another. All the philosophical systems purport to give a description of reality. In large measure the dilemma of the noumenal and phenomenal is of the philosophers' own making. For the idealists and realists are "both incorrect, inasmuch as each tries to make one part the basis of the whole."[45] In their efforts to escape the dualism of body and mind, the pure idealistic concept was modified time and again.

[45] E.E. Wood, *The Glorious Presence* (New York, E.P. Dutton & Co. Inc. 1951), p. 258.

An English philosopher, Locke, developed a system of idealism which comes very near the concept of the self as exemplified by Sāṅkhya-Yoga. His point of emphasis was epistemological rather than metaphysical. If he had fully understood his own statement on personal identity, the West might have achieved a fuller comprehension of the relationship of mind and matter as well as discovering the eternal and enduring self. Locke says that personal identity or the sameness of a rational being is dependent upon the continuity introduced into consciousness by memory. He even feels, since the body can be altered, that "continuity of consciousness is not dependent upon permanence of organic constitution."[46] Further, he makes the distinction of man and person, and that the man might be a number of different persons. If there were no communication by way of memory, man could not recognize that he was the one and same being. Locke even suggests that personal consciousness is probable "annexed to the affection of one individual substance."[47]

A study of the social and political conditions of the time will give evidences indicating the stimulus and motive of Locke's thought. It was a time of change and all the old heretofore accepted authorities were being questioned. In order to substantiate the ideal of freedom of thought and speech, a system of philosophy had to be constructed which would be consistent with life and still allow the desired freedoms. Thus, Locke postulated the mind as a "tabula rasa" at birth and maintained that all that one can know is that which he has experienced. If all that can be known is the experiential world, there can be no innate or "a priori" ideas. He failed to recognize that the structure of the mind constitutes innate ideas. Of course he was prevented from developing a concept more similar to that of Indian philosophers, not only by the difference in cultural heritage but also by his doctrine concerning causation. According to his reasoning, the observation of sequence plus ignorance of the actual relationship of events is what is normally referred to as a causal series. Because of this view of causation, he did not recognize that his consciousness was what became enmeshed

[46] Fuller, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, p. 131.
[47] *Loc. cit.*

in this world and was the enduring factor which was and is behind the person or whole series of persons. He could not recognize a causal relationship between things nor between moral actions. That is, the concept of Karma as a law of cause and effect on both the material and moral level was outside of both his heritage and system. Thus, Locke stands for a concept of the true self as consciousness and pairs it with the world of phenomena. His description of the self is similar to the self of Sāṅkhya-Yoga, and of the physio-psychic being to the prakṛtic being of personal existence, but he failed to recognize that consciousness is not part of phenomenal world which includes both mind and matter.

Taking his cue from Locke, George Berkeley accepted the premise that "the mind can know nothing but its own ideas or conscious states,"[48] and followed it to its logical conclusion. Since all things are ideas, he asserted that the physical world does not exist.[49] His reasoning was that ideas are the sole objectives of cognition for the mind, thus things only have being in so far as they are perceived and since nothing outside the mind can be perceived they are non-existent.[50] Berkeley asserts that all that really exists is God and the human mind, and that the ideas of the external world are only the projection of the ideas of God. To the extent that the Mahat or first production of prakṛti in the involutionary process and that Citta, the phenomenal form of Mind, projects both the personal mind and the external phenomenal world, Berkeley was expressing the relationship of mind and matter as conceived in Sāṅkhya-Yoga. Of course he considered the first evolute of prakṛti as God, and thus represented a loss from the position which Locke had made available. His successor, Hume, went even further. For he declared that the only thing which can be known to exist are phenomena and all that the mind consists of is nothing more than a conglomeration of different perceptions arranged in certain relations.[51] His concept of the self is thoroughly confused. He realized that his explanation was so

[48] C.N. Bittle, *Reality & The Mind* (Milwaukee, The Bruce Publishing Co., 1941), p. 106.
[49] *Loc. cit.*
[50] *Loc. cit.*
[51] *Ibid.*, p. 108.

poor in his "treatise" that he omitted any discussion concerning the self entirely from his "enquiry." Beyond being aware that there seemed to be a something or principle which defied his logic and did give continuity even though the phenomenal personality was constantly changing.[52] Hume could not find nor give a satisfactory explanation of this continuity. He believed that all substances, including physical bodies, soul, and God, could be argued out of existence. The only things which he would acknowledge "to exist are phenomena, and the mind consists of nothing but a heap or collection of different perceptions united by certain relations."[53] Hume recognized that the phenomenal personality did not represent the true inner being, but he never was able to discover the real self of man. The only thing which he could assert was the fact of change permeating all of the phenomenal world and anything which is subject to change cannot be eternal. He was unable to achieve a satisfactory philosophy because he still regarded the mind as different from that which it experienced.

The trend of the British Empiricists toward a complete scepticism spurred Emmanuel Kant to attempt a vindication of the human mind. His contribution was the recognition that the mind was not a passive recipient of the raw data of experience. He felt that all data received concerning the external world must conform to the structure of the mind.[54] This was the very thing which he said all previous philosophers had failed to recognize. In this manner he re-established the possibility of the mind arriving at truth, and reason would again be considered "trustworthy within the realm of experience."[55] Even though Kant accepted the denial of innate ideas, he felt that the Empiricists had unknowingly ascribed innate predispositions to the structure of the mind. Thus the mind is to be regarded only void of experience at birth. The mind is not to be considered just a blank sheet of paper, but rather a sheet with a very intricate design water-marked into it. The moment that experience began to write upon it, the complicated pattern began to show through. Everything which the empiricists had denied to

[52] Fuller, *op. cit.*, p. 171.
[53] Bittle, *loc. cit.*
[54] *Ibid.*, p. 109.

the external world is to be found in the configuration of the water-marked design. These things which Kant said was ingrained into the very structure of the mind are "substantiality, and identity, and power, and necessary connection, and all the rest."[56] Mind for Kant has a structure which is the "preliminary condition, not the result, of knowledge."[57] This conception of the mind is the basis for his theory of "a priori" knowledge.

Kant accepted the inescapable fact of an experiencer as well as an external experienced world. But, both the external world and the experiencer can only be understood in terms of the categories of the mind. These categories are just what prevents the person from knowing what it is within itself. In Kant's mind the soul is the ego's representation of itself to its self, and the ego cannot be known since "the 'I' that does the thinking . . . only catches a 'me' which is not the 'I' as it is in itself, but merely as it must represent itself to itself."[58] Kant has equated the ego with the eternal being of man, and made consciousness an attribute of the mind. His philosophy is in agreement with the Sāṅkhya-Yoga system in making the mind and the world of experience of the same substance and in that he insists that the self of man is not know able to the ego of man. He erred in taking the ego as the unity of the mind and then equating the ego, as the unity of the mind with the true self. For "Kant's philosophy, while releasing the mind from the trap of the world, binds the self in the trap of the mind."[59] He made provision for the true, the good and the beautiful, but he failed to make unity of their relationship other than in a mental construct. Although Kant recognized that the mind can only know the ideational world of experience, his error prevented him from discovering that the mind had a purpose only in so far as it is the function of the transcendental influence of the real self.

Like the Indian idealist philosophers, Kant regarded knowledge of the world as only idea. The ideas of the world are configurations which the mind gives to the sense data, which

[55] Fuller, *op. cit.*, p. 219.
[56] *Ibid.*, p. 218.
[57] *Loc. cit.*
[58] *Ibid.*, p. 235.
[59] Wood, *op. cit.*, p. 274.

it receives via the nerve system of the body. He would find agreement among the philosophers of the Vedānta and Sāṅkhya-Yoga schools of thought with regard to the impossibility of the ego knowing what it is in itself, but the agreement would be on grounds quite different from those of Kant. The assertion that the world cannot be known appears to resemble the doctrine of māyā. His equation of the ego and the mind prevented him from conceiving the ego as a particular mode of the total mind of the individual which in its turn is nothing more than a particularized function of the universal mind. The reason that the ego could not be known in itself is that it and "the external world are known only as phenomena, not as things-in-themselves."[60] Whereas Kant stopped here, the Indian philosophers, realizing that the ego could not be known in itself because it has no real existence, assert the possibility of the self realizing the self of itself, not in terms of the realm of the experiences of the phenomenal world, but in an area of existence which is beyond intellectualization. Thus, the West's fundamental error of equating the ego, the mind and the abiding being again thwarted the discovery of the inner being of man.

Kant, having resolved all that man could know of the phenomenal world into the realm of ideas, set the stage for the "absolute" of George Hegel. The absolute for Hegel is "pure Thought of Idea, dynamic with immanent activity."[61] His concept of the Absolute shows the influence of both Schelling and Fichte. For Hegel, "life is an organic unity, a spiritual activity, in which all seeming antagonisms between man and nature are overcome, and the clash of opposing forces is stilled."[62] In conjunction with the idea of the unity of all phenomena, Hegel had another leading idea, freedom. These two basic ideas form the mainstay of his philosophy. In order to be free it is necessary that "man conquers nature by obeying her."[63] This victory is of a deep spiritual sense.

> It is found in a triumph over his destiny, which consists in accepting with joyful resignation the renunciation his fate exacts from him. Not to rebel against life but to love

[60] Fuller, *op. cit.*, p. 235.
[61] Bittle, *op. cit.*, p. 113.
[62] Fuller, *op. cit.*, p. 303.

> it as it is, with all its limitations and vissitudes, is to overcome fate and to transmute it into freedom.[64]

Hegel could assert a belief in the attainment of freedom because he saw that all of life is a process of becoming.[65]

Since Hegel had seen that life is a unitary process, he broke with his predecessors. Fichte's Absolute Ego was rejected because "it remained a kind of 'substance' which underlay the finite ego."[66] Further, he regarded Schelling's indeterminate Absolute as purely a negative quality. Hegel felt that the Absolute could not be outside of the experience of man if it is to account for and explain the "multiple, varied, changing, kaleidoscopic spectacle of existence."[67] The Absolute could not be an Ego or Mind which creates the world by thinking, for apart from its thinking the Ego or Mind is nothing. "An Absolute Ego or Absolute Intellect is simply the conscious 'process' of experiencing and thinking, no less, no more. The Real, then, is a 'process' not a substance."[68] Thus the totality of all experience fully describes the nature of the Real. Fuller says that Hegel's reasoning had him assert "The Absolute 'is' the world-process, just as I 'am' my career. The Absolute is a 'life' and nothing more, just as I am my life and nothing more."[69]

In the evolvement of the world-career, the Absolute does not become nature and spirit, rather it proceeds to become nature and spirit through self-actualization. Hegel's concept of this evolution is constituted of the ideas of thesis, antithesis, and synthesis. That is the Absolute proceeds to become spirit and nature and evolves self realization by a series of transitions from a "state of 'in-itself (an-sich), through the state of 'out-of-self (für-sich, otherness)' into the state of 'for-itself (an-und-für-sich). The dialectic of the evolutionary movement is through the three stages of position, contraposition, and the

[63] *Loc. cit.*
[64] *Loc. cit.*
[65] Wood, *op. cit.*, p. 281.
[66] Fuller, *op. cit.*, p. 304.
[67] *Loc. cit.*
[68] *Loc. cit.*
[69] *Loc. cit.*

identity of these two or it can be said in another way," . . . affirmation, negation, and the negation of negation."[70] This basic triad of Hegel's is the substance out of which the Absolute derives its self consciousness. Bittle says that since Being and Idea are to be regarded as identical, it is by the dialectic of the logical process of becoming that the Being-Idea successively evolves from a state of indeterminateness to that of determinateness for all beings. Progressively developing into the world as nature and into spirit as consciousness. Finally all differences of being are harmonized in the Absolute Spirit. In this manner Hegel has equated the entirety of unity and plurality as well as all identity and change with the supreme self-differentiating unity of the Absolute Idea-Being. Essentially, unity is diversity and self negation and the power of negativity is that eternal compulsion for self-evolution of the Absolute. Thus, "as the final result of this self-actualization of Being-Idea, all beings and all selves are but modes and manifestations of the Absolute."[71] This means that there is no creation, for all finite things are nothing but the appearances of the expression of the self realization of the Absolute as it becomes through the process of logical necessity. For the omnitude of the Absolute Reality "all dualism between thought and things is obliterated, and man and the world possess no 'otherness' of their own : all is thought."[72]

From the cursory description of the philosophy of Hegel it might appear that his system in describing the world as only idea-in-process has great similarity to the doctrine of the Vedānta dealing with the concept of māyā.[73] It does to the extent that it recognizes that the ultimate reality of experience is beyond intellectual description, but it falls short of the realization that comprehension of ultimate reality must be of a nature different from one of its evolutes. "In fact, Hegel's own opinion about the fundamentality of Idea partakes of his tendency to this error of mistaking parts for wholes."[74] Since he has developed a "doctrine of the identity of thought with

[70] Bittle, *op. cit.*, p. 114.
[71] *Ibid.*, p. 115.
[72] *Loc. cit.*
[73] Wood, *op. cit.*, p. 282.
[74] *Ibid.*, p. 285.

the object of thought."[75] Hegel has taken the realm of prakṛti as that of the Absolute Puruṣa, for he has equated thought with consciousness and thus given it, in his system, a value equal to that of ultimate reality. Unfortunately, the Western thinkers do not seem to be able to conceive of thought as occurring within consciousness rather than being conscious.

The philosophy which is thought to be most representative of American thought is Pragmatism. This philosophy is generally accredited to William James, and was based upon several earlier efforts. Pragmatism is a philosophy which insists that mind is a part of nature and in fact is continuous with it. It regards the dualism of subject and object as false, and asserts that ideas and knowledge are merely instruments of activity and are not ends in themselves. A proposition is considered to be true only if it can be validated by direct application to practical situations. "If it works, it is true," is an over simplification of the pragmatic position on truth. For James' reality was nothing more than experience with two dimensions devoid of any transcendental depth. "It is only a flowing, extended 'surface'."[76]

Postulating a concept of truth based solely upon empirical phenomena, pragmatism does not allow for the existence of anything outside the realm of experience. Thus, the "transcendental unities of apperception, ego, souls, spiritual substances, are all out of the picture."[77] James accepted plurality of streams of consciousness. In his concept of consciousness there seems to be a certain inconsistency. He says that man has no right to go beyond experience for any metaphysical entities because of his truth theory. The existence of anything beneath consciousness is denied in this theory, yet in discussing volition and attention in relation to experience, it is maintained that the content of consciousness is not exhausted by the data immediately presented to it. All experience is continuous, without any breaks at all. It is not atomic, rather it is continually flowing, shading, coagulating and merging into things or substances. These then spill over and run into each other in both

[75] Bittle, *op. cit.*, p. 116.
[76] Fuller, *op. cit.*, p. 465.
[77] *Loc. cit.*

time and space. There is nothing which is self-contained. All phenomena are the result of the flux of ether-like "liquid 'transitive' stuff, which thickens immediately into some new 'substantive' aspect. The content of consciousness then, though infinitely multiple and varied, is 'one', not many."[78] Thus viewed, experience loses the distinctions between matter and form, substance and relation, and all experiential phenomena tumble into and are absorbed into the stream of consciousness. "The continuous, unbroken, flowing character of all experience is sufficient to account for its continuity, without invoking the intervention of a transcendent self."[79]

The individual streams of consciousness for each man are to be regarded as really currents in an ocean of experience. The obvious fact of the narrowness of normal consciousness is regarded to be the totality of the consciousness of the self. James has erred as most Western philosophers have before him. His error is in taking the content of consciousness as reality. He recognized that experience is the content of consciousness, but did not comprehend that the container has a reality which is of an ultimate nature. Pragmatism fell short of full realization of the goal of all philosophies. It did move Western thought nearer to the understanding of the phenomenal world of mind and matter. Unfortunately, the intellectual effort of the Occident has taken the means to be the end of the eternal search of man.

Another Western philosopher of import to the present study is Josiah Royce, who epitomized American Hegelianism. His philosophy is based upon an assertion that the world is ideal. This premise is based upon the fact that all that can be known "per se" is related to a mind. All that exists outside the mind of the individual exists only if it is in another mind. Royce insists that to speak of an absolute unknowable is nonsense. Further, that everything which is knowable is an idea, and as an idea it is the content of some mind. He continues, saying that a thing capable of being known by a mind is essentially ideal and mental, so that the real world must be a mind or a group of minds as differentiations of one absolute mind.

[78] *Ibid.*, p. 465.
[79] *Ibid.*, p. 465.

Royce held that since the individual cannot get beyond his own ideas, the whole of phenomena is essentially one world, thus "it is essentially the world of one self and 'That art Thou.' The self that 'means' the object is identical with the larger self that possesses the object."[80] The deeper self is the knower in unity of all truth. "There is then but one self, organically, reflectively, consciously, inclusive of all selves and so of all truth. It is the Logos, problem-solver, all-knower,"[81] Self, God, Absolute. For Royce, reality is to be thought of as a supreme mind. Royce's Absolute does not engulf the individuals for they are to be thought of as unique and essential parts of the Absolute. Royce says, "My hypothesis is that in case of Nature known as our fellow-men, we are dealing with phenomenal signs of a vast conscious process."[82] "Nature as a whole and in its specific parts is conscious."[83] The infinite and reflective Self transcends the individual consciousness and since it is all-inclusive, it is a person which is definitely more conscious than the particular individual. The Absolute Mind possesses self-reflecting knowledge, and knowledge which is aware of itself is nothing other than consciousness. Nearing the end of his book, *The World and The Individual*, Royce asserts that the individual Self may recognize that it finds fulfilment in God even while distinguishing other Selves within the Absolute. "It may be conceived then as a Part equal to the Whole wherein it dwells."[84] He closes with a statement that despite God's absolute unity, man, as an individual, preserves and attains his unique life and meaning, and is not lost in the very life that sustains him for its own expression.

Although Royce starts his system upon empirical grounds, he reflects the influence of his studies in Indian philosophy. His concept of the all-inclusiveness of the Absolute Self is very near that of the Saguna Brahma of the Vedānta. His acceptance

[80] M.M. Kaunitz, *A Popular History of Philosophy* (Cleveland, The World Publishing Co., 1941) p. 358.
[81] *Loc. cit.*
[82] Josiah Royce, *The World & The Individual*, Second Series, (New York, The Macmillan Co., 1913), p. 226.
[83] D.J. Bronstein, et al., *Basic Problems of Philosophy* (New York, Prentice-Hall Inc., 1949), p. 594.
[84] Royce, *op. cit.*, p. 452.

of the individual as an eternal mode of the Infinite Self is closely related to the thought of Ramanuja and to the Integral philosophy of Sri Aurobindo. He recognized the Self as conscious but not consciousness, and thus again remains a Western thinker rather than an universal one. Salvation, for him, was the unifying of the individual will with that of the Absolute.

Two contemporary philosophers who have taken a view which is thought to be the epitome of scientific thought are Bertrand Russell and Alfred North Whitehead. These two men have nearly the same view with respect to the concept of the self. Russell regards consciousness as nothing more than a relation. He says, "No mental occurrence has, in its own intrinsic nature, that sort of relational character that was implied in the opposition of subject and object, or of knower and known."[85] Both men feel that the nature of mind and consciousness is not an entity apart from events. All events are bipolar experiences fluctuating between the mental and the physical pole. "Consciousness is an ordering and unifying of events such that the whole appears as more than the aggregate of its parts and as a new unit of occurrence."[86] Fuller says that consciousness cannot be analyzed into a succession and collection of event-experiences, and the totality of these experiences is to be conceived of as constituting a single event. Further, since it is a single event, it is an experience of itself as well as its constituent occurrences. "It is a 'reflective' experience a report 'to' itself about itself. Our personal, individual, self-conscious minds are such events."[87] Minds are not isolated and independent of the event-experiences entering them. Mental configurations are intimately interwoven with other minds and external events. Mind knows both itself and the universe which constitutes its environment since event-experiences of other contents and conformations intersect them. "So it is that the content of 'my' consciousness is also an experience of events happening outside and independently of myself."[88]

[85] B. Russell, *An Outline of Philosophy* (London, George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1927), p. 225.
[86] Fuller, *op. cit.*, p. 492.
[87] *Loc. cit.*
Loc. cit.

But it cannot be said that 'I' exist independently of 'them' says Fuller. Rather, he continues, the content of my consciousness, that is, the consciousness of which I am 'self'-conscious contains occurrences which belong to the community of complexes of event-experiences. The "I" could be withdrawn, according to Fuller, and the other event would not be affected, but in that case they would not be "my" experience. If the other event-experiences were withdrawn, nothing would be left for the mind to be aware of, and thus no awareness to report to itself anything of itself. "Since every conscious subject is simply a unified awareness of some aspects of other events, there can be no such thing as an independently existing individual thinking subject."[89] Russell actually credits William James with having inaugurated his thought along these lines, and in fact, the description of the event-experience, which constitutes the individual, is very similar to the description of the thickening and folding of the flowing consciousness as described by James.

Essentially, the primary weakness of the philosophies of both Russell and Whitehead lies in the consistent failure to recognize that consciousness as such and the finite consciousness of the individual are not the result of mere intersection of vectors of events. James is more nearly correct in regarding the phenomena of the world as occurring against a background of consciousness which ultimately encompasses all finite consciousness. Of course the equation of mind and consciousness is ever present in Western thought.

Russell and Whitehead have rightly indicated the ephemeral character of the individual phenomenal being. The apparent rational order of the universe is counted as God by Whitehead and indicates that "the presence of a God in the structure of the Real is something that nothing and nobody, not even God himself, can account for."[90] This smacks of anthropomorphism, for it assigns the fallibilities of the human mind to the Infinite Being. This is the major weakness of the philosophies of today which follow in the general line of Logical Positivist. If the structure of the human mind can logically place events or ideas into a system, then they are logical and valid. On the other

[89] *Ibid.*, p. 493.
[90] *Ibid.*, p. 494.

hand, a concept which does not fit within the narrow limits of human logic is not rational nor logical. This error of circular reasoning has occurred because they insist on the equation of mind and consciousness, that is, they have made the part equal to the whole. The mind, according to Sāṅkhya-Yoga, is conscious, in so far as it is conscious, only because it is within the consciousness, resulting from the transcendental influence of the puruṣa.

It is to be noted that Russell, and Whitehead in so far as he propounds a similar concept, has designated his concept of the ultimate real as a neutral monism.[91] In taking the physical world as the basis of his analysis of reality, Russell has made a fundamental error according to Ross Thalheimer. That error is in the differentiation of private and non-private sub-sensations. It has been pointed out above that both Russell and Whitehead think of reality as a bipolar unity, a unity of the psychological and physical aspects of mind. Thalheimer says :

> . . . that whereas sub-sensations are 'not' qualitatively and existently dependent upon a percipient organism, images and "bodily feelings" 'are' qualitatively and existentially dependent upon a percipient organism, and that whereas sub-sensations 'obey' the laws of physics, images and "bodily feelings" do 'not' obey the laws of physics.[92]

Thus, Russell, has in reality, established not only a dualism in the area of private and non-private sub-sensations, but also in the realm of laws. He has one set of laws for the physical world and a second set for the psychological world of the mind. This, of course, would be denied by the Sāṅkhya-Yoga philosophers. Mind and the physical world are only different aspects of the same primal stuff.

Another system which is current today is that of Existentialism. As with any system, it too claims to have ancient antecedents. Emmanuel Mounier connects Socrates with Existentialism because he is thought of as having founded a doctrine of absolute morality which was based upon a conception of a type of felicity representing the good of man as man. One of

[91] Russell, *op. cit.*, p. 218.

[92] R. Thalheimer, *A Critical Examination of The Epistemological and Psychophysical Doctrines of Bertrand Russell* (Baltimore, Md., The Johns Hopkins University, 1931), p. 30.

the things which the Existentialist tends to reject is the systematization of his philosophy. Yet Mounier says there are certain concepts which tend to recur in varying degrees in all forms of the existential philosophies. He gives a description of eight such concepts.

The first asserts the contingency of the human being. This concept is based upon two questions or rather a two-fold question. They ask, why is the world a contingency of man in general and why this particular man represented by the one isolated individual asking this question. Within the Existentialist philosophies are two main branches representing the Christian or theistic school of thought and the non-Christian or atheistic school. The former answers the above question by stating that the individual's contingency draws its succour from "The original contingency of the free creative act and this contingency has a double application through the free mercy of the Incarnation and the Redemption."[93] The creative act can be defined as the absolute distance separating man from God. But this act is not a source of joy, rather it is regarded as, " . . . the misery of man without God and Divine Presence."[94] On the other hand, the answer given by the division represented by Heidegger and Sartre, would respond that "the contingency of existence no longer assumes the nature of an exciting mystery. Man is a stark, staring fact."[95] When the individual becomes conscious, he is already what and where he is in the malestrom of life.

The second concept deals with the impotence of human reason. This concept deals with the paradox of the reason and unreason of the world. It is a scepticism which is taken to such extremes as to risk bringing the world to a state of absurdity. The objective of this is to jolt "wisdom out of its complacency," and for the Christian, to reawaken the passion for the Cross."[96] The paradox is the point where the logical systems "must be expressed as a mixture of knowledge and non-knowledge, as something which stimulates investigation rather than something

[93] E. Mounier, *Existentialist Philosophies* (London, Rockliff, 1951), p. 24.

[94] *Loc. cit.*

[95] *Ibid.*, p. 25.

[96] *Ibid.*, p. 25.

which is absolutely certain."[97] It is the impotence of the mind, as reason, to transcend itself in order to comprehend itself.

At this point another concept is introduced. This third premise deals with the fact of the mind leaving itself to reach itself. It is the bounding-leap of the human being. Man's bounding-leap is the fact of his power to be which is an impulsion that makes him a "being-in-advance-of-himself." This is man's transcendence of himself. Man is self-determined, that is, he is his own existence, and that existence is what he determines it to be. Heidegger has proposed a prospective existence rather than the classical static concept of existence which is inert and determined. Sartre says that man is a "being who is not what he is and who is what he is not."[98] So it is that man cannot be properly fitted into an abstract definition and made a part of a system anterior to his existence. "His moods are not permanent possessions which he owns, but ways of living in reality, each of which in turn occupies his whole attention and carries him forward to the great adventure of being himself."[99] The implication of Heidegger's movement of being is developed into an impotence by Sartre. The impotence which is the result of "being-in-oneself" is taken to mean a type of fullness, a fullness that is a fullness of death. "Being-in-oneself is what it is in a stupid way, with no recoil upon itself and without any over-extension in advance of itself."[100] Heidegger places emphasis upon the nature of tragic urgency of the call of the future. Sartre regards time's duration as a hollow and rotten prospective. For the past is finished and present represents an eternal flight from a death which follows as close as the individual's shadow. This eternal chase has in it the promise of eternity for Kierkegaard. Not so for the non-Christian Existentialist, it is a disgraceful flight from the hostility of being.

Following this line of thought, the next concept declares that the human being is instable. Because of its prospective nature, there is a fundamental instability in the contingency of the individual which leads to a continual instability of his existence. No positive gain is achieved since it is a constant repetitive

[97] *Ibid.*, p. 27.
[98] *Ibid.*, p. 29.
[99] *Loc. cit.*
[100] *Ibid.*, p. 31.

process. The individual must continually reassume his existence, beginning anew forever. He is a frail existent, lost in the bitter ocean of infinity, and he is the weak, "lonely god without whom this spontaneous creation of myself by myself is liable at any moment to sink in the depths of nothingness."[101] In the theistic Existentialistic aspect the individual's instability is attributed to the fact that he is maintained in existence by the action of God to whose decree he is continually subject. Beneath the humdrum of every day life of every man lurks the feeling of frenzied anguish. This feeling which is constantly thrust into the background is to be thought of as including elements of seduction and revulsion as well as holding both danger and security. The feelings of frenzy and anguish are continually intersecting. These intersections create the "syncope of freedom" for Kierkegaard. These very values of freedom and choice are the twin causes of the frenzy and anguish which tend to negate their source. For Kiekegaard, anguish elicits a response similar to ecstasy. In the case of Heidegger, anguish is the result of the brutal fact of finding one's self in the world. This realization of one's being-in-the-world and of the total worldliness of the world in its purity, causes Heidegger to resign to a form of obstinate abandonment of all hope. He lumps all theories of salvation as psychological lies which have been evolved out of fear of the anguish of living for death.

In the Christian, anguish and instability are thought of as representing the ransom of his source of strength, freedom, and the right of choice. The very necessity of making a decision is the mainspring of human personality. Decision purges man of all the surface doubts which beset him as he makes the final approach to the crises which finally compel his decision. Life is a series of gambles all forming the basis of the one great gamble of death. The guiding principle in regard to this gamble is that the being must be willing to take the risk. Theistic Existentialism regards the principle of decision as having guiding value. Atheistically, they think that it is risk all and lose all.

The fifth concept deals with what is involved in the myth of the fall of man. In Christianity the separation of man and God

[101] *Ibid.*, p. 31.

is regarded as an estrangement resulting from moral evil. On the other hand, the non-Christian feels estrangement as a result of the encroachment of being on the subjective receiver.

The conclusive-finality and imminence of death is regarded as the sixth concept. Although Existentialism favours an aggressive cheerfulness, it regards man's goal as unattainable. Divine Grace will rescue the Christians, at least they hope so, from eternal death. On the contrary, Heidegger feels that there can be no completion or totalness of life. He regards death as the purpose for the existence of man. It is man's greatest potential. "My death is my most personal potentiality; it is the most authentic, and, at the same time, the most absurd potentiality."[102] Death comes not at the end of life, but is present potentially in every act of living. For Sartre, death is not to be regarded as a cheerful prospect, no matter how macabre, rather as brutally bringing an end to being as a dynamic prospect. It is a concrete concept which petrifies the being, rendering him defenceless and totally dispossessing him of all meaning.

The impossibility of communicating the experience of existence is to be regarded as the primary source of suffering for the existent. This basic isolation is the seventh concept of the Existentialist. Each being in himself is solitary and the inhabitant of a secret state from whence he cannot escape totally. The man in the relative state can, by robbing the inner secret state, manifest himself in the objective relationships of the external life. The gap in the completeness of being results in the being of human reality. This last concept, the eighth, takes this gap, not as a positive state, but as nothing. Existentialism postulates nothingness as the main fiber of existence. Sartre says that "the being of human reality cannot be classed as an ontological super addition but as a faultiness of being, as a gap in the completeness, of a being."[103] The shortcomings of the world are due to the presence of human shortcomings and the existence of desire is taken as sufficient proof of this. Life is a continual struggle toward a goal which is unattainable. Human existence is vain existence, maintaining a miserable consciousness. "The human being is never what he is, and, to an even

[102] *Ibid.*, p. 39.
[103] *Ibid.*, p. 42.

greater extent, he never is what he will be or what he wants to be."[104] The human being is always "Ahead of himself, behind himself, but never just himself."[105]

Sartre further feels that the human existence, no matter how spontaneous, is absolute deception. Attempting to objectify and inwardize this deception, reflective consciousness endeavours to reclaim the being that disappeared in the unity of a particular aspect. Since it is already an aspect, it produces a distorted reflection which enmeshes psychical life in the past. "It ascribes to the mobile and projective for-oneself a nature which is on an exposition of the in-oneself; it merely projects a lifeless shadow of the for-oneself."[106] Consciousness does not advance the existent. Consciousness is to be regarded as nothing more than a further fundamental fraud. The human state is to be equated with the analogy of the donkey and the carrot.

Existentialism has a great deal of similarity to some of the philosophies of India. It resists efforts at systematization, and it makes the individual existent the result of desire. The phenomenal world owes its existence to the projection of the spectator of the world. Despite the derogatory attitude toward the goal of Eastern philosophy, Existentialism asserts that man comes from nothing and goes to nothing.[107] Heidegger denies that this movement from nothing to nothing is comparable to what he terms Eastern nihilism. This philosophy is generally a very pessimistic school. Even the concept of hope as expressed by Gabriel Marcel is not a source of real hope. The Sāṅkhya-Yoga would agree with the Existential thinker in indicating that man's misery is due to his involvement in the world. It seems that the Existentialists have "gone and done it again," that is they consider the phenomenal being as the real being of man. They obviously are correct in regarding the human being as transitory and contingent, but they have made the fundamental error of the West and regarded pure consciousness as only an aspect of the human personality. Even the systems which appear

[104] *Ibid.*, p. 43.
[105] *Loc. cit.*
[106] *Loc. cit.*
[107] H.J. Blackham, *Six Existentialist Thinkers* (New York, The Macmillan Co., 1952), p. 97.

nihilistic in the philosophies of the Orient hold a goal which will give man release from the agonies of repeated entanglement in the world.

In summary, it can be said that the philosophers of the West have tended to skirt the fundamental truth of the being of man. The ancient thinkers were more closely akin to the thinking which is represented in India today and all the yesterdays of known history. Unfortunately, for the Occidental world, the mind of man has been taken to be the non-material aspect of man, whereas it has been almost continually regarded only as an aspect of the phenomenal being in the Orient. The confusion of the ego, the mind, and consciousness has gone on almost unabated. Only recently has a more universal spirit of philosophy begun to penetrate into Western intellectual circles. The technological reduction of the size of the world has forced some to look at the Orient. It is beginning to produce benefit to both. The so-called modern psychology is only beginning to incorporate the lessons of the centuries of introspective investigation and experimentation. Still there is a resistance to giving credit where credit is due. As the horizons of the peoples of the world are expanded, there will come a greater and greater appreciation of each culture and what it can contribute to the general well-being of the world society. Generally the philosophers of the West have been taking each of the steps that were made many eons ago in the East as the basis of their philosophies. Ultimately, the philosophies of science and non-science in the Occident will merge and find that they have not discovered a new philosophy, but have only recovered one which the older generations have misplaced. The cosmologies of modern day physics only tend to bear out the speculations made by the Sāṅkhya philosophers three milleniums ago. Psychoanalysis is basically nothing more than what the guru of old did for his followers, and its aim is the development of a fully integrated person. Essentially, the difference in progress between the Orient and Occident has been due to the direction in which the search for the fundamental answers has taken. The former taking the internal path and the latter the external path. The internal path, since it is closer to the source, has had more success in helping man to be man in the realm of values. External search has revealed many of the solutions of the

problems of understanding the man of the world. The basic problem of the present day world is to maintain the progress in both realms without creating a disbalance as has occurred in other times.

One fundamental method by which the values of both spheres of human endeavour can be made of benefit to all is by greater familiarity with each other's culture and all that it represents. The proper median of internalization and externalization must be achieved. Technologically, man has made tremendous strides in recent years. He has only begun to recognize that he has created a gigantic deficit in the realm of non-material values for man. The ever growing number of mental cases in the West is ample evidence that there is a need to look toward the peoples of the Orient for help on how they have managed to maintain such a low insanity rate. It is obvious that they are lacking, in the view of Europeans, in many of the necessities of life. Sanity cannot be dependent upon the lack of want, for the country which has the highest incident of insanity also has the highest standard of living. Eventually, the ultimate reality will be discovered by individual men, but whether it is accepted or not cannot be foretold. Truth is not provincial, only men are.

CHAPTER VII

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

THE first problem the dissertation dealt with was the historical position of the Sāṅkhya and Yoga systems of thought in the philosophical development of India. It was first pointed out that no system develops independently of the preceding intellectual accomplishments. When a group of people invade another culture, it is done with an eye to the gain they will make in their material well-being. Domination of the defeated society does not protect the conquerors from the cultural influences of their subjects. This influence works by way of personal contact with the people as well as by the use and acceptance of the products of their industries. This process of osmosis in which a subjected culture diffuses into that of its captors was indicated in some more recent Western history, that is, the military conquest of the Greeks by the Romans who later tried to be more Greek than the Greeks themselves. The reader was reminded of the process which is now functioning today in the United States of America. The stimulation of the recent wars in the Orient has drawn attention to this great cultural area of the world not only in a military and economic sense, but also in an aesthetical and intellectual sense. Contact between peoples invariably results in a change in the parties involved. The change in positive; its manifestation may be either negative or positive. The influx of art goods from the Orient indicates a tendency to appreciate art forms which heretofore had been considered as curiosities. It is felt that a process similar to the above occurred in India when the nomadic Aryans made their exodus into the land of the Indus.

Recent archaeological findings in the areas of Hārāppā, Mohenjodāro, and other sites have shown that the Aryan found

indigenous cultures of very high level when they invaded India.[1] These cultures were already very old at that time. The Aryans brought their artifacts and cultural inheritance with them. The subjected people and the Aryans co-mingled in the transaction of their daily tasks, and as they did so, an exchange of ideas took place. This exchange was not always at the verbal level. When the Aryan used the tools of the enslaved culture, he learned by imitation. Native peoples were used for domestic servants and nursemaids. The formative years of the new generation of the Aryan people were thus very much under the influence of the subjected peoples.

This influence can be traced in the literature of the Aryans. The more ancient hymns of the Vedas show the worldly philosophy of these nomadic peoples.[2] As the new life became more and more comfortable, the infusion of some non-Aryan thoughts became more and more apparent. Recognizing this trend, and in order to keep the subjected people in their proper place, the Aryans absorbed the indigenous gods into the Vedic pantheon in an inferior position. Thus, they were not only degrading the indigenous gods, but they were justifying their rule over the original inhabitants. A good bit of the ancient literature appears to be a form of propaganda to build up the ego and prestige of the less cultured and nomadic settlers.

Out of this amalgamation evolved a philosophic trend which has continued down to the present day. This basic non-verbal attitude has allowed the philosophies of present day India to flourish. So long as this attitude of acceptance permeates the philosophical efforts of the Indian and Buddhist thinkers; so long will philosophic effort have freedom to grow and bear its fruits.

A brief word was devoted to the founding of the two systems. The germinal ideas for Sāṅkhya and Yoga can be found in the ancient literature of India. The dating of Sāṅkhya as a formalized system is in the sixth century B.C. and that of Yoga as at least three centuries B.C. This is not to say that the basic philosophies of these two systems came into existence at the mentioned times. Rather, it is only to indicate the approximate

[1] Vide. supra Chapter II; Zimmer, *Myths and Symbols*, p. 92f.
[2] Vide. supra p. 19f.

time of their crystallization into formalized systems. Both schools are to be thought of as growing out of the common heritage of Indian intellectual effort, thus accounting for the similarities.

The founders of these systems are Patañjali and Kapila for the Yoga and the Sāṅkhya respectively. For some scholars there seems to be some doubt about Kapila ever having lived. For the people of India, unobstructed by excessive scholarship, his having existed and taught is unquestioned. It is more important that his teachings be understood than to waste time in bickering about a particular phenomena having or not having occurred. Essentially, the same attitude exists in respect to Patañjali, except that even the scholars acknowledge his having been a real individual. But scholars must disagree, they have raised a dispute about his proper identity. Most seem to think that Patañjali was both the grammarian and the compiler of the Yoga Sūtras.

Whether these two personalities are fictional or otherwise, their philosophies have had a profound influence in the history of thought in India and in fact in all the Orient. There are some evidences which show that this influence may have extended beyond Asia. Pythagoras and Plato are two Western thinkers who are thought to have been influenced by the Sāṅkhya, or a very similar school of philosophy.[3] Most of the current philosophies of India exhibit certain aspects of the teachings of both Sāṅkhya and Yoga. They have been greatly enlarged and altered to fit the particular system in which they have been absorbed.

Nature abhors a vacuum in any realm. This applies to the realm of ideas as well as to that of the material world. Process in nature is an eternal cycle of pulsating growth, death, and decay followed by further growth, death, and decay. The materials of growth are the basis of death, and the products of decay are the nourishment of a new growth. A new culture has its roots in the culture or cultures which it supplants.

The indigenous people of India had a rather advanced civilization when the Aryan invasion occurred. The fusion of these

[3] Edward Washburn Hopkins, *The Religions of India* (Boston, Ginn & Co., 1895), p. 559f.

two cultures resulted in the civilization which produced the Upaniṣads and the intellectual achievements which are continuing even today. It cannot be said that the philosophies of modern India are exact duplicates of the golden age of Brāhmanism. The philosophies which are generally referred to by the term of Hinduism have their roots in the ancient achievements of the society which was made up of the Aryans and the people they found in India. The roots also draw succour from the influx of the later intrusions of the cultures represented by the Moslems and Christians. The mixing of several elements in chemistry produces a compound which has properties that are different from those of its constituents. In like manner, this is the case for mixing of cultures. India's heritage goes very far into the rich soil of history, but it has a life of growth even today.

Sāṅkhya and Yoga are two philosophies which have a history that extends into the past beyond the ken of present day knowledge. They have value not only because of their age, but because they have not lost the essential ingredient of growth. This ability of ever renewing itself is the very foundation of the "enduring East." This is exemplified by the quote which constitutes the preface. The resilience and vigour of a youthful mind are the very things which are essential to philosophic growth. It is this which the West must gain anew from India. Each new surge forward in cultural and intellectual achievement in the West has come about after a dramatic encounter with the older civilizations of the East. The current development in theoretical physics can find some of its roots deeply imbedded in the philosophy of Sāṅkhya. The modern effort in the realm of psychology is in reality a revival of the introspective science of Yoga, in some cases overtly, although the majority of Western psychologists do not or would not agree with this assertion.

Next, some of the basic concepts of the Sāṅkhya philosophy were discussed and described in preparation for the understanding of the method and goal of the Sāṅkhya-Yoga psychology. The first problem dealt with in this chapter is the name of this system. Depending whether the emphasis is upon the method or the goal, Sāṅkhya is taken to mean the enumeration of the categories of knowledge or as perfect knowledge. Both are

valid and serve very well in summarizing the Sāṅkhya, for it seeks to attain perfect knowledge by the enumeration of all within the criterion of knowing.

It is demonstrated that the philosophies of India are not to be thought of as pantheistic. The weight of the evidence proves that they do not believe that the manifest world exhausts the Being of God, rather the manifest is spoken of in many places as being within the unmanifested.

Sāṅkhya has developed as a dualistic system. There are some evidences to indicate that it is not an absolute dualism. For example, the first emanation from prakṛti is the mahat which is the common source of all the buddhis that are lost in prakṛti during the state of pralaya. The duality is of the puruṣa and prakṛti. These two ultimate principles are the bed rock of all phenomenal existence. Puruṣa is the pure subject and is the transcendental source of all consciousness. On the other hand, prakṛti is the causal background of the whole objective world.

The existence of prakṛti is based upon the inferences from logic and experiences. Satkārya-vāda or the theory of causation is based upon these logical facts: (1) Activity can be directed only toward an existent object, (2) Effects are produced only by related material causes, (3) Particular effects result from particular causes, (4) The effect exists unmanifested as a potential of the efficient cause, (5) Something cannot come from nothing, (6) Cause and effect are fundamentally identical with each other in the material cause. Followed to the logical conclusion, these facts assert that the ultimate cause of the objective world is contained in the concept of prakṛti.

Both the material world and the mental world are embodied in the prakṛti. The great difficulty of Western thinkers created by the artificial dichotomy of mind and matter is never faced by the Indian thinkers. An absolute distinction is made between puruṣa and prakṛti. All the psychical aspects of man are placed within the realm of the natural world and thus available for study and understanding. The dualism of Sāṅkhya is one of the material and the purely spiritual.

Sāṅkhyan physics describes the prakṛti as constituted of three basic elements which are not absolutely distinct from one another. In fact, the description of these basic elements

corresponds very closely to the description of the ultimate reality of the material world as expressed by the modern nuclear theories. The sattva, rajas, and tamas guṇas of this ancient system of thought are essentially similar to the current concepts of the proton, electron, and neutron. Sattva and proton are similar in that they represent the basic force of order within the structure of the atomic building blocks of the material world. In the case of the electron and the rajas guṇa, the dynamic energy of the atom is the referent point. The mass of the atom is dependent upon the tamas guṇa or, in today's terminology, the neutron. The theoretic physics of the modern scientists is only beginning to delve behind these three basic elements. In reality the guṇa elements are of a much subtler nature than the atomic components. Each of these three elements, that is the electron, proton, neutron, is in all probabilities, composites of the elemental guṇas. This is an area in which there remains much research, and it constitutes another problem to which the present investigator plans to return. It is not sufficiently related to the present objective.

As the material and first cause of the world, prakṛti holds all effects whether manifested or unmanifested. The manifested includes not only the material phenomena of the world but also the mental phenomena of the psychical life of individuals. It should be noted that prakṛti holds all possible effect, and to that extent all phenomena are determined. The area of freedom is in the determination of which effect will be actualized from the infinite potential. The satkārya theory gives the Sāṅkhya a theory of evolution which differs radically from that of the West.

This doctrine of evolution, or tattvāntatapariṇāma proceeds from the highest state to the lowest, and is more properly a theory of involution. It is an aspect of the nature of the constitutive guṇic elements of prakṛti that they tend toward a state of equilibrium. In this state, called pralaya, the equilibrium produces a homogeneity which is characterless. The world no longer has an actual existence, but it is not non-existent. It is existent as Potential, and not existent in that it is not in an actualized state. Prakṛti as the first cause is composed of three component factors. These components hold the potential of all further productions in the world. All phenomena other than the

three guṇas are nothing more than the resultant product of configurational relationships of these ultimate constituent reals.

The term guṇa has at least three meanings, and in a certain sense all apply. The three meanings are quality, rope, and not-primary. The meaning of quality does not apply to the primal constituents directly, rather it applies to the reactional relationships of the guṇas. Quality cannot be possessed, they are only subjective responses to the manner in which these substances interact. The second meaning is applicable in that the three prakṛtic elements are as three strands that make up the rope which binds the puruṣa to prakṛti and her productions. Since they are not the final cause but are components of prakṛti, they are not primary. The three guṇas are sattva, rajas and tamas.

The guṇas are not abstract qualities. They are real substantive entities or subtle substances. These ultimate constituents are infinite in number. Sattva guṇa is the finest and represents the aspect of prakṛti which is most responsive to the transcendental influence of the puruṣa. This guṇa designates the intelligence-stuff or potential consciousness. Energy-stuff is called rajas, and is the very embodiment of activity. Factors of obstruction, mass or materiality are termed tamas guṇas. The variety of combinations of these guṇa factors is unlimited. The only limitation would be that which would result from the internal characteristics of the particular guṇas. Above, it was indicated that the modern concept of the structure of the atom was built upon lines which are very similar to that of the Sāṅkhya conception of the physical basis of the world. It is only a similarity, for the atom as such is quite far removed from the first cause. In the physics of this system the various guṇas may combine with one another or with themselves. Thus, two or more sattva guṇas may combine and then later combine with one or more rajas or tamas guṇa, or both. In this manner, the particles of an atom are accounted for by this contemporary, though ancient, system of thought. The electron, for example, has mass, motion, and a factor of coalescence. All three of the guṇas are present, but the rajas guṇa is in predominance. In the case of the other factors of the atom, it should more properly be said that the sattva guṇa predominates in its similarity to the proton, while in the case of the neutron, the similarity is in the predominance of the tamas guṇa. So it is that modern science

and Sāṅkhya both assert that the entire objective world is constituted of three basic substantive entities. Sāṅkhya has proceeded further than the physists of today, for it has asserted that there is but one material cause of the universe. Modern men of science are only now beginning to think in these terms.

When prakṛti is in the equilibrium of pralaya, a homostatic situation exists. The pulsation of the guṇas compensate and cancel any effect which could disturb the quiescent state. The cycle of evolvement is re-inaugurated when the prakṛti again comes under the transcendental influence of the puruṣa. The transcendental influence of the puruṣa is comparable to the influence that a magnet has upon a piece of iron. It effects the iron and causes a change in its status, but the magnet is unaffected by the reaction of the iron. Another analogy is that of the sun sending forth its rays of light in all directions and those rays effecting whatever object, such as the earth, it may strike and thus cause a reaction in the object. This relationship is one of the most difficult for the human mind to grasp. It is this problem with which Sāṅkhya-Yoga deals; in fact, most of the systems of philosophy in India deal with this problem.

As was noted above, the sattva guṇas are the most responsive of the guṇas to the influence of the puruṣa. This is due to an affinity of great similarity. The mental side of existence has a greater preponderance of this guṇa. In order to make use of the affinity of the sattva factor, it must be concentrated and the other guṇas dispersed. Evolution of the products of the world within the prakṛtic matrix consists primarily of reducing the preponderance of sattva until the comprehension of the puruṣa and prakṛti relationship becomes more and more difficult to distinguish. There is a descent from the purely mental aspect of existence to the evolvement of gross atoms which then coagulate into the great variety of physical phenomenon.

Once the dynamic equilibrium of the pralaya is broken, the guṇas undergo heterogeneous modification and the first product is mahat. The mahat is composed primarily of sattva guṇas. It is the universal mind which holds within it all the buddhis of the puruṣas. Buddhi is the individual "mind" in its broadest sense. Within each of the buddhis are the old ignorances which have been carried over through the period of pralaya. Each buddhi with its particular avidyā or ignorance re-establishes its

relationship with the puruṣa. This is an area in which there is much confusion. Does the transcendental influence of the puruṣa cause the production of the mahat which contains the buddhis of all sentient beings? Or is each puruṣa responsible for the evolvement of its own buddhi? This is the point which has divided many thinkers. The Vedānta says that there is but one puruṣa and all the multitude are but particular modes of that One. The Yoga school insists upon the multiplicity of puruṣas, but credits only one particular puruṣa with the transcendental influence to break the pralaya in order that the others might progress toward the goal of full realization. In the case of the Sāṅkhya, it is asserted that there is a plurality of puruṣas, and apparently each puruṣa breaks the pralaya in relation to itself. Some efforts have been made to make this a plurality within a generic oneness, and thus, the equilibrium would be broken by the culminative transcendent influence of all the bound puruṣas. Kapila maintained that if there were a single all inclusive puruṣa, it is outside the realm of philosophy. This is a problem which must be solved by each individual seeker for himself when he achieves the ultimate goal of Sāṅkhya.

Following the emergence of the buddhi is that of the ahaṅkāra. This term means more than mere self-consciousness or self-assertion. Ahaṅkāra means, in the philosophical sense in which it is used in Sāṅkhya, the perception of the self, but because of avidyā this became the sense of self-exaltation or egotism. Within consciousness there are three modes of the ahaṅkāra. They are sattvika, rājasika, and tāmasika forms of ahaṅkāra. The preponderant guṇa of each is sattva, rajas, and tamas respectively. Sattvika ahaṅkāra in conjunction with the rājasika ahaṅkāra give rise to the five organs of perception (jñanendriya), the five organs of action (karmendriya), and the mind or manas. Rājasika ahaṅkāra supplies the energy for the transformation of the tāmasa ahaṅkāra into the five subtle elements. These two parallel developments occur simultaneously. The rājasika ahaṅkāra functions only as the energizing factor in the development process of the other two modes. In fact, the relationship of the buddhi and the evolutes of ahaṅkāra is only a differentiation of function, and all the evolutes of the sattva evolutes are comprehended within the buddhi as differentiations and modes.

Every buddhi, with its included ahaṅkāra modes and sense, constitutes a separate microcosmos which is distinct from all other buddhi evolutes of prakṛti. All buddhis are similar in that they have a common source in prakṛti, but because of their own particular avidyā, each buddhi is individual and particularized. Both the phenomenal and epiphenomenal worlds are included within the buddhi. The buddi and all of its derivatives are of prakṛti, and thus are ultimately only configurations of the prakṛtic substantive constituent elements.

The physical side of the ahaṅkāra development first produces the subtle elements which in turn combine with more tamas units to eventually form the atoms of the various elements. These disproportionate collocations of the tamas and rajas guṇas exhibit more than mere mass and energy. They possess characteristics which are comparable to those which modern science attributes to the particles which are displaced from atoms in nuclear fission. These particles are too fine for the senses. The five tanmātras are the generic essences of the five gross physical elements. The tanmātras, after grouping and regrouping, finally achieve a configuration which is comparable to the modern concept of the atom and are called paramāṇu. The tanmātras are only potentially able to affect the senses while the paramāṇu are the actual gross matter of the world. Lest some chemists feel that the description of the five gross elements is too archaic, it must be stated that the description of gross matter as ether, air, fire, water, and earth is not a chemical analysis. It is descriptive only of the effect which the particular paramāṇu has upon the senses. The prakṛti is the infinite source of the guṇas for the evolvement of the entire world of phenomena. The paramāṇu are the final products of prakṛtic evolvement; all that follows are merely a rearrangement of these factors into enumerable new configurations and collocations.

Epistemology is based upon the assumption by Sāṅkhya that there are three discernible aspects of knowledge. These aspects are the knower, the known and the matrix of knowledge. The knower or subject is a conscious being and in reality the self. The known or object is that which the mediating intellect presents to the self. The transcendental relationship of the puruṣa and its particular buddhi with its component parts

constitute the matrix of knowledge. Valid knowledge has only three sources. Parmā or valid knowledge comes from perception, inference, and fit testimony. True knowledge must be definite and unerring.

The two kinds of perception is the result of cognition of particular objects through contact of the senses. It must be noted that the perception of mukti is distinct from sensual perception. The two sense perceptions are indeterminate and determinate. Indeterminate perception is the raw physical cognition of the senses, and the determinate perception is the result of the manas having analyzed, synthesized, and interpreted the raw sensum. Inference is also divided into two types, vīta and avīta. The former means affirmative and the latter means negative. An inference is vīta if it is based upon a universal positive proposition and conversely it is avīta if based upon a universal negative. Sāṅkhya inference is a combination of Western inductive and deductive reasoning. The third and least reliable source of pramā is that of authoritative testimony. This source must withstand the analysis of logic to be counted as valid. A reliable person or the scriptures may be sources of this type of knowledge. The basis of release from the pain and suffering of life is vidyā. Mukti is to be achieved by overcoming avidyā. Pramā is the key to mukti, if it is properly utilized.

In the listing of the six main systems of Indian philosophy, almost invariably Sāṅkhya and Yoga are linked. The similarity of these two systems is such that some have referred to Yoga as the Theistic Sāṅkhya. It is in this area that their difference has been most widely recognized, but it is not the most important point of difference. Yoga and Sāṅkhya are distinguished primarily in their approach and methodology in respect to many philosophical, ethical and practical points. There are some evidences to indicate that both of these schools are parallel developments from a common source which preceded both Kapila and Patañjali.

It would not be correct to think of Sāṅkhya as an atheistic system of thought. It is agnostic in that it refuses to recognize anything which does not fit into its logical structure of the world. It does not deny God. All that is denied is the possibility of logically proving the existence of a comprehensible

God. The God of Yoga is not a universal God, for He cannot aid or grant mukti to anyone. The most that is allowed Īśvara is the ability to use His transcendental influence to disrupt the quiescent state of pralaya. Prakṛtic activity facilitates the achievement of mukti by the puruṣas which are bound by the avidyā. Sāṅkhya feels that prakṛti has an inbuilt teleology which automatically brings the pralaya state to a temporary end, and thus, all puruṣas are of equal value and ability. Liberation is not union with God, rather it is true discrimination of the essential distinction between puruṣa and prakṛti, for both the Sāṅkhya and Yoga philosophies. The difference between the schools on psychology is more apparent than real. Yoga seeks discriminative knowledge by emphasizing psychological discipline while the Sāṅkhya strives for the same goal by way of logical analysis. Manas, ahaṅkāra, and buddhi are regarded as separate principles by the Sāṅkhya, whereas Yoga groups them all under one term and regards them only as modes of function within the citta. Yoga regards citta as all pervading in the human form : Sāṅkhya does not.

The same sources of pramā are accepted by Yoga. These three are also related to five vṛttis or mental functions by Yoga. They are the vṛttis of right cognition, illusory knowledge, imagination, sleep and memory. Yoga aims at a complete control of all of these states so that the liberating discriminative knowledge can be achieved.

Cosmologically there is one basic difference. In Sāṅkhya the tanmātras evolve out of the ahaṅkāra, but in Yoga they evolve directly from mahat. In this manner the Yoga system allows a single individual to achieve mukti without dissolving the entire world as they feel it would in the Sāṅkhya system. Both of these systems comprehended the conception of space-time, and made the expression of it purely relative to the perceiving subject.

Essentially, the basic difference between these two systems is one of emphasis. Sāṅkhya concentrated upon the logical structure of the world and thus the universal aspect of experience. Yoga directs its efforts toward the embodiment of the pramā in the life of the individual. Sāṅkhya prefers the theoretical approach, while Yoga strives to apply its science to life.

Up to this point, the paper has dealt with the constitution of prakṛti. This has been necessary because in order to understand what puruṣa is, it is essential that these two be delineated. Prakṛti is the non-self and puruṣa is the self. The great difficulty involved in discussing the puruṣa concept revolves around the fact that there are no categories of the mind which can properly apply to puruṣa. All mental constructs are of prakṛtic substance and of the relations of these substances, Because of this difficulty, the philosophers of the East have resorted to a system of negation in order to describe what the puruṣa is not. Unfortunately, this very system has created a grave misunderstanding in the minds of Western scholars. They have accused the Orient of negativism. Part of the fault lies in the fact that most of the translations of Oriental literature have been done by people who were first and foremost philologists rather than philosophers. They would accept a technical term at face value and miss its true meaning. For example, the term śūnya is literally translated as void, and this term then is used to accuse the system of nihilism. The term, in reality, does not mean that ultimate reality is devoid of existence or characteristics, rather it means that the characteristics of the absolute cannot be described in any term that is dependent upon prakṛtic sources for its validity. Puruṣa is beyond description. All that can be done is to indicate things about it and point to aspects of prakṛti which most resemble the puruṣa.

For most of the philosophical systems of India, there is no doubt as to the existence of the puruṣa. The area of doubt that exists concerns the nature of the puruṣa. Kapila indicates that even the materialists acknowledge a puruṣa, although they try to deny its permanent existence.

The self-intelligent principle, puruṣa, is distinguished from the prakṛti and its qualities. The puruṣas are isolated, neutral, intelligent, and inactive. They are many, without parts, without qualities, and do not contract or expand. When occupying a body, the puruṣa is all-pervasive and is not contained in the body in which it is manifested. The exact nature of the puruṣa must be comprehended in order to understand the Sāṅkhya and Yoga philosophies. Both systems describe puruṣa as entirely devoid of characteristics of any kind and of the nature of pure consciousness. Sāṅkhya-Yoga is not only dualistic, it is pluralistic. The dichotomy of puruṣa and prakṛti is absolute. The evident diversity of human action is cited to support their contention of the multiplicity of puruṣas.

Although the existence of the puruṣa is accepted as a fact by Sāṅkhya-Yoga, five arguments are put forward in support of its existence. This was done for the benefit of the non-believer in all probability. The first reason for inferring puruṣa's existence is the fact that prakṛtic combinations are intended for a transcendent purpose. The next, since prakṛti is of a composite nature, it cannot be resolved to an independent absolute. Thirdly, the progress of the unintelligent prakṛti must have a presiding power which co-ordinates all experiences. The fourth assertion is that there must be someone which experiences, and since prakṛti is experienced there must be the experiencer, and he is the puruṣa. Finally, since there is a tendency toward isolation-integration, and since "the eternal prakṛti's nature does not allow it to achieve a state of absolute unity, kaivalya is possible only to the puruṣa for which the guṇas are only reflexional.

At this point, the use of the term soul in the translations has been discussed. The confusion which surrounds this term because of its over use in the West was cited as sufficient cause for its discarding, but a stronger reason was demonstrated. The great similarity between the description of the linga-śarira and the Christian concept of soul was presented. These two are not of the nature of the puruṣa since they partake of the nature of prakṛti. The soul or the linga-śarīra constitutes the personality of the phenomenal individual, and that is composite and therefore not of an eternal nature. It would be more proper to use the terms spirit or self, but in reality the term puruṣa should not be translated any more than the term "elan vital."

Īśvarakṛṣṇa describes the witnessing puruṣa as isolated, neutral, perceptive, and inactive by nature. Kapila states in his aphorisms that the puruṣa is without qualities, intelligent, witness, constantly and altogether free, and indifferent. The self-luminous puruṣa within each individual illuminates all of the processes of gross and subtle matter of both life and consciousness. It will be noticed that almost all of the terms are of a negative nature. How else could the puruṣa which is without form or content, devoid of qualities and peculiarities,

beginningless, and without parts on divisions, be described? Puruṣa is the living and abiding entity which is behind and within all metamorphoses of life in bondage. It is spiritual and of the nature of sheer self-effulgent light.

If the puruṣa is of the nature of an inactive, neutral, formless, qualitiless entity, how does it become involved with prakṛti which is its absolute opposite? Further, is it able to influence the direction of the prakṛtic processes? These two problems are the eternal thorns which every dualistic system must solve if it is to have validity. For both Sāṅkhya and Yoga the answer appears to be self illusion. The false identification of the self with the prakṛtic activity is due in part to the fact that there is great similarity between the sattva guṇa and puruṣa. The resemblance of the pure intelligence (puruṣa) and the buddhi as the reflecting power of prakṛti is such that the buddhi takes on the appearance of sentience even though it is intrinsically insentient. Buddhi reflects the puruṣa to such a degree that the witnessing puruṣa seems to be viewing its own intelligence. Since the buddhi, as a product of prakṛti, is constantly in action, it reflects a distorted image of the puruṣa. The confusion results from the puruṣa believing that it is viewing its own intelligence, when in reality it is the witness of a distorted reflection. In order to remove the avidyā of non-discrimination the buddhi must be brought to the state of pralaya.

How can the self-illusion of the puruṣa come about if the two prime principles are absolutely different? In order that things may interact, they must have some properties in common. Puruṣa and prakṛti by their very nature do not have any factor in common. The relationship of these two is similar to the relationship of the God of Aristotle to the world. The unmoved mover of Aristotle moves the world merely by his being. There is no effort on his part, the effort is that of the world striving after God. In like manner, the prakṛti is activated by the transcendental influence of the puruṣa. Puruṣa is the cause of the phenomenal world only in the sense that its mere existence incites prakṛti to activity. An analogy is made between the effects of a magnet and a piece of iron. There is no contact between the two, yet the iron is caused to respond with activity. In like manner, the puruṣa by its effulgence, though

uninvolved, suffuses the non-conscious material of the world and processes of life and consciousness and, in this sense only, creates the life and consciousness of the individual. Another example of this relationship is that of the spectator of a drama who becomes so engrossed in the play that he suffers the agonies of the tragedy as though they were his own. At the end of the play, he regains the sense of his own freedom.

Fundamental to a thorough comprehension of the Sāṅkhya-Yoga philosophy are the concepts of prakṛti, puruṣa, and the relationship of the two. Prakṛti becomes manifest only after the dynamic state of pralaya is disrupted by the transcendental influence of the puruṣa. The manifestations which are assumed are the results of guṇa aggregates which are the basis of the totality of the phenomena of both the physical and psychical world. Puruṣa is of the nature of pure intelligence, effulgent, inactive, neutral and devoid of any comprehensible characteristics. Prakṛti, conversely, manifests a nature which is non-intelligent, dark, active, and purposeless. Prakṛti is similar to a puppet on a string. As long as the light of consciousness shines upon prakṛti, she performs. When the puruṣa's effulgence is turned from her, she no longer is able to perform rationally and disappears back into the unmanifest stage of pralaya. The entire multitude of puruṣas are enraptured of prakṛti in much the same manner as an audience is captured by an excellent drama. True insight occurs when the puruṣa recognizes the prakṛtic entanglements for what they are. Mukti can be realized only after the buddhi is stilled and the puruṣa discriminates between itself and its reflection from the buddhi.

What becomes of the liberated puruṣa? According to Müller, this is an improper question. All that can be said must have reference to mental constructs, and since the puruṣa is beyond the pale of even the most subtle forms of prakṛtic substance, it can only be indicated. Puruṣa returns to itself. In this state it remains free of all the bonds of ignorance or knowledge, joy or sorrow, and is unrestricted in a state of perfection.

Both the puruṣa and the prakṛti are real in the Sāṅkhya and Yoga philosophies. The relationship of these two is both the result and cause of the self-illusion which makes it appear that the puruṣa is participating in the prakṛtic cycle. The Sāṅkhya on the one hand has developed a theory of psychology to

explain the psychology of the self-illusion, while the Yoga has developed a method of applying the theory in the removal of this illusion.

The Yoga is a realistic, mystical and scientific school of thought. It is realistic in its insistence upon the reality of the phenomenal world and that a normal evaluation of the perceptions of the sense be made. It is mystical since its objective is the achievement of the abiding truth, which is beyond mental comprehension. Its method and training of the total individual is scientific, employing the best pyschological principles. Yoga is founded upon a doctrine of psychological functionalism. The relativity of all states of reality are demonstrated and made known. The inner world is known as a function of the inner psychic organs and the outer organs. Control of these energies by extension or retention frees the Yoga practitioner from all worldly bondage. Complete independence of all the pairs of opposites is the unconditional prerequisite by which control and experience of this functionalism is brought about. Once the dvandvas or psychic potencies are controlled, the bird net of avidyā is torn asunder forever. He is no longer involved with the direction or the hierarchy of the body, both physical and psychic.

The relationship of puruṣa and prakṛti is dissolved when it is recognized that the misconception of the self is in the reflected prakṛtic self and not in the self as such. This reflection is what gives the prakṛti the appearance of consciousness. Ahaṅkāra or ego-sense is the binding which seems to unite the prakṛti and puruṣa. This relationship of the puruṣa and its associated prakṛtic buddhi is of such a nature as to cause the puruṣa to regard all mental phenomena as its own experience. Non-discrimination belongs to buddhi and in bondage it is reflected in puruṣa. Final release is accomplished only when the puruṣa discriminates between itself and its reflection, no matter how accurate the reflection may be. Mukti is eternal for the puruṣa, the prakṛtic elements formerly associated with it are returned to infinite stock of the prakṛti for re-use in further evolutions of the other puruṣas which are still subject to avidyā.

When buddhi has a preponderance of the sattva guṇa, true knowledge is possible. If the preponderant guṇa is rajas, desire is the result. False knowledge occurs when the tamas guṇa is most abundant. The knower, the known, and the

process of knowing are the three factors of all knowledge. Buddhi and the rest are products for the sake of the puruṣa which is more profound than thought, feeling, or will. Puruṣa is the seat of knowledge, but the conjunction with the prakṛtic being does not alter its true nature in any way. In order that the citta or the mental apparatus may perceive an object, it must undergo a modification to the form of the object. Even though the citta is modified in assuming the form of the object, it cannot have a real perception of what it sees. It perceives only by way of the transcendental reflection of the puruṣa acting upon it. The citta is affected by both the objects of knowledge and the puruṣa. It is by the conjunction of the puruṣa that the buddhi is produced and is able to function, and since the buddhi is the internal organ which gathers and assesses the sense data, it is affected by the objective world. Citta is in constant flux, but despite this its functions are always known by the puruṣa. Citta is not self perceiving, nor is it capable of more than one modification at any one time. Release is achieved when puruṣa directs its consciousness toward itself.

Yoga and Sāṅkhya both maintain that liberation can come only through the true discrimination between puruṣa and the prakṛtic buddhi. The main emphasis of the Yoga system is on the method of attaining the state of mukti by controlling all the activities of the mind in both the buddhi and citta aspects. The objective of Yoga or concentration is the exclusion of the superficial layers of mental activity until the puruṣa is laid bare. There are many stages of concentration. The mind is similar to a field of battle. Many forces are in conflict driving the person first in one direction then another. This clash between the inner drives of man brings dissatisfaction and pain. Contentment and peace results from harmonizing these apparently opposing drives or interests. Sāṅkhya-Yoga assumes that emperical knowledge, which is the product of the erroneous confusion of buddhi and puruṣa, is the knowledge which is contained in and gained through the three sources of valid knowledge, but it can be counted only as relatively valid. Buddhi can only approximate the reality of truth for the puruṣa. In order to become totally integrated, isolated, realized, and fully matured, the seeker after the true wisdom must break the spell of absolutely everything which his mind and feelings

have ever imagined to be his own. Reality will be found through the suppression of the illusory activities and penetrating beyond the mental strata which comprises mundane life to diviner nature of man.

Yoga advances the proposition that salvation can be obtained by way of the discipline expounded in its teachings. The basic concept in this method is to move from one stage to another progressively upward toward the final stage of samādhi. The real and final purpose of philosophy, according to Sāṅkhya-Yoga is to transcend the limitations of reason in intellect.

Before a person can begin the mental discipline of the Yoga doctrines, he must become a morally healthy person. His body must be disciplined so that it will not need too much of his attention. The āsanas are designed solely to give the student a sound and healthy body so that he will be able to devote his full energies to the arduous task of gaining control of the mind. Eventually, the individual is able to maintain the attention of the mind upon a single object for an indefinite time. When this stage has been attained, he experiences the state of samādhi. This state, when sustained and entered at will, leads to mukti.

In recognition of the individual differences, the philosophic systems of India assert that there are at least four basic paths or margas which lead to mukti. These are related to the four basic types of men. The margas are not mutually exclusive. It is a matter of individual temperament as to which is to be emphasized, and allowance is made for the individual to change from one to another as his personal development progresses. The four basic margas are Bhakti, Karma, Jñāna, and Rāja. The individual's own position in relation to the goal of mukti is the prime factor in determining which of the paths should be combined or emphasized. The goal is achievable by everyone, the number of tries vary with the individual. Attainment is assured, but it is up to the individual how rapidly the state of pralaya will be brought about, and the beatific vision of the puruṣa in all its purity will be experienced by the ever abiding puruṣa.

In the examination of the self concept of several representative Western philosophers, it was discovered that the older systems more nearly approached the concept as expressed in the Sāṅkhya-Yoga. Plato describes the soul in much the same

manner as the linga-śarīra is delineated by Sāṅkhya-Yoga, and he also recognized that the soul looks beyond itself to that which is the object of all true knowledge. The truly existing essence of the soul is discussed in negative terms which are nearly identical with those used by Sāṅkhya-Yoga, colourless, formless, intangible. Plato's psychology of the soul holds a remarkable similarity to the tripartite concept of the buddhi, manas, and ahaṅkāra. The psyche or soul is constituted of noūs, thumos, and epithumia, and are roughly the equivalent of the three listed above. Aristotle, the greatest pupil of Plato, wrote an entire book on the very subject of the inner being of man. His discussion of the mode of knowing is similar to that of Sāṅkhya-Yoga. Aristotle finally states that the psyche can only be itself in its purity when it has been freed of the conditions of the world. He then concludes that the soul is nothing but lifeless matter without the immortal and eternal essence. So it is that he recognizes the shortcomings of his own intellectual efforts, and that the essentia of man is not in or of the world. It is in fact of the nature of the puruṣa.

From the time of Aristotle until the time of Descartes, there was no substantial development in Western philosophy with regard to the self concept. The real contribution that Descartes made to philosophy is more in the stimulation which he gave to philosophic endeavour. That is not to say that his efforts in philosophy were without influence, for he posed and compounded a problem, the solution of which has been the object of almost every major Western philosopher since. His first principle was that his real existence was his soul which he equated with his mind. He then compounded the difficulties thus posed, and declared that there exists an absolute distinction between mind and matter. The only connection that was allowed between the body and mind was a tenuous one through the pineal gland. From here the dilemma developed through the various philosophers so that even this tenuous link did not remain. If mind and matter are absolutely different, there can be no interaction between them. Since there could be no interaction between these opposites, Spinoza developed a system of parallelism. Occurrences in the phenomenal world were accompanied by a corresponding change in the mind of the individual so that, to all apparent effects, the person was a participant in

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the world of nature. Following Spinoza and Descartes, Leibnitz went even further and not only accepted the divorce of the mind and matter, divorced every single monad from all other monads, and in reality from the infinite source of all. Leibnitz's description of the monad is very similar to the conception of the self as expressed by the Jaina philosophy. The monad, as with the puruṣa, is beyond description and entanglement in the world. The only relationship between the monad and the world is due to the act of creation having set a pre-established harmony between the occurrences in the world and the apparent perception of these occurrences in the monad. The excesses of the rationalistic school severed the ties of mind and matter and created an opposing reaction.

Basically, there are two opposing views of reality. One says that nothing exists except as ideas in the mind, and the other asserts that there is nothing outside the physical world. Between these extremes all manner of shading and combinations can be found. All philosophical systems purport to give a description of reality. Most fall short because they try to make a part of reality the basis of the totality of reality. In the interpretation of a system, care must be taken so as not to insert more than the founder intended. Yet, this care does not deny the right and possibility of advancing beyond what the original thinker felt was the final extent of his philosophy, for new ideas and interests constantly alter the circumstance in which a particular philosophic idea may be applied.

In the systems of the empiricists can be found an interpretation of the phenomenal world, both mind and matter, which is more in accord with the findings of the ancient systems of India. Locke was primarily interested in epistemology rather than the self concept. His statement concerning personal identity comes very near the psychological description of the unity of the buddhi and its constituents. He further recognized that an individual might be more than one person. The possibility of consciousness being annexed to a single substance even occurred to him. Since his prime interest was with the mechanisms of knowledge, he did not pursue these speculations. The outcome of his work in epistemology was the doctrine of the mind conceived as a blank sheet and capable of knowing only those things which the person has sensuously experienced. All possibility of innate

ideas was denied. Locke regarded consciousness as a part of the phenomenal world. Following Locke's cue, Berkeley developed the concept of the mind and matter relationship in terms which are comparable to the mahat of Sāṅkhya-Yoga. This development moved Western thought into a new direction and away from the advanced position which Locke had brought it. Hume went even further than Berkeley and said all that can be known to exist are phenomena. The mind is nothing more than a conglomeration of different perceptions arranged in certain relationships. Hume recognized that the phenomenal personality did not represent the true inner being, but he never was able to discover the real self of man. The world is in a constant state of change and anything which is subject to change cannot be eternal. He could not see that he regarded mind as different from that which it experienced, and thus never found a satisfactory answer to the problem of the reality of man.

Even though Kant accepted the idea that the mind was blank at birth, he denied that the mind was a mere passive receptacle of the raw data of experience. The structure of the mind defined the data in accordance with its internal configurations. In this concept the mind cannot know the external world as it is in itself, nor can it know itself as it is in itself. Kant equated the ego with the eternal being in man and made consciousness an attribute of mind. His philosophy agrees with that of the Sāṅkhya-Yoga in making mind and the world of the same substance and denying the ego the possibility of knowing the real Self. Having discovered that the ego could not know the self, Kant failed to understand that the Self could know itself. By placing all that men could know in the realm of ideas, Kant set the stage for the development of the absolute of Hegel. This absolute is a unitary process. The description of the constituents of the absolute is strikingly similar to the constituents of prakṛti. It is composed of three elements which are comparable to the three guṇas. The elaboration of the absolute by Hegel is very near the evolution of the prakṛti of the Sāṅkhya-Yoga. All beings and selves are but modes and manifestations of the absolute, but these modes and manifestations are thought realized. So the totality of all experience fully describes the nature of the real. Hegel, as others, has equated thought with consciousness and in so doing gives thought the value of

ultimate reality. This is invalid because thought occurs within consciousness rather than being co-extensive with consciousness.

The pragmatism of James denies the need or existence of a transcendent self. The individual selves are thought of as only particular streams of consciousness, and as such are mere experiential phenomena which eventually are absorbed into the main stream of experience. Normal consciousness is regarded as the totality of the consciousness of the self. This conclusion was drawn from James's accepting the content of consciousness as the ultimate reality.

The American Neo-Hegelian, Josiah Royce, conceives of the absolute as an infinite and reflective self transcending the individual consciousness. Since this vast all-inclusive process is conscious, it is a supremely conscious person. Individual selves can find fulfilment, with other selves, within the Absolute. His concept of the Absolute Self is quite similar to the Saguṇa Brahma concept of the Vedānta. Royce conceived of the Self as conscious but not as consciousness. Salvation consists in the unification of the will of the individual with that of the Absolute. In relation to the Sāṅkhya-Yoga, the will is an attribute of mahat which is an emanation of prakṛti. So Royce remains a true Hegelian.

Whitehead and Russell express a philosophical position which is taken to be synonymous with that of contemporary science. They regard consciousness as nothing more than a relational character which is implied in the opposition of subject and object, or of knower and known. The nature of mind and consciousness is not an entity apart from events. All events are of a bipolar nature fluctuating between the mental and physical pole. Consciousness is to be taken as the unity and order of the bipolar experiences which appear as more than the whole. Thus, they regard every conscious subject as a mere vector point or intersection of event-experiences, and since consciousness is simply a unified awareness of some aspects of other events, there can be no independently existing individual thinking subject. The philosophy of Russell and Whitehead, in the light of the Sāṅkhya-Yoga, manifests a basic weakness in its failure to recognize that consciousness as such and the finite consciousness of the individual are not the result of mere intersection of vectors of events. The root of this

failure is in the complete faith in the efficacy of human logic. Logical Positivists insist that only those ideas which can be placed into a logical system are to be counted as valid. Such a system of thought cannot account for nor acknowledge the fact that the whole is greater than the sum of its parts. Any concept of the transcendental influence of the true self acting upon the substance of the phenomenal world cannot fit into such a system, although the system could and does have a proper place in a more universal mode of thought.

Another contemporary philosophy of today is existentialism. It refects efforts to systematize its thought, and regards the individual existent as the result of desire. The phenomenal world owes its existence to the projections of the spectator of the world. Man comes from nothing and goes to nothing is the consensus of existentialist thinkers. Sāṅkhya-Yoga would agree with them because what they have described as man is the ahaṅkāra or the ego, and its very existence is the embodiment of desire. Obviously they are correct in regarding the human being as transitory and contingent.

From the perspective of the philosophy of Sāṅkhya-Yoga the self concept in the West seems still inadequate. Various systems of philosophy have propounded self concepts which have all failed to shake the dilemma which Descartes posed for them. Fundamentally, since the inception of the dichotomy of mind and matter in the Western thought, all efforts have attempted to balance reality either on one or the other horn of the dilemma or to precariously perch on both. The problem has been and still is an illusion in light of recent evidence in the field of psychology, physical science, and the studies of comparative philosophies. The ancient Greek thinkers were more in accord with what has been philosophical fact for the philosophers of India for almost three milleniums. There is no real difference between mind and matter. Both are compounded of the same ultimate constituent units. These units are the basic building blocks of all phenomena, whether it be physical or psychological. In the systems of Sāṅkhya and Yoga they are called guṇas and in the West they could be termed quanta units. Essentially, the same concepts are designated by the terms sattva, rajas, and tamas as by the more modern terms of cohesiveness, energy, and mass. The mode of physical

evolution is almost identical in modern theoretical physics and in the physics of the Sāṅkhya. Both systems assert that the ultimate reality of phenomena is one, unitary, ultimate, and enduring. The scientists of today have discovered that there is a segment of reality which does not conform to the regular laws of physics. In other words, there is an area which is not subject to the laws of cause and effect.[1] With regard to the modern concept of space-time the scientists of Sāṅkhya-Yoga indicated long ago that this is only a relational situation of the prakṛtic evolutes, and has no ultimate and abiding reality. Modern psychological theories are finding that a great deal can be learned from the teachings of the Yoga philosophy. Once a real recognition of other cultural traditions is made, a mutually beneficial exchange of ideas and techniques can be fruitfully achieved.

The peoples of the Indian sub-continent have only recently begun a real renaissance of their heritage. It is to be hoped that they will not make the mistake of dwelling too much on their past glories and thus remain stagnant. In either East or West, the lessons of the ancients should be examined and utilized, but they must be adapted to the present world. Since the time of the crusades, the West has been infused with a sense of urgency which has gained in momentum to the point of foolhardiness. At first the effort was to catch up with the more learned and advanced cultures of the East, then the drive became one for superiority of Eastern material wealth rather than a balanced and well rounded growth. The East rested on its laurels, and the laurels withered.

The advanced concepts of theoretic physics which are contained in the Sāṅkhya and the demonstrated psychological theories of Yoga are sufficient proof that there is a great deal which the West can and must learn from the philosophies of India. Technology of the West must be used to aid the peoples of Asia raise their standard of living, but both must not lose the ground which they have gained, for the one is not of value without the other. One of the basic teachings of Patañjali is that the āsanas should be practised only to enable the individual

[1] Lincoln, Barnett, *The Universe and Doctor Einstein* (New York, Mentor Book, 1952), p. 37.

to proceed with his studies without the interference of an unhealthy and dissatisfied body. Excessive concern for the health and welfare of the body is to be frowned upon. Equanimity cannot result from its negation. An unbalanced effort is likely to defeat its own purpose.

The study has presented some of the principles of two philosophic systems of India. Both the Sāṅkhya and the Yoga, in the light of modern research, have very valid and applicable concepts for all peoples. The ancient remonstration of "know thy self" is the heart of both of these systems, but they offer more than just a goal. Not only is the goal presented, but a map is laid out and directions are given on how to achieve the greatest of all treasures. To secure the benefits of any valid philosophy, it must be applied to the individual's life, but it must not be distorted in the adaptation to the individual needs. Life is dynamic and when its many facets are harmonized, mukti results. Prakṛti returns to her unmanifest state and the puruṣa is freed from the attachment to the transitory prakṛtic being.

In the state of pralaya, prakṛti waits in dynamic quiescence to once again manifest itself for the benefit of the puruṣas which have not yet turned from the avidyā caused by attachment to the prakṛtic dance. The puruṣa cannot achieve mukti, for it has, in reality, never lost it. It is simply a matter of realizing itself in its pristine purity which re-establishes the eternal distinction between the products of prakṛti and its constituent elements and the puruṣa. The puruṣa or self is pure consciousness which infuses the prakṛti with apparent consciousness by its transcendental effulgence. The self is beyond intellectual description and distinction, but it is not beyond realization by itself. Once the puruṣa has realized its eternal self there can no longer be the avidyā attachment to the non-self. It is free to participate by its presence or to withdraw into complete integration-isolation.

The self concept of the Sāṅkhya-Yoga defines puruṣa as pure consciousness devoid of any humanly comprehensible characteristics. These systems do not regard the puruṣa as beyond existence. Rather, puruṣa is beyond the ken of finite being. In the West, the self concept has become entangled in the dilemma of a misconception of the distinction of mind and matter. At

present, the validity of the systems of Sāṅkhya and Yoga is being verified to a great extent by some of the modern developments in the realms of physical science, psychology, and in philosophy as discussed above. Intellectual recognition of the fact that all phenomena occur only in the light of the pure consciousness is of no value unless this knowledge is acted upon. Once the barriers to cultural communication have been dispersed, intellectual appreciation can occur and this will make it possible that this knowledge can be acted upon. Mere familiarity with the system and the method of application is no guarantee that the fruit of the system will be received. There are many paths available, but they are of no value if the necessary effort is not made. Each individual is his own past, present, and future, and they are the products of his own making.

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